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ART. I. — *Admonitions to Protestants*. Introduction. "*Quærite ergo primum regnum Dei, et justitiam ejus, et hæc omnia adjicientur vobis.*" — S. Matt. vi. 33.

Is it not strange, my brethren, that the great primary questions, whence we came, why we are here, and whither we go, — questions which we must answer, or have no rule of life, and be compelled to live as the beasts that perish, — should be regarded by large numbers of you, who believe yourselves to constitute the more advanced portion of mankind, as unsolved, if not, indeed, as unsolvable, problems? Is it reasonable to suppose the race has subsisted six thousand years, and, as many of you would fain persuade us, much longer, on this globe, with these problems unsolved? Is it true that no light has ever dawned on our origin and destiny, — that we are placed here with darkness behind us, darkness before us, and darkness over, around, and within us? If not, as it cannot be, how happens it that so many of you find your minds filled with doubt and anxiety, that you feel that nothing is settled, that all is loose and floating, and in the bitterness of your hearts, from the depths of despair, you are calling upon all nature, upon the heavens and the earth, the living and the dead, and some of you even upon hell itself, to disclose to you the secret of your origin and destiny, and to determine for you the rule of life and the purpose of existence?

My brethren, you need not seek far for the cause. It is nigh you, and plain before your eyes, if you will but open them. Your ministers, whom in an evil hour you preferred to the priests of the Most High God and the consecrated pastors of his people,

have misled you ; they have turned your faces away from God, and caused you to lose sight of the truth he has graciously revealed for the instruction and consolation of men. They have given you their words for his, the chaff for the wheat, a faint and mutilated shadow for the substance. By casting off authority, and substituting in its place what they term private judgment, which is necessarily followed by interminable disputes, innumerable sects, divisions, and contradictions, they have made, for you, what was clear and certain in the Word of God dark and doubtful, religion a weltering chaos of discordant elements, the noble science of theology an unmeaning jargon, and piety a reproach. Their utter inability to agree among themselves on a single positive doctrine, their variable and incoherent speech, their sectarian wrath and bigotry, fierce contentions, arrogant claims, pretended faith, yet obvious doubt, boasted interior illumination, yet undeniable and often deplorable ignorance, have disgusted men of sober practical sense who know no other teachers, sowed in their hearts the seeds of universal skepticism, and induced them to look upon all religion as a cheat, and all pretensions to divine revelation as ridiculous and absurd. It is thus they have darkened your minds and perverted your hearts, cast you down from the high heaven of God's grace, robbed you of the supernatural riches bestowed on you by your Heavenly Father, wounded you and left you half dead in the streets, as did the robbers the man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho.

It is not presumed, my brethren, that your ministers in the outset intended to bring about the deplorable state of things of which they as well as you are the victims. Men rarely, if ever, will evil for the sake of evil ; they will it for the sake of the good they hope to obtain from it. Eve did not suffer herself to be seduced by the Serpent, for the sake of bringing sin and death into the world ; she did it that her eyes and those of her race might be opened, and that men might be as gods, knowing good and evil, that is, as God knows them, without being obliged to learn them from the law or command of a superior. Yet none the less did sin and death follow her act of disobedience, and become the painful heritage of all her posterity. " There is a way which seemeth just to a man ; but the ends thereof lead to death." Prov. xiv. 12. The early Protestant ministers, the Reformers as you call them, it is to be presumed, had no wish to introduce evil for the sake of evil ; they may have verily believed their movement compati-

ble with Christian faith and morals, and even that it was wise and necessary in order to preserve our holy religion in its purity, integrity, freedom, and vigor; yet are they responsible for the fatal consequences of that unlawful movement. They might, and should, have foreseen them. They knew that they acted against legitimate authority, on their own private judgment; they were distinctly warned of the unlawfulness of their act, and of the consequences which must inevitably follow, and with ordinary prudence they could not have failed to foresee them. The arguments which they were obliged to use, in order to defend their movement, their revolt from the Church and rejection of her teaching, are precisely, in principle, the arguments which a Voltaire uses against divine revelation, and a D'Holbach against the existence of a God; while those by which they defended and must defend, if they defend it at all, their principle of private authority are precisely those by which the Rationalists undertake to establish the sufficiency of reason, and Transcendentalists, that human nature is the ground and measure of truth and goodness, as has been demonstrated to you, perhaps a hundred times over, by some of your own ministers themselves.

It is conceded that your ministers have written several able and learned works against unbelief, and in defence of religion; but in these works they have only borrowed Catholic principles and arguments, conclusive when urged by us, but of no practical value when urged by them, because practically denied and refuted by their position outside of the Church, and by the other principles and arguments they must adopt and urge in their own defence. Actions speak louder than words. The rebel chief, in arms to overthrow his lawful sovereign, cannot preach loyalty with much effect. His practical disloyalty more than neutralizes his speculative loyalty. The practical rejection of Catholicity by your ministers necessarily does more to spread infidelity and licentiousness than any Catholic principles and arguments they may urge can do to arrest their fatal progress.

It is certain, and the experience of three hundred years has proved it, that Christianity is defensible only on Catholic ground, and every attempt to defend it on other grounds has failed. Philosophers have tried to defend it on philosophical grounds, but in doing so have only reduced it to a philosophy. Rationalists have attempted to do it on the ground of reason alone, and have obtained only the same result. Socialists and

progressists attempt to do it on humanitarian principles, and have only reduced it to a system of humanityism, which is pure egotism, pure socialism, pure pantheism, or pure atheism, according to the point of view from which it is considered. A religion which emanates from a supernatural source, and which is intended to be authoritative for man, cannot be defended on grounds which recognize no authority that does not emanate from man himself. That which is subject to man, controllable by his reason or will, is not authoritative for him, and, instead of giving the law to him, receives it from him. The very moment, then, that one of your ministers undertakes to defend Christianity, not as a philosophy, not as a system of rationalism or of socialism, but as a religion imposing the law on man, on both his reason and his will, which he must obey in thought, word, and deed, he must recognize and defend the principle of authority. It is so in the nature of things. But as a Protestant he must either deny this principle or condemn himself; for as a Protestant he is obliged to protest, not simply against this authority or that, but against authority itself. When he objects to the Church, it is not so much what she teaches, as her authority to teach. Many Protestants do not object at all to Catholic doctrines, if they may believe them for other than Catholic reasons. There are men in our own day who reject the Roman Catholic Church, and yet boast that they hold "all Roman doctrine." You all profess dogmas, when you profess to believe any thing at all, as difficult to reason as any of the Catholic Mysteries. You even contend for a church, a *catholic* church too, and find it very reasonable, in case it is an abstraction, an ideal thing, claiming and able to exercise no authority over the individual judgment and belief. When your ministers object to certain doctrines and practices of the Church, it is chiefly because they wish to break down her authority; not because the doctrines or practices themselves are felt to be intrinsically so very objectionable. It is clear, then, that it is to authority, in a word, to an authoritative religion, to what Christianity must be, if a religion at all, that your ministers as Protestants must object. It is equally clear, then, that whenever they undertake the defence of Christianity, and offer any thing solid in its defence, they must abandon the Protestant ground, and take the Catholic ground, the ground of authority. If we examine the defences they have written, those which have really contained something to the purpose, we shall find that they have uniformly done so.

But such defences from your ministers amount to nothing, because they practically, and, when defending their Protestantism, speculatively, deny the soundness of the principle on which they rest, and from which they derive all their force. It is therefore that, though they have written able and learned works on the evidences of Christianity, they have never been able to arrest for a moment the progress of their movement towards unbelief and immorality. In vain do you attempt to prevent the disciple from pushing the principles of the master to their last logical results. No form of Protestantism has ever been able to remain for any length of time what it was in the outset. The principles which the Reformers asserted against Rome were not slow to develop themselves in the very lifetime of the Reformers themselves. Both Luther and Calvin, as the movement went on, were carried farther than they originally intended to go, and were obliged to modify their views more than once. The last days of Luther were spent in battling against those who were for pushing his principles to a logical extreme, from which he recoiled. It is always, therefore, at a terrible disadvantage that the Protestant minister reasons against unbelievers. They can always reply,—“If you believe what you say against us, why are you Protestants? Why do you not follow it out, and return to the Church? If you hold that the grounds on which you separate from the Church are legitimate, why do you object to us for proceeding on them? If private judgment is authority for you, why is it not authority for us? If on its authority you may legitimately separate from the Catholic Church, why may not we on its authority legitimately separate from yours? If your principle is sound for you, it is as sound for us, and no principle is sound which may not without error be pushed to its last consequences. If the consequences are false, the principle is unsound.” This reply is conclusive. The Protestant never has rejoined and never can rejoin any thing solid against it.

But your ministers, my brethren, have not only not been able to offer on their own principles any solid defence of religion, but, by borrowing and misapplying our principles and arguments, they have made its defence, even by Catholics, much more difficult than it would otherwise have been. The evil they do by their writings against us is small in comparison with the evil they do by their writings in defence of Christianity. They are far more formidable as allies than as enemies. The weakest Christians are in general able to protect them-

selves against Satan when he appears to them in his own proper character, undisguised ; it is only when he comes to them in the guise of an angel of light that their danger is imminent. Evidences of Christianity by Protestant ministers are a byword among yourselves. There are few of you who do not feel that on Protestant principles they establish nothing. You see that from your stand-point they are inconclusive ; — why, then, you ask, not from ours ? why shall the same principles and arguments, which, urged by Protestants, are obviously inconclusive, be held to be conclusive when urged by Catholics ? The reason is not apparent to all ; and as you have in the outset a strong prejudice against us, and have settled it in your own minds that our Church is false, the principles and arguments your ministers borrow from us are regarded by you as inconclusive because you easily see that they are as strong for us as for religion itself. If they conclude any thing for your ministers, they conclude too much. You thus imbibe a strong prejudice against them, and will not give them their due weight when we urge them. The habit of rejecting them when urged by your own ministers leads you to reject them when urged by us. “ Our ministers,” you say, “ have said all that. Give us some reasons and arguments which they have not adduced.” This is not always easy to be done ; because those which they have adduced are ordinarily those which are nearest at hand, and such as you are least able to appreciate. Those which they have not urged are more recondite, require more research, and a patience of investigation, and habits of close and rigid reasoning, which are not to be expected from the majority of you. Your ministers have borrowed our readiest arguments, and by so doing have in some measure unfitted them for our use.

Your ministers have also thrown doubt and distrust on all Christian experience, and rendered appeals to it of little use. In vain we tell unbelievers of their need of religion, of their nothingness without it, and of the peace and ineffable repose of the believer, the consolations they will receive when once they believe, the joy and gladness which will crown their lives. Have not Protestant ministers told them and promised them the same things, and deceived them ? The alleged experience of Catholics in all ages and nations, which on every principle of moral evidence ought to count for something, excites in them only a smile of incredulity, or pity for our weakness. Do not Protestants tell the same story ? Why shall we trust

you rather than them? They, we know, only deceive or delude; and why not you? Men have trusted your ministers and found themselves deceived, and now they will trust no one, not even the Almighty God himself. See what your ministers have done! They have thrown so much false coin into circulation, that you will no longer believe that there is any circulating that is not false.

One thing is certain, my brethren, that your ministers have deceived you, and have in no instance kept their word to you. For what did you rashly consent to follow them? What did they promise you? Was it to lose all religious faith, to be replunged into the darkness and corruption of heathenism, to be reduced to the world of time and sense, and to despair of all but mere earthly goods, that you listened to them, and consented to follow their lead? No, by no means. Nor was this what they promised you. They told you that the Church had lost her first love, that she had been unfaithful to her heavenly Spouse, that she was corrupt, rotten, and could not be touched without defilement. They called her Babylon, and conjured you by your love of the truth and purity of the Gospel to come out of her, to drink no more of the wine of her fornications, or partake of her sorceries. They promised, if you did, that you should have pure Christianity restored, a *reformed* church, reconstructed on the primitive model, into which nothing unholy or unclean should enter, in which the pure word of God should be preached, and the pure ordinances of God's house should be kept and observed. They promised you a revival in your midst of the work of the Lord, as it were a renewal of his covenant with men. The restored Gospel was to have free course and be glorified; all the ends of the earth were to be converted; and you were all to be of one mind and one heart, filled with love and peace, abounding in faith and in good works as its fruits. This is what they promised you, what you looked for, what you followed them for. Have they kept their word? Have you obtained what they promised?

My brethren, you have given your ministers full three hundred years to make good their promises, full three hundred years for their experiment; surely a long time enough for them to succeed, if success were possible. Look around you. Where are you now? Of all that was promised you, that you expected, what have you obtained? You were promised a pure, holy, and living evangelical church; have you obtained it? Which of your thousand and one jarring sects is it?

You were promised the pure, unadulterated word, the true and most holy faith once delivered to the saints ; which of your thousand and one contradictory creeds is it ? Are you agreed as to what are the true ordinances of God's house, what is their right administration ? Have you found peace and unity ? Have you found the necessary helps against temptations, and aids to virtue ? Alas ! my brethren, these questions must seem to you cruel mockery. You know, you deeply feel, that it is not so. You have gained nothing of what was promised you. You have spent your money for that which is not bread, and your labor for that which cannot satisfy you. You have wasted that portion of your Father's goods which you took with you when you left his house, travelled into a far country, and set up for yourselves. Your faith is gone, leaving you not even so much as a philosophy ; your hope is turned into disappointment ; your charity is become a weak and watery philanthropy ; and your zeal for God has lost itself in zeal for the world. You have no unity, no compactness ; your doctrines vary with each individual teacher, and, when nominally the same, scarcely any two can be found who hold them in the same sense ; your minds are perplexed, your hearts sad, your passions fierce and ungovernable ; and you no longer know what to believe or what to do. This is the way in which your ministers have rewarded your confidence, in which they have kept their promises !

In vain, my brethren, would you deny it. Look to the classic land of the Reformation, where Luther thundered his innovations, and Melancthon with gentler feelings polished and defended them. Where do you find your pure evangelism ? Is it in the all-absorbing Rationalism, Transcendentalism, or Humanityism, — impious *isms* more revolting to sober sense than the late Philosophism of France ? Look at Geneva, where Farel preached, and Calvin legislated. Do you recognize the pure word of God you were promised in the hardly baptized Deism discoursed from the very pulpit of Calvin, and which even Rousseau would have disdained ? Look at Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Scotland, England, and, alas ! you behold your beloved Protestantism sinking down, down to a lower deep, — into the bottomless abyss of nothingness. In this good city of Boston, the Geneva of America, once the paradise of Protestant ministers, where find you your *reformed* church, your pure evangelism ? Is it in the Melodeon and Ritchie Hall ? Cambridge, once your boast, has passed over

into Nihilism ; and Andover, raised up to atone for her defection, follows close upon her heels. Each day new reformers emerge with fierce tones, bold speech, and animated gestures, to accuse their predecessors of having stopped short of the mark. The vanguard of yesterday is the rearguard to-day. A novelty is hardly announced before it is antiquated ; there is no interval between birth and old age, the cradle and the grave. Each moment you find the old ground giving way under your feet, and yourselves obliged to spring for your lives for some new ground, which will give way in turn the next. Alas ! my brethren, you have nothing solid on which to stand, you have no fixed residence, no spot to call your own. Home and fire-side are not for you. Ever since, at the bidding of your ministers, you spurned the Church of God, and withheld your charity from her Spouse, you have been doomed, like the "Wandering Jew," to wander on, seeking rest and finding none, — to live that you might reap, not life's blessing, but life's curse.

You boast, indeed, of progress, — and progress you certainly have made ; but, my brethren, in what direction ? As Protestants, you have cast off authority, have asserted private judgment, and gained the right to select, teach, and govern your teachers, and this you call progress. The Unitarian rejects the mysteries of faith, makes his Redeemer a man, a creature, that is, no redeemer at all, and it is — *progress* ; the Universalist has cast off the fear of judgment and hell, asserted that after death it fares as well with the incorrigible sinner as with the saint, perhaps better, and it again is — *progress* ; the Liberal Christian discards all creeds and confessions, asserts, virtually at least, the indifference of truth and falsehood, and therefore of right and wrong, and behold ! what marvellous *progress* ! But see you not, my brethren, that your progress is a progress in casting off, in denying, in losing ? In what consists it but in a more and more complete rejection of the supernatural order, and in reducing yourselves nearer and nearer to natural indigence and nudity ? Your positive gain, admitting all that you even claim, consists solely in the increased facility of acquiring mere earthly goods. In politics, you have effected changes by which a mushroom moneyed aristocracy may supplant the old hereditary aristocracy ; in the industrial world, you have introduced steam-engines, steamboats, railways, spinning-jennies, power-looms, and an endless variety of labor-saving machinery, by which you seek to evade the original

sentence, that man should gain his bread by the sweat of his face ; but all, be it more or less, is progress only in relation to the goods of this world, and undeniably tends only to draw off the affections from God and heaven, from the spiritual and eternal, and to place them on the things of the earth, the sensual and the perishing.

Turn the matter over as you will, my brethren, this much is certain, your ministers have deceived you, and your grand Protestant experiment, as a religion, has proved a failure. It has established nothing ; but it has unloosed every thing, and made all in religion as variable and transitory as human passion and caprice. It is no contradiction of this that some few among you may still hold up your hands in horror at the audacity of the younger and more adventurous members of your party, and still cling with a death-grasp to some of the dogmas retained in name by the early Reformers. There is no party among you that believes in all things as Luther, as Calvin, as Zuinglius, as Cranmer, or as the Socini taught. There is not one of your sects that does not depart widely from the doctrines of its founder ; nay, there has been no founder of a sect among you that has steadily adhered from first to last to his own doctrine. So certain and so evident is this, that you erect variation in doctrine into a principle, and boldly defend, under the name of progress, the founder of a sect in departing more or less from himself, and his followers in departing from the formulas he sought to establish. Finding that nothing among you is fixed and permanent, you boldly contend that to be fixed and permanent is a demerit, and that the merit is in being movable and transient.

It is not denied, that many of you may still retain a vague notion that there is a real, substantial Christianity distinguishable from the Church, that faith and hope and charity may be possessed out of her communion, and that Rationalists, Transcendentalists, and Humanityists depart from the original principles of Protestantism, and may be rejected for Christian reasons, without any thing being implied in favor of Catholicity. But these sects tell you, and they tell you truly, that they have only developed Luther and Calvin, and maintain only what was really meant or logically implied in their movement ; and when you see that movement, in every land where it has been free to develop itself, resulting in the teachings and practices of those sects, you cannot reasonably doubt what they tell you. You must not imagine, my brethren, that you retain the Christian

faith, because you may still profess to believe some of the Christian dogmas. The test of one's orthodoxy is not in his professing to believe orthodox dogmas ; for to be an orthodox believer, we must not only believe the orthodox doctrine, but we must believe it for an orthodox reason. He who believes all the articles of the creed, if he believe them as a philosophy, is no Christian believer, and if for a Transcendental reason, he is nothing but a Transcendentalist. The character of our faith is determined by its *formal*, not its *material*, object. Hence there are individuals who profess to believe the whole material object of Catholic faith, who nevertheless have no Catholic faith, no Catholic thought, even ; because they do not believe it for a Catholic reason.

It does not therefore follow, my brethren, that those among you who may flatter themselves that they retain some portion of the Christian faith, because they profess some of its dogmas, are distinguishable at all generically from the non-evangelicals, as you call them, and avowed unbelievers. Evangelicals, non-evangelicals, and avowed unbelievers, all assert the same formal reason of belief, that is, belief on private judgment, or human authority, and are therefore radically indistinguishable. Out of the church which is commissioned by Almighty God to teach, you do not and cannot embrace Christian doctrine as Christian ; you do and can, unless an express revelation is made to you individually, embrace it only as a philosophy, or as a human opinion, because you have for embracing it only human motives ; and therefore in embracing it, even if you define it in the very terms of the Nicene creed, you are really unbelievers, just as much so as if you did not profess to believe it at all.

Have you not observed, my brethren, that a striking change has taken place in relation to the controversies which you formerly carried on among yourselves ? In former times there were among you fierce and obstinate dogmatic wars ; creed was arrayed against creed, and dogma against dogma. The Consubstantialist and the Sacramentarian stood mutually opposed, each hurling his anathemas directly in the face of the other ; the Trinitarian Protestant sought to establish his dogma *against* the Socinian, and the Socinian his *against* the Trinitarian ; the Calvinist insisted on his "*decretum horribile*" against the Arminian, and the Arminian on his free will and unlimited grace against the Calvinistic election and reprobation ; the professed believer attempted to defend revelation, and the un-

believer attempted its direct overthrow. There is little of all this among you now. The king of Prussia, by his royal edict, unites Lutherans and Calvinists in the same communion, permitting each party to retain its peculiar dogma, and the great body of both find it admirable. Schleiermacher professes to accept all the symbolical books of the Lutherans, and maintains in a grave discourse that one may have all that is essential in the religious belief and life, without believing even so much as the personality of God, or a future state of personal existence. The Neologists generally accept the old dogmata, and seek only to explain them. Unitarians are found who sing the Nicene creed as a part of their religious service. Your philosophers no longer directly oppose the faith; they make a boast of accepting all Christian doctrines. All religious doctrines which have ever been believed, say they, are symbols, conceal great truths; and they only seek to interpret the symbol, and to prove philosophically that which they suppose to be symbolized. Whence comes this significant change? Why has your old internecine warfare been brought to a close? Simply, my brethren, because the modern enemies of Christianity have discovered,—and this is a progress they have made,—that it makes nothing against them that the matter of the Christian faith is professedly believed, so long as it is believed only for a human reason; and that there is no radical difference between men, so long as they really believe or disbelieve on the same ground, however diverse the matter they believe or disbelieve. The ground of belief with you all is undeniably human. You are, then, really, whatever some among you may sometimes persuade yourselves, all in the same category, unbelievers, deprived of all religion, reduced to the nakedness of nature. What you call your religion is no religion; it is a human affair, and pertains only to the life of nature.

Here, then, you are, my brethren, after three hundred years of trial with an open field and fair play. You have had wealth, power, learning, talent, genius, and laborious application; what you have not been able to do with the means at your disposal, and in the three hundred years you have had for your experiment, you must see it is in vain for you to hope to do hereafter. What men, out of the Church, taking the Bible and private judgment or a humanly constituted authority for their rule, can do, you have done. Greater or more learned men than you have had you cannot expect. New discoveries you cannot make; and if you could, what in the mean time is

to become of the millions who live and die, before your new prophets arise, your new teachers come to disclose the true way of salvation? But you are making no new discoveries, nor advancing towards them; your new reformers only revive exploded theories, and reproduce what the old heretics or the old pagans had long ago tried and found worthless. Hope, then, nothing better from your Protestantism than you have already attained to. It is not in the nature of things that you should attain to any thing else. Every movement has its law of development, from which no human power can withdraw it. You see, and know, and feel, to what result the inevitable developments of Protestantism tend. Thither you must follow, or prove false to your own principles; and you are Protestants no further than you do so. A progressive religion, if the term may be used, must be ever changing its formulas, and they only truly adhere to it who change their formulas with it. It is the boast of Protestantism, that it is progressive. Luther, and Calvin, and Cranmer, and Socinus saw a portion of the truth, but they saw not the whole; and to be true to their spirit, we must not stop where they did, and refuse to accept the new light which dawns upon us. They did not break the fetters of Rome to forge new fetters of their own. No. Their movement was a movement in behalf of liberty. They emancipated the human mind, and conquered for it the power to advance; Protestantism is the religion of progress. So you hold it, my brethren, and, as such, you hold it up in contrast with the invariableness and immobility of Catholicity. Your great objection to us is, that we hold the mind to a fixed form of doctrine and worship, — chain men, as you express it, to a dead past, and will not suffer them to go forward to a living future. You, then, are Protestants only as you advance with the Protestant movement. You deny the legitimacy of that movement, condemn it and yourselves, whenever you linger behind with the old formulas it outgrows or casts off. It is, then, absolutely impossible for you, if faithful to your Protestantism, not to be reduced to nature, to this world alone, to satisfy yourselves as best you may with such goods as it offers. To look beyond it is for you an in consequence, a folly.

But, my brethren, you cannot be ignorant that it is not in human nature to be satisfied with the goods of this world. Universal experience proves that you may possess all this world can give, and yet look round and sigh for what you have not, and to be other than you are. Riches do not enrich.

Our views of what it is to be rich expand with our accumulations, and the distance between what we have and what we desire to have is ever widening. Wishes gratified give rise to new wishes ; for every desire satisfied, a dozen new and more inordinate desires spring up, and with loud clamor demand the means of satisfaction. Hence the richer we grow, the poorer do we become ; for poverty is always to be measured by the number of wants which we have and are unable to satisfy. Hence the wisdom of all ages admonishes us, if we would enrich a man, to diminish his desires, not to increase his possessions.

Pleasures, so called, are unable to please, and none enjoy so little as those who make it their sole business to enjoy. Appetite and passion strengthen by indulgence, and as they strengthen, the power to indulge them is impaired, and the capacity of their objects to please is lessened. The Epicurean philosophy is the saddest philosophy man has ever invented, and its votaries sooner than any others are forced to exclaim, from the depths of bitter experience, — *Vanitas vanitatum, vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas!* The pursuit of knowledge is hardly better. The eye is not satisfied by seeing, nor the understanding by knowing. It is but little, at best, that we can know ; and the more we know, the less we seem to ourselves to know, and the more are we oppressed by what we know not. Ignorance may plume herself on her conquests, and in the foolish pride of her own heart imagine that no more worlds remain to be conquered ; but science knows no exultation, no self-complacency. It encounters in its progress only darkness and difficulty, doubt and perplexity. As we advance, we become a painful mystery unto ourselves ; the universe becomes to us “ a sealed book, written within and without, sealed with seven seals,” which no man can open ; and when we have reached the farthest limits of our power, we are forced to say, with the wisest son of Athens, “ All we know is, that we know nothing.” The chase after fame and worldly honors and distinctions is equally vain.

Nor do we, my brethren, find a more substantial good in those idols of the age, love and philanthropy. Love, abandoned to nature, and sought for its own sake, consumes itself in its own fire. It is capricious, morbid, a torment to him who harbours it, and an insurmountable obstacle to its own gratification. He cannot truly love who rests in love ; and he wants the qualities which command the love of others. Phi-

lanthropy can, at best, only weep over evils it cannot cure, and it is almost invariably doomed to aggravate the wrongs it would redress. It springs from nature, and is confined within her limits. It has, and can have, nothing to offer its objects but wealth, pleasure, knowledge, fame, honors, worldly goods, which yield, and can yield, no substantial good to their possessor, — nothing to slake his burning thirst, or to appease his gnawing hunger.

The experience of all ages proves beyond doubt or cavil, that man never suffices for himself, and never does, and never can, obtain any substantial good from the world in which he is placed. He has wants which transcend the universe, and which nothing created can satisfy. The fact itself, whatever explication of it you may adopt, is certain, undeniable. The goods of this world are goods, if ever goods at all, only when we do not seek them, when we do not desire them, but despise them, trample on them, and live not for them, but for some end above and beyond them. This may seem strange. It may seem strange that our good can never come from the world in which we are placed, that even the possession of the very objects towards which our nature itself points, and with all but irresistible force impels us, should bring us no satisfaction, and leave us poor and destitute ; but so it is, and we cannot make it otherwise.

Here, then, my brethren, are two great and undeniable facts. On Protestant principles, you are invariably reduced to depend on the goods of this world alone, and the goods of this world are no goods at all. If, then, you are right in your Protestantism, there is, and can be, no good for man. Is it so ? Has some evil being made us ? Is our existence a blunder ? Are we, my brethren, compelled by some irresistible necessity to spend our money for that which is not bread, and our labor for that which satisfieth not ? Are you prepared to maintain this ? Can you believe it ? Has our existence no purpose ? Is there no rule of life for us ? Is there no substantial good set before us ? Is there nothing fixed and eternal, which is not as the shadow that passes ? Must we all our days walk in a vain shadow ? If so, my brethren, our condition is most desperate ; man, with the rational soul, the thinking head, and feeling heart, is the most miserable of creatures. Better to have been a brute beast, better to have been a crawling worm, an insect of an hour, the veriest mote in the sunbeam, than a man.

If you are right, my brethren, you cannot defend even the low and worldly morality which, for decency's sake, if nothing else, the greater part of you profess. Your ministers preach to you love and philanthropy, and even dare to speak to you of love to God. Love to God ! if he has made us, placed us here without a purpose, to be the victims of an ignorance which is incurable, the sport of wild and ferocious passions which we cannot suppress or control, the prey of deep wants which are unappeasable, doomed to toil without object or recompense, to chase an empty shadow, and, exhausted, die ! For what shall we love him ? How can we love a being in whom there is not for right reason one amiable trait ? How, again, can you exercise love towards man ? Nature can love only what is naturally amiable. Your ministers strip man of all his grandeur and worth ; they make him mean and despicable ; and who can love him ? Who can make sacrifices for him ? Why shall we seek to do him good ? What good is there for him ? He has no good. He is born, propagates his species, dies, rots, and is no more for ever. Having reduced him below the beasts that perish, below the loathsome worm of the dust, what mockery to preach love to man, to bid us love our brother, to live and die for him ! If your ministers wish you to love man, they should show that he is worth loving ; and if they wish you to devote yourselves to his service, they must show that there is a good for him, what that good is, whence it comes, and how it can be secured. On their principles, philanthropy is a folly, and the only possible rule of life is cold and heartless selfishness. It would be right and prudent to reason with the wicked :—

“ The time of our life is short and tedious ; and in the end of a man there is no remedy ; and no man hath been known to have returned from hell. For we are born of nothing, and after this we shall be as if we had not been ; for the breath of our nostrils is smoke, and speech a spark to move our heart, which being put out, our body shall be ashes, and our spirit shall be poured abroad as soft air ; and our life shall pass away as the trace of a cloud, and shall be dispersed as a mist, which is driven away by the beams of the sun, and overpowered with the heat thereof ; and our name in time shall be forgotten, and no man shall have remembrance of our works. For our time is as the passing of a shadow ; and there is no going back of our end ; for it is fast sealed, and no man returneth. Come, therefore, and let us enjoy the good things which are

present, and let us speedily use the creatures as in youth. Let us fill ourselves with costly wines and ointments ; and let not the flower of time pass by us. Let us crown ourselves with roses before they be withered ; let no meadow escape our riot. Let none of us go without his part in luxury ; let us everywhere leave tokens of joy ; for this is our portion, and this our lot." — *Wisdom*, ii. 1–9.

This is as sad as sad can be ; and yet, on the principles of your ministers, nothing better remains for you. Pause, therefore, my brethren, and ask if it is through necessity that there is nothing better for you. Your ministers induced you to spurn the Church, and you have found yourselves deprived of all good, compelled to live and toil to no end. But the Church explains to you your origin and destiny ; she tells you that there is a good for you, a solid, a permanent, an infinite good, within your reach ; and that she, and she only, can direct you to it, and enable you, if you choose, to possess it. She tells you that God made you not for this world, and that he never intended you to find your good in those objects to which your nature inclines and impels you ; but he made you for a supernatural end, to seek and find your good in him, and in him only. She tells you that he alone can satisfy the soul, meet its deep wants, and fill it with peace and joy ; that when we seek him in the way and by the means which he has himself ordained, we are spiritually restored to our normal state, live our normal life, and all things fall into their proper places, and work together for our good. Therefore, in the words of her heavenly Spouse, she says, " Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." She presents herself, as you well know, as commissioned by God himself to direct you how to seek, how to live, and to enable you both to seek and to find. She promises you, in his name, that, if you follow her directions, you shall live, that your souls shall be filled, that they shall overflow with joy, that you shall eat the good things of the land, have in this world a hundred fold, and in the world to come life everlasting. This she tells you, this she promises to all who will love and obey her.

It is true, my brethren, you do not believe her ; that you refuse to listen to her sweet and consoling voice, that you scorn and detest her, and seek by all the means in your power to destroy her. You treat her as if she were your bitterest enemy, as if she were the very quintessence of evil, and you

had nothing to expect from her but the certain destruction of both soul and body in hell. But let her be what she may, you risk nothing in listening to her words, or even in believing what she says. Without her you have no good ; and they for whom there is no good have, and can have, nothing to lose. She cannot harm you ; and perhaps she may do you good ; for if what she says is true, there is a good for you. She says, she can do you good, and that without her there is no good for you. Your own experience confirms one half of what she says. You have tried all but her, and have failed. She is your only chance. It is for you, either the Church or no good. Without her you can have only unbelief, infidelity ; and infidelity leaves you to this world alone, from which no substantial good is obtainable. You run, then, no risk. If you miss, you are as well off as before, have lost nothing ; if you gain, you gain every thing. It may be that all she says is true. You cannot say to the contrary. You have no authority for denying or doubting her words. Then, without the Church, there is, as your experience proves, no possibility of good ; but with the Church, for aught you know, there is not only a possibility, but a certainty, of good. With her there is, if any difference, a chance of good ; without her, no chance. You cannot, then, in common prudence, my brethren, suffer your prejudices against her to prevent you from inquiring and listening to what she has to say for herself.

But the case for the Church is much stronger. There is a reasonable presumption in her favor. The Church has never deceived you. Your ministers have deceived you ; the philosophers, the politicians, the economists, the poets, have deceived you ; the world, your own senses, instincts, passions, reason, have deceived you ; all but the Church has deceived you. Did she not tell you they would deceive you ? Did she not solemnly forewarn you of the consequences of listening to them ? Did she deceive you in this ? Did she lie to you ? You were unruly sons, headstrong, self-willed ; you would have your own way ; you disregarded her admonitions, and would not obey her directions ; you would follow the insidious counsel of your young companions, which fell in with your own passions and inclinations. You now know, though you may be too proud to own it, that what she told you was true, and what they counselled you was false. She told you not to listen to them ; that what they promised, you would not obtain, or obtain but to your own hurt ; that they were prophets of

the delusion of their own hearts, that they would cause you to err, would involve you in total ruin ; for out of her, or away from her, there was no good for you, or for any one. Your ministers told you to heed her not, that her maternal words were lies ; that she was no true mother, that she was a sorceress and only wished to lure you to share her fornications. You now know her words were true, and that theirs were lies. If, then, they deceived you, if all but she has deceived you, and she never, you have not only no reason for doubting her words, but a strong reason for believing that she is no deceiver, and that all she says is true. The law of evidence is, to believe every witness when there is no reason for disbelieving him.

But, my brethren, the case may stand less favorable for you yet, if you remain without the Church. Certain it is you cannot say the Church is not what she professes to be. As far as you have had the means of testing her words, you have found them strictly and exactly true. They certainly, for aught you know, or can know, may be strictly and exactly true throughout. But if it be so, what then will be your condition ? Undoubtedly, the majority of you have no fear of judgment or hell. You look upon what the Church says of the last judgment, and the eternal punishment of the wicked, as an idle tale, or a bugbear to frighten the weak and timid. You have made great progress, and have advanced, it may be, as far as the mark left by old Lucretius ; still you must own that the Church possibly tells the truth, and that, in spite of all the mockeries of the licentious and profane, judgment and hell may turn out to be awful verities. You, with all your progress, have not been able to discover any thing to the contrary. You have never yet been able to adduce a single fact against the Church. Do your best, and you can bring against her nothing but your own private judgment, and she, at the very lowest, has her private judgment against you, — any day, and on any supposition you can make, the equal of yours, and therefore able to neutralize it. On any possible hypothesis, you have as good, as strong a reason for believing that what she teaches is true, as you have that what you oppose to her is true. Your private judgment is no better authority for disbelieving than her private judgment is for believing her. But if what she teaches turns out to be true, where are you ? You are then the enemies of God ; you have lost not only the life that now is, but that which is to come ; you have lost the beatific vision ; you will never see God ; you will be doomed

to suffer the tortures of hell for your sins, — tortures which, in the case of each single soul, will far outweigh all the actual or possible sufferings in time of the whole human race from the beginning to the consummation of the world. On any grounds you choose to put it, you must admit that you have as good authority for believing the Church to be the Church of God as you have for believing that she is not ; and if she is, there is no escape for you who reject her.

These, my brethren, are great and solemn considerations. You have no good out of the Church, that is certain ; without her you must lapse into absolute infidelity ; and with infidelity you have nothing left but the world, from which no good is derivable ; all out of the Church has deceived you ; but she, as far as your experience goes, has never deceived you ; it is possible she deceives you in nothing ; that she is the Church of God, and may raise you to God, and secure your eternal life ; if she is, there is a last judgment, there is an everlasting hell, and you, if you do not return to her, and submit yourselves to her, will fall under the eternal wrath and condemnation of God. What, in common prudence, then, is your duty ? Consider, if she is the true Church, the danger to which you are exposed, the loss you must incur, and, above all, the scandal you give. Consider that you, then, neither enter into the kingdom of heaven yourselves, nor suffer those to enter that would. Are you not bound, in common prudence, to sit down patiently and investigate the claims of the Church ? Are you not mad, if you do not ?

ART. II. — *A Reply to Dr. Milner's "End of Religious Controversy," so far as the Churches of the English Communion are concerned.* By S. F. JARVIS, D. D., LL. D. New York : D. Appleton & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. 251.

MILNER'S *End of Religious Controversy*, first published about thirty years since, is a well-known and highly esteemed work ; and after — and perhaps we should not make the exception — *The Sincere Christian*, by Bishop Hay, it is unquestionably the best work in our language on the points of our faith and practice controverted by Protestants, for general circulation and reading ; although, for our own reading, we prefer

the work by Father Edward Worsley, entitled "Protestancy without Principles, or Sectaries' Unhappy Fall from Infallibility to Fancy," a small quarto volume, printed at Antwerp, 1668, and of which we wish some of our enterprising publishers would bring out a new edition. But for the generality of readers, Milner's work is the most appropriate, instructive, and convincing. It is admirable for its lucid arrangement, the easy and natural manner in which the precise questions to be treated are placed before the reader, and for its condensation of matter. We are at a loss which most to admire, its solid learning, its rigid logic, or the candor and modesty of its temper and language. It is all it professes to be, — the end of religious controversy. It has never been answered, and never will be ; and no fair-minded person, willing to embrace the truth, though it conduct to that Church which he has hitherto despised, can read and understand it, and have any doubt remaining as to the fact that Catholicity is the religion, and the only religion, of God.

To this work Dr. Jarvis, a Protestant Episcopal minister of Connecticut, very well known in this section of the country, has, in the publication before us, attempted a reply. Dr. Jarvis, we are told, has an excellent library, and he enjoys, among people of his own persuasion, the reputation of a learned theologian, and of being profoundly versed in patristic lore. It is, we learn from his work, now twenty-five years since he first read Milner's work, and we are led to infer, though it is not expressly so stated, that his reply has the benefit of his reading and studies for that length of time. Certain it is, his work bears the marks of careful preparation, and appears to have received all the elaborate finish the author could give it. It evidently is the best he could do ; and we have no reason to suppose that it is not equal to any thing a minister of his own denomination could do. It may, then, not be uninteresting or unprofitable to our readers to learn what he has succeeded in doing.

They who have read Dr. Milner know that the excellent and learned Bishop wrote his work for candid and honest inquirers after the truth, for readers who were willing to seek, and who had actually begun to seek ; and that it is to such that it is specially adapted. His purpose is not controversy, but the end of controversy ; and he aims not simply to silence the logic of Protestants, but to meet their actual wants, and, by the grace of God, to convince their understandings and

convert their hearts. He writes as the pastor of souls, and not as the mere controversialist ; consequently, he consults not merely what can be legally demanded of him by the logical conditions of the argument, but also what is demanded by the peculiar intellectual state of his readers. He therefore goes over much ground which the Catholic controversialist is not bound to go over, and meets and removes objections which he was under no obligation, save by the law of Christian charity, even to entertain.

The only thing a Catholic, in his argument with Protestants, can be required to do, is, to prove that Almighty God has instituted and commissioned his Church to teach all nations, unto the consummation of the world, all things whatsoever our Lord commanded his Apostles. That once proved, there is, and can be, no further controversy. All there is, then, to do, is to hear and obey the Church. Particular objections to this or that doctrine or practice of the Church are of no moment, because overruled by her authority to teach, established, if established at all, on a higher principle of certainty than is, or can be, the principle of any objections which reason can urge or suggest against it. Nevertheless, Protestant ministers imagine various objections to the several doctrines taught by the Church, which they urge with great vehemence, and which create real difficulties in the minds of the Protestant people, and render it often desirable that special solutions of them should be given. Protestants, *in religious matters*, are poor reasoners, and in general require, for their practical conviction, not only to have a doctrine proved in its principle, but also in all its details, and not only that the truth be proved by one process, but its contradictory falsehood disproved by another. Hence our authors, aiming never at a barren victory, but always at practical instruction and conviction, often go beyond what can be legally demanded of them, and attempt by special replies to remove the particular difficulties Protestants suggest in the case of this or that particular doctrine. Dr. Milner has done this to a very considerable extent, and has thereby greatly enhanced the practical value of his work for the class of persons for whom he designed it.

But this labor of love, on the part of our controversialists, is not without a certain practical evil. In performing it, we in some degree descend from our high Catholic vantage-ground, and act on the principle of private judgment and private interpretation, and thus place our adversaries more

nearly on a footing of equality with us than they have any right to pretend to. We thus give them a chance to talk, and sometimes with the appearance of saying something. We enable them to continue the debate ; and there are many people in the world who will take it for granted, that, so long as they continue to talk, they are not refuted ; for there are many people who seem to hold that to refute a man is to shut his mouth as well as his reason ; as if a man never speaks without saying something, or saying only nonsense ! Nevertheless, so it is ; and hence Protestant controversialists always seize upon this supererogatory part of our work, where they can apparently meet us on equal ground, and attempt to show that their objections to particular doctrines and practices are solid, and that our special answers to them are not conclusive. This, in general terms, is precisely what Dr. Jarvis attempts in his Reply ; and under this point of view, he may be thought by those who already believe, or rather disbelieve, with him, to have said some few things not wholly irrelevant, — though, in fact, even under this point of view, he says nothing that amounts to any thing.

But with whatever success Dr. Jarvis should reply to Bishop Milner's special answers to objections to this or that doctrine, it would not affect one way or other the real question at issue. If it were conceded, that, independently of the authority of the Church, on the principle of private authority, or private interpretation of the Divine Traditions and of the Fathers, we cannot triumphantly prove that every Catholic doctrine taught by the Church to-day has been always and everywhere taught by her, it would amount to nothing. No Catholic believes any doctrine because, independently of the authority of the Church, he can prove it to be an apostolic doctrine ; and one of our strong arguments for the Church is precisely this, that, without her authority, there is no sufficient authority to determine what is apostolic doctrine. Surely it is not to refute us, to prove successfully what we ourselves assert and urge against our adversaries ! The Catholic rule is, to take the doctrine from the Church, not the Protestant rule, to take the Church from the doctrine. We prove the Church ; we show that she is divinely commissioned to teach ; and when we have done that, we have authorized belief in all she teaches. There our argument stops ; henceforth we listen and believe. If, in our ardent charity for souls, we sometimes show or attempt to show that there is a *corroborative historical*

testimony to the fact that the Church has in all ages taught as she now teaches, it is not because we are under any obligation to do so, nor do we thereby abandon or weaken the ground of authority. If, furthermore, in this we should not always succeed, it would be nothing against us, and not in the least impair the authority on which we believe, and on which all must believe, or not be Catholic believers. Even if Protestants could convict us of total failure, in regard to this historical evidence of particular doctrines, and it should turn out that not a trace of the teaching of the Church is to be found in external history, they would prove nothing against us, or for themselves ; the real question at issue would be unaffected. This fact Protestant controversialists in general, and Dr. Jarvis in particular, do not appear to understand, and hence all their reasoning tends only to mislead themselves. If all they adduce were conceded, nothing would really be conceded against us or for them ; and the very utmost that could be said would be, that a certain line of argument, which our controversialists, out of pure *charity*, condescend to adopt against Protestants, must be abandoned. We should still have enough left for all our wants, and to satisfy all the demands of *justice*, but should not have so much to give away in charity as we now have or persuade ourselves we have.

The fault of Protestants has always been to argue either on false principles, or some other question than the real one. We recollect no argument of theirs which does not conceal either a *petitio principii*, the *ignorantia elenchi*, or some other sophism. It must needs be so. No man can reason against the truth without falling into a sophism of some sort. Protestants are not sophists because they want education or natural ability. We wish for no abler or more acute and rigid reasoners, sounder or more skilful dialecticians, than some Protestant lawyers we have known, when engaged in their own profession. It is a necessity of their false position, and grows out of the fact that nothing really logical ever is or can be urged against the truth. Protestants should try to get a clear and precise view of the real questions to be discussed, and of the principles on which they are to be settled. If they would do this, and adhere rigidly to both, the debate between them and us would soon be concluded.

Undoubtedly, the questions to be debated between us and Protestants are questions which must be decided by reason, speculative or practical, or both ; therefore the only questions

which can properly be debated between them and us are questions which come within the province of reason. These are, Has Almighty God instituted a Church commissioned to teach? If so, which is it? Here is all that is really in issue between the parties. The commission is the divine warrant of infallibility in teaching, because Almighty God cannot authorize the teaching of a lie; and the Church commissioned is divine authority for believing whatever she teaches or commands in the name of God. Then to know what she so teaches and commands now, and always has so taught and commanded, we have only to ask her authorized teachers, and listen to what they say. The Catholic, then, has simply two points to make out, namely, that God has instituted such a Church as supposed, and that his Church is the one; Protestants, in general, have one of two points to make out, either that God has instituted no such Church, or, if he has, that it is not the Roman Catholic, but theirs, or some one of theirs.

But there is in the outset a presumption in favor of the Catholic, and against Protestants. Protestants originally were subjects of the Roman Catholic Church, which claimed and was acknowledged to be the Church commissioned by Almighty God to teach. She was in possession, and to be presumed to be lawfully in possession, as such Church. Protestants were therefore bound to show good and valid reasons for protesting against her, or for throwing off her authority; and till they did so, she was under no obligation to produce her titles, or to adduce evidence to sustain them. The burden of proof was on them. The two points she has in the argument to make out were already made out, at least so far as Protestants were concerned, if they failed to adduce good and valid reasons for contesting her claims, or for the points necessary for them to make out in their own justification. Thus, though the refutation of Catholicity would not be necessarily the defence of Protestantism,—if Protestantism is anything more than a protest against the Church,—the failure of Protestants to establish their claims would be their condemnation as rebels. Protestants, then, must set forth what, if sustained, will completely vindicate them, clear them of the charge of rebellion against their legitimate sovereign, before the Church is under any obligation to say one single word in her own defence. This is the exact state of the question between us and Protestants, and the precise view to be taken of the logical obligations of the two parties.

Dr. Milner, yielding to his desire to meet as far as possible the actual state of Protestant minds, has waived the presumption on which he had the right to insist, and which we ourselves will never consent to waive, and has attempted to do more than he was logically or legally bound to do. He attempts to establish the two points which Protestants are bound to presume to be in favor of the Church; to refute the pretensions of Protestants; and to repel their objections to particular Catholic doctrines and practices. The second was all that was logically necessary; and the proof of the first carries with it *all* that it is necessary to say in regard to the other two. Consequently, Dr. Jarvis, in order to refute Dr. Milner, or to reply to him successfully, must show, either negatively, that what Dr. Milner advances in support of the two points which the Catholic has to make out is false or inconclusive; or, positively, that the pretensions of Protestants, or, since he does not undertake to sustain Protestants in general, "the Churches of the English Communion," are well founded. Whatever is proved or disproved with regard to this or that doctrine, is said or not said about such matters, is of no manner of consequence. The authority of the Church, if established, suffices for *all* her doctrines, and its successful denial is their successful refutation.

We can now understand what the Protestant Episcopalian had to do; let us see if he has done it. The point for us to consider is not whether Dr. Milner has successfully maintained his cause or not, but whether Dr. Jarvis has successfully replied to him or not. This it will be well to bear in mind. We must also premise that there is a great deal said by Dr. Jarvis on which we have neither space nor disposition to remark, and it must not be supposed we concede because we do not contradict it. We take notice of only such portions of what he says as may be supposed to have some direct or indirect bearing on the main argument; the rest we pass in silence.

Dr. Milner divides his work into three parts. In the first part he concludes the Church from its necessity as the rule of faith, and the insufficiency of all other methods. Faith is assumed to be necessary, commanded by Almighty God, and is conceded to be so by those against whom he is reasoning. Then there must be some infallible rule or method of finding out what is the faith we are to believe; for, without some such rule or method, faith is not possible, and God does not and cannot command what he does not render possible. But

without the Church there is no such rule or method. Hence the *necessity* and the *fact* of the Church. To refute this argument, Dr. Jarvis, since he concedes the necessity of faith, must prove either that faith is possible without the rule or method asserted, or that there is some such rule independent of the Church. Has he done either? We answer, that he can hardly be said to have even seriously attempted to do the one or the other.

In illustrating and maintaining his argument, which is conducted in a logical, though popular form, Dr. Milner discusses and refutes the several rules of faith contended for by Protestants, and arrives at the Catholic rule, which he states to be "The word of God at large, whether written in the Bible or handed down from the Apostles in continued succession by the Catholic Church, and as understood and explained by *that Church*."* This definition of the Catholic rule is intended to include the *whole* word of God as taught or delivered by the Apostles, on the one hand, and to exclude all revelations, if such there are, which have been made to individuals subsequently to the Apostles, on the other; and, furthermore, to include that word *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*. The rule, as defined, does not assert whether the word is written or unwritten, but simply covers the whole word, whether written or unwritten, or whether in part one and in part the other. This is a question it does not determine, and which is not to be determined before determining the Church; for it is obviously a question to be determined by the rule, and not before the rule itself is determined. Unquestionably the whole word of God delivered by the Apostles is to be received, whether written or unwritten, and Dr. Jarvis concedes it more than once. Furthermore, if the whole word of God, as defined, is to be believed *as understood and explained by the Church*, all she understands and explains to be the word of God, whether written or unwritten, must be received and believed as his word. Consequently, the only point in this rule to which Dr. Jarvis can legitimately object is the definition of the rule of faith to be "the word of God as *understood and explained by the Catholic Church*."

But, strange to say, this is precisely the point to which he does not formally object. He raises a question not raised in the definition of the rule, namely, Whether the Church can

* End of Controversy, Letter VI.

understand and explain any thing to be of faith not recorded in the written word ; or, if she should do so, whether we should be obliged to receive it ; — plainly a question for the Church herself to decide, if her authority is conceded ; for we seek the Church to tell us what is the word of God, not the word of God to tell us what is the Church. Antecedently to the Church, we are undoubtedly able to say, that any church that denies that to be the word of God which is his word, or affirms that to be his word which is not his word, is not the Church of God. But if we concede the Church to be necessary to teach us the word of God, we cannot determine, independently of her, what is the word of God, and erect it into a standard by which to try her. Dr. Jarvis, therefore, has no right to raise the question he does. He must deny and disprove the Church ; for if she is conceded, her authority is sufficient to settle the question without his reasoning, and overrides whatever he may say on one side or the other.

Moreover, the answer to the question decides nothing as to the point in debate ; Dr. Milner in his definition does not affirm or deny that the word is written or unwritten, and therefore to assert that the word is *all* written is not to deny any thing the definition asserts. Dr. Jarvis says, “ The simple question at issue is, whether the Bible, the written word of God, or what Dr. Milner calls the word of God at large, written or unwritten, as received and understood and explained by the Roman Catholic Church, is the proper rule of faith.” — p. 25. But this is a mistake. Whether the written word alone, or the written and unwritten, whether the whole is written, or only a part is written, &c., is a question solely for authority itself to decide, after we have ascertained it, whether the authority be the Church, private judgment, or something else, and therefore not debatable. Whether the rule is “ the word as understood and explained by the *Roman Catholic Church*,” is the second question in order, not the first, nor a part of the first. If we agree that the rule is the word as held and taught by the Catholic Church, then, unless Dr. Jarvis and his Protestant friends concede the Catholic Church to be the *Roman Catholic*, — the point he tries to dispute, — we must proceed to the question, Which is the Catholic Church ? Dr. Jarvis's simple question, therefore, is a *duplex* question, to say the least, and therefore cannot be the *simple* question at issue. The real question at issue is, Whether the rule of faith is the whole word of God — written or un-

written — delivered by the Apostles, as understood and explained by the Catholic Church, or the Bible as understood by each particular reader or hearer of it.

Dr. Jarvis undertakes to prove, and under the head of “the rule of faith” the main thing he attempts to prove is, that nothing can enter into the rule of faith not contained in the written word; but this is nothing to the purpose; for even if it be so, it does not follow that the Protestant rule is true, or the Catholic false. To assert that the rule of faith is the word of God contained in the written word only is one thing; to assert that it is solely the word of God as contained in the Bible, and as interpreted by each particular reader or hearer of it, — the proposition Bishop Milner denies, — is another and a very different thing; for should it be conceded that the whole word was written, and nothing can be received as of faith not recorded in the Bible, it might still be true that the rule of faith is what Dr. Milner asserts, namely, the word of God at large, — that is, the whole word delivered by the Apostles, — *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*; which is the proposition of the Bishop that Dr. Jarvis is to disprove.

Before determining the authority which is to determine what is the word of God, the question of written or unwritten tradition can be raised only as an historical question, or for the purposes of an *argumentum ad hominem*. If it be historically true that unwritten tradition has in all ages been contended for by the generality of Christians; if it be true that it is contended for by Fathers and Doctors held to be authoritative by Protestants; or if Protestants themselves profess to hold as revealed truth doctrines which are not contained in the Scriptures, or not to be obtained from them without the aid of unwritten tradition, and yet assert that the Bible alone is the rule, then we may urge the fact as a conclusive argument against their rule; for if there be unwritten tradition, they are certainly wrong; or if it is shown that they must admit it or abandon their doctrine, they are refuted on their own principles. It is only in this sense that we understand Dr. Milner to urge unwritten tradition. If he urges it successfully, he overthrows Protestantism; if unsuccessfully, he does not thereby render Catholicity false or Protestantism true; and all that can be said is, that he has used an unsound argument against Protestants; which would, indeed, affect his character as a polemic, but not at all the real points in issue. The whole discussion into which Dr. Jarvis enters was therefore

aside from his purpose, and he would not have advanced a single step in his argument, even if he had succeeded in his denial of unwritten tradition. But he has not succeeded; nay, after going into a long and elaborate argument against unwritten tradition, he very frankly concedes it. Thus he says, p. 29, — “Now the Church of England, and the churches in communion with her, do not deny, certainly, what an Apostle has asserted, *that the written gospels do not contain all that Jesus did or said*. Nor do they deny that the Apostles, in proclaiming the Gospel and establishing the Church, *did and said many things which could not properly enter into the apostolic writings* which have been transmitted to us. Let it be proved, then, that any doctrine or practice proceeded from Christ or his Apostles, and we receive and embrace it. ‘The question is not,’ as Bellarmine well observes, ‘how great is the force of divine and [or] apostolical traditions, but whether any tradition [*aliqua traditio*] be truly divine or apostolical!’” p. 29. ‘This, if it mean any thing, means that “the churches of the English communion” acknowledge both the fact of unwritten traditions and the obligation to receive and embrace them, if *proved* to be really from Christ or his Apostles, which is all that the Catholic says; for no Catholic holds that he is bound to believe any thing as from our Lord and his Apostles not proved by *infallible* authority to be from them.

Dr. Jarvis, after this, is precluded from restricting the rule to the written word alone, and must say with the Catholic Bishop, “the word of God at large, written or unwritten.” Thus far, instead of refuting the Catholic rule, he concedes it, and asserts its soundness. The only point, as we have already said, for him to deny, if he means to controvert the Catholic rule, is, that the rule of faith is the word “as understood and explained by the Catholic Church.” Does he deny this? Not at all. He concedes it, and denies, though he also asserts, the Protestant rule of private judgment; for he maintains expressly that the Church is the judge of controversies of faith, according to Art. XX. of the Thirty-nine Articles of his society, and that the Scriptures are to be interpreted according to tradition, or “the consentient testimony” of antiquity, or rather, of all ages. The last, if it mean any thing, denies private judgment; the first necessarily implies that the word is to be received as understood and explained by the Church. After all his flourish, to borrow his own phraseology, he denies the Protestant rule, and concedes the Catho-

lic, and of course gives up the whole argument to the Catholic as to the necessity and fact of the Church,—the first point the Catholic had to make out.

It being now proved, or at least conceded, that there is a Catholic Church, and that the rule of faith is the word as understood and explained by this Church, the next question in order is, Which is it,—the church in communion with the see of Rome, or “the churches of the English communion”? But Dr. Jarvis is not yet prepared to broach that question. He has other work to perform first. He is placed in a delicate position, which may be expressed by *Protestant-Catholic*, and *Catholic-Protestant*. He must be Catholic enough to condemn Puritanism and dissent from Anglicanism; and Protestant enough to condemn *Romanism*. In other words, he is an *Anglo-Catholic*, which means a man who asserts one set of principles against us, and the contradictory set against Puritans, Socinians, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, &c. So, though he has conceded the Catholic rule in principle, and given up the Protestant rule of private judgment, we must not be surprised to find him going into a long, elaborate, and learned defence of the Protestant rule, and also indulging in very liberal abuse of us for asserting ours.

After having given up the Protestant doctrine as to the unwritten word, he must, in order not to be too Catholic, reassert it, deny all unwritten tradition of doctrine, and insist on the sufficiency of the Scriptures. But the Scriptures speak of “traditions.” Very true; but *tradition* means “handed over,” and may apply to the written word itself, which the Apostles handed over to their successors. But St. Paul speaks of traditions, “by word or our Epistle.” True, very true; but that which was unwritten at the time St. Paul afterwards wrote. The proof? “*We say*, and that very plainly and openly, that it is an arrogant assumption of the very point at issue, to assert that he meant unwritten tradition of his doctrine. *We say*, that, in the fourteen epistles which bear his name, he did record the doctrine which he as a divinely inspired Apostle thought it necessary to deliver in addition to the already written doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, as received by him. St. Paul’s traditions of doctrines were written traditions.”—p. 32. Brave assertions, no doubt; but the proof? “His epistles to the Thessalonians were among the earliest, and are comparatively short. Who will undertake to prove that doctrines, not recorded in them, were not afterwards

recorded in his other Epistles?" — Ib. But, with your permission, this is not to the purpose. You assert that "St. Paul's traditions of doctrines were *written* traditions"; and yet when the Apostle exhorted the Thessalonians to stand firm, and to hold them (2 Thess. ii. 14), they were undeniably, in part, *unwritten*; it is, therefore, for you, who assert that they were *all* subsequently written, to prove it. The fact that they might have been is no proof that they were. Besides, you have conceded "that the Apostles, in proclaiming the Gospel, and establishing the Church, did and *said* many things which *could not properly enter* into the apostolic writings which have been transmitted to us."

But Dr. Jarvis attempts to save himself by a *distinction*. He distinguishes between *doctrines* and *precepts*, and contends that the unwritten traditions are traditions not of doctrines, but of *precepts*, though, as we understand him, of *divine* precepts, — precepts which the Apostles received from our Lord himself, or from the dictation of the Holy Ghost. That is, they are traditions of things to be done, not of doctrines to be believed. The distinction shows, no doubt, the master. But is not faith itself a precept, in so much as it is commanded, and as in believing we are active, that is, *do* something? Again, is not a precept something *taught* as well as commanded, and therefore a *doctrine*? And must we not *believe* it from God, in order that, in obeying it, we may be obeying God? Moreover, are the divine precepts less a part of the word of God than the divine mysteries? And is not a rule of faith which excludes a portion of the divine precepts, or even *ordinances*, — to adopt another term insisted on by Dr. Jarvis, — just as much a false rule as one which excludes a portion of the dogmas? The distinction, therefore, between doctrines and precepts, on which the author lays so much stress, though valid enough for some purposes, can avail him nothing for the purpose for which he makes it. The precepts are the law of God, what the law practically ordains; and could any body regard a tradition of the word of God as complete, which only partially handed down the *law* of God?

Nevertheless, we must expect Dr. Jarvis to hold on to his Protestantism, at least for some few pages further. Notwithstanding his concessions, he asserts (p. 37), that "the Bible, the written word of God, *in its true intent and meaning*, is the only rule of that faith which is necessary to salvation." But how does he prove this? He has already admitted that

there is a portion of the word not recorded in the Bible, and whether he call it doctrine, or precept, or ordinance, how does he know that it is not necessary to salvation? He cites, indeed, the English Synods; but till he has proved that they were commissioned by Almighty God to teach, they are authority neither for him nor for us. And yet we can find no other proof of his assertion of the sufficiency of the Scriptures. But this is a serious question. What is the faith necessary to salvation must be determined by divine authority, and therefore, if what is contained in the Scriptures is sufficient, we must have divine authority for believing it. But, unhappily for the Protestant minister, he has no such authority; for the Holy Scriptures, as is well known, nowhere assert their own sufficiency. This, of itself, is decisive against Protestantism.

In arguing against the Protestant rule, Dr. Milner presses home the inability of the Protestant to settle the canon, and to be certain that he has an authentic copy of the original Hebrew and Greek autographs, — that his translation is faithful, — and that he seizes the true sense. Dr. Jarvis, still in his Protestant vein, undertakes at considerable length to dispose of this formidable objection. Let us see how he succeeds.

1. The Protestant cannot proceed a step, even if the sufficiency of the Scriptures be conceded, till he has settled the canon, that is, determined what books are authoritative. Dr. Milner tells his Protestant opponents that they are unable to do this. Dr. Jarvis *says* Protestants can do this as well as we can; but he fails to show how. He, however, proceeds himself to settle the canon by a very short and simple process. The Catholic canon and the Protestant agree, except that the former includes seven books and certain parts of Esther and Daniel excluded by the latter. “The question, then, as to the canonical Scriptures, or Scriptures to be adduced as a rule of faith, is clearly reduced to this: Whether the seven books named, and the parts of Esther and Daniel as contained in the Septuagint and the Old Latin Vulgate, are, or are not, canonical.” — pp. 44, 45. These books were not in the Jewish canon, were not received by some early Christians, were thought lightly of by St. Jerome, and therefore are not canonical. Therefore the Protestant canon is the true canon, and the Catholic, so far as it differs from the Protestant, false. But, waiving the argument against the books in our canon not in the Protestant, which, it were easy to show, is of no weight, on what authority does Dr. Jarvis assert the canonicity

of those books with regard to which there is no dispute between Catholics and Protestants, that is, of the books which Protestants hold to be canonical? On our authority? Nay, because he does not admit that authority, and because, if admitted, it is as good for those rejected as for those retained. On what authority, then? On the authority of the primitive Church? By what authority do you determine what was the canon of the primitive Church? Your own? That is, no doubt, very respectable, but hardly sufficient for an act of faith; at best, it cannot be more than human, and therefore not above the authority of the Holy Council of Trent, at worst.

2. But Dr. Milner continues: Supposing you have settled the canon of the Scriptures, how do you know that the copies of them translated and printed in your Bibles are authentic? Here is a further difficulty; for even if you have the true canon, but a corrupt text, it avails you nothing. What does Dr. Jarvis answer to this? 1. That Dr. Milner should have used the word *genuine* instead of *authentic*. [Doubtful.] 2. That various learned men, though they have detected thousands of various readings, are of opinion that the received Hebrew and Greek text is substantially correct. 3. Conceding that the text of the Psalter in the Book of Common Prayer is not pure; and 4. Entering into a long and learned dissertation to prove that the text of the New Testament, in one instance at least, is grossly corrupt, and contains what was originally only a marginal gloss! — pp. 52–65. This looks to us more like assigning reasons for doubting than for crediting the accuracy of the text.

3. But, Dr. Milner goes on, admitting the canon, and the genuineness of the text, how can you be sure that yours is a faithful translation? The generality of those who read the Bible must read it in a translation, the faithfulness of which they have themselves no means of ascertaining; and yet, if they are to take their faith from the Bible alone, they cannot be certain of their faith, unless they are certain of the translation in which they read or hear it read. What has Dr. Jarvis to say to this? So far as we can understand him, he answers Dr. Milner's question, 1. By abusing and misrepresenting the Holy Council of Trent; 2. Berating the Latin Vulgate; 3. Excusing one error in the Protestant English translation, on the ground of a various reading; 4. Trying in vain to defend another; 5. Asserting that the Protestant version, take it all in all, is a very excellent translation; 6. Placing in parallel columns

an extract from our English version and one from the Protestant, and calling on "plain, unlettered" men to decide between them; 7. Abusing ours for coming through a *Latinized* medium, and for retaining the word *Cephas*, instead of translating it *Peter*, in a passage in which it is not certain that Peter was the person meant; and 8. By leaving a strong impression on the reader that translations can never be worthy of full confidence. — pp. 65–70.

4. But, Dr. Milner asks again, — "Admitting that your Bible is canonical, authentic, faithful, what security have you that you understand it rightly?" Dr. Jarvis is bound to answer this question, for he says, as we have seen, that "the Bible, the written word of God, *in its true intent and meaning*, is the *only* rule of that faith which is necessary to salvation." Besides, what we are to believe is unquestionably the word of God, and the Bible is, and can be, the word of God only in the exact sense intended by its divine Author. If we have no infallible certainty that we have that sense, we cannot have faith; for faith must exclude doubt, and where there is not infallible certainty, where there is a liability to error, doubt is not excluded. Now what certainty has the Protestant, or can he have, that he understands the words of the Bible in the very sense intended by the Holy Ghost? Here we are at some loss to make out what the author really answers. His vituperation of Dr. Milner and the Catholic Church is intelligible enough; but when he comes to the direct answer to the question, he grows dark and profound. He seems himself to feel that there is a difficulty in the case. If, he says, the noble design once entertained by the English Reformers had been carried out, — our Lord himself not having made any provision for the right understanding of his word, we must suppose, — there *would* have been a way, he is sure. The child would have been baptized, early taught the creeds, [what vouches for the creeds?] catechised, in due time confirmed, and then would every day of his life have heard four chapters in the Bible read by a learned priest, and "with that just emphasis and intonation, that the very reading would have conveyed to him the true sense of God's holy word." — p. 74. This *would have been*; but, alas! Catholics and Puritans marred the "noble design," and so it *is not*, and *has not been*. Very unkind on the part of Catholics and Puritans, and very unfortunate for the "churches of the English communion," certainly. If the "noble design" had been carried out, the Protes-

tants would have an authoritative interpreter of the word in the "just emphasis and intonation" of the reader! But who would have gone guaranty for the "emphasis and intonation"? The fact that the priest knew Hebrew and Greek? Alas! we have known men who knew both Hebrew and Greek who had a shocking bad emphasis and intonation, and we presume Dr. Jarvis has known some eminent Hebrew and Greek scholars who were, in his estimation, very bad Biblical interpreters, whether by reading or otherwise.

Dr. Jarvis frankly concedes, that, as matters now stand, the method of arriving at the true sense of the word of God in his communion is not perfect. He says, "*Even in the present weak and imperfect state of our communion, longing as we do for a more devout and general fulfilment of the Church's purposes, I will be bold to say, that no one who clearly understands our system, and follows it in his daily practice, can be carried about by every wind of doctrine and the cunning craftiness of men, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.*" — p. 75. Here the *weak and imperfect* state of the author's communion is taken as a settled fact, and also, that the perfection of the Church is a thing *in futuro*, perhaps, but certainly not in the present. True, after this admission, the author takes courage, grows bold, and asserts — what? "That no one who understands our system," — but who understands it? — "No one who understands our system," — very well, — "and follows it in his daily practice," — that is, understands and *adheres* to it, — "will be carried about by every wind of doctrine." Certainly not; a man who understands and sticks to Episcopalianism is not an Anabaptist, a Quaker, or a Mormon; but is it certain that he understands and adheres to the word of God? How know you that? How be certain of that?

"Thanks be to God, we have a prayer-book, which the most ignorant of our laity can understand, and which embodies in a devotional form the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures." — p. 74. That the most ignorant of your laity, or even the most learned, can understand your prayer-book, may be questioned; but be it so; how are they to know, that, by understanding it, they rightly understand the Scriptures? Because I understand an Episcopal prayer-book, is it certain that I rightly understand the word of God?

But it "embodies the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures." If you say that, you abandon the Protestant rule, and imply the Catholic. But let that pass. How are your most

ignorant laity, or even your most learned laity, to know that your prayer-book embodies in a devotional form the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures? Rely on their ministers? But that were "blind submission," to which (p. 75) you object, and which you regard as the condemnation of Dr. Milner's system. How, indeed, are even your ministers to know the fact themselves? What is the guaranty, even to your ministers, that they do not themselves mistake the Catholic interpretation? Moreover, what authority have they for saying that the interpretation, even if the Catholic interpretation, is the true sense of God's word, since you deny the infallibility of even the Catholic Church, adduce Catholic testimony only as *human* testimony (p. 37), and say that "all attempts to enforce the decision of a present *infallible* interpreter end only in spiritual despotism"? (p. 75.) If there is no *present* infallible interpreter, there can be no present infallible interpretation, and no infallible assurance that any ancient interpretation is infallible; and then no assurance, sufficient for faith, even if we understand your prayer-book, that we rightly understand the Scriptures.

Dr. Jarvis appeals to what he calls *traditive interpretation*, to the traditions, the "consentient testimony of all ages"; but appeals to them as helps only to private judgment. They are to be collected and ascertained by private judgment, not defined and declared, as the Catholic holds, by authority; and when collected and ascertained, private judgment is at liberty to accept, modify, or reject, as seems to it good. But private judgment may err in determining what is the tradition of all ages, what is the consentient testimony of the Fathers; it may gravely mistake as to the traditive interpretation itself; it may also err gravely in the use it makes of it; and therefore, with all the helps it gets from it, be still liable to err in the interpretation of the Scriptures. How, then, is the Protestant to be certain that he rightly understands the word of God, has seized "its true intent and meaning," — and not merely the plain, unlettered Protestant, but even the most gifted and learned? Our author is silent, — nay, not quite! "The *well-taught Christian* [who has taught him, and taught him well?] will apply to him who is set over him in the Lord to resolve his doubts." (p. 75.) That is, he must apply to his pastor, — a plain surrender of the Protestant rule, and, in principle, an equally plain assertion of the Catholic. But who is guaranty for the pastor, if there be no infallible church who teaches him, sends

him, and teaches through him? "There is no more uncertainty in our communion than there has ever been in the Catholic Church." — *Ib.* That is assumption; but at any rate, then, there *is* uncertainty in your communion; how, then, in your communion, be sure that you rightly understand the word of God? "All attempts to enforce the decision of a present *infallible* interpreter end only in spiritual despotism." — *Ib.* We distinguish; the decision of a pretended infallible interpreter, or of an interpreter who is not infallible, we concede it; of an interpreter who is really infallible, we deny it; for submission to truth is spiritual freedom, and the decisions of an infallible interpreter *are* truth. But in saying this, Dr. Jarvis evidently concedes that his communion is not, *at present*, infallible, and then not authorized by Almighty God to teach. "The fires of the Inquisition have made *hypocrites*, not *converts*." — *Ib.* The author's mind must be running on the English Court of High Commission, and we are happy to think his Anglicanism a little modified from what it was under Elizabeth and James.

It is clear, from Dr. Jarvis's own statements and concessions, that he is aware of no method by which, on Protestant principles, either ministers or people can be sure that they rightly understand the word of God, that they seize its true intent and meaning, and hold it in the sense intended by the Holy Ghost. But with any uncertainty on this point, they cannot have faith; for faith and uncertainty cannot coexist in the same mind, on the same subject, as is evident from the force of the terms themselves. But faith is possible, and, if not possible without the Church, then the Church must be, and is. The Reply is constantly recurring to the Church. The author speaks of the *well-taught* Christian; but there cannot be well-taught Christians, unless there be some one competent to teach them. He fails, therefore, to defend his Protestantism, and, as we have seen, concedes in principle the Catholic rule, namely: The word of God at large, written or unwritten, *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*. He then concedes that there is a Catholic Church, whose function it is to teach, understand, and explain the word. Then the first point in the Catholic argument, and which Dr. Milner undertakes to establish, is conceded. Thus far the Reply makes out nothing against Dr. Milner, but, as far as it goes, either concedes or defends all he contends for.

We may pass now to the second question in order, namely,

Which is the Catholic Church, — the church in communion with the See of Rome, or “the churches of the English communion”? There is a Catholic church essential to the rule of faith. This is now certain, so far as regards the argument between Dr. Milner and Dr. Jarvis. This church is none of the minor Protestant sects, by the concession of Dr. Jarvis, and therefore, in an argument with him, they may be thrown out of the question. The controversy, so far as he is concerned, turns, and he wishes it to turn, between the *Roman Catholic Church* and “the churches of the English communion”; for it is, as he tells us in his title-page, only so far as “the churches of the English communion are concerned” that he undertakes to reply to Dr. Milner. Dr. Milner, under this head, maintains that those churches are not the Catholic Church, and that the Roman is; Dr. Jarvis, to refute him, must refute these two propositions. Dr. Milner, if he refutes the pretensions of the Anglican communion, can, against Anglicans, at once, without further argument, conclude his second proposition, that the church in communion with Rome is the Catholic Church; or, if he establishes by direct proofs that this church is the Catholic Church, he can conclude at once against *all* others. Dr. Jarvis, however, does not prove his own church, even if he uncatholicizes the Roman, and must either disprove the pretensions of all pretended ecclesiastical bodies but his own, or prove his own by direct affirmative proofs. Let us see, not whether Dr. Milner has succeeded, for that is not the question, but whether Dr. Jarvis has succeeded in maintaining against him the catholicity of “the churches of the English communion.”

Dr. Jarvis begins by accusing Dr. Milner of having in the outset assumed the point in dispute, by speaking of his church as the *Catholic Church*. In this Dr. Jarvis is wrong, and all he says about Bishop Milner’s “chicanery,” and “quibbling,” and using words in “a double sense,” is irrelevant and unjust. Dr. Milner calls his church *Catholic* from the outset, it is true; but he builds no argument on the name, and in his second part he undertakes to prove that it is what he calls it. The church in communion with the See of Rome, whether in fact the Catholic Church or not, is legitimately so called. Catholic is its official name; the name by which it has always designated itself, and been designated by others. It is its historical name, its proper name, by which it is distinguished in history, and in the common speech of mankind. It is a name

exclusively appropriated to it. No church or ecclesiastical body not in communion with the See of Rome has ever been known and distinguished among men by the name of Catholic. All other churches, or bodies, are known and distinguished in common speech, by the common sense of mankind, and we believe, even by themselves, by some other appellation. She alone bears it, and she has as good a right, when speaking of herself, to call herself by the name Catholic, as Dr. Jarvis has to call himself *Samuel Farmer Jarvis*. If the name is an argument in her favor, that is not her fault. She is not obliged to change her name, because others change their faith and communion.

Dr. Jarvis wishes, we are aware, that "the churches of the English communion" should be called *Catholic*; but those churches have never officially called themselves so. The Anglican Church is officially "the Church of England," and the queen of England, who is its supreme governor, or governess, in her coronation oath, did not swear to protect and defend "the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church," but the "Protestant religion," as established in her realms. The official name of Dr. Jarvis's own society is, "The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America"; and when he himself, in its General Convention, at Philadelphia, in 1844, introduced a resolution changing its name to "Catholic," or "*reformed Catholic*," the Convention voted it down, and by doing so, voted that his church is not *Catholic*; for it is notorious that they hold it to be *reformed*. This of itself is decisive against the catholicity of the *Protestant Episcopal Church*. Dr. Jarvis, in asking us to call ourselves *Romanists*, and him and his friends Catholics, or *Anglo-Catholics*, is not modest. He asks that we should give up the name by which the whole world knows us, and call him and his friends by a name which they have solemnly voted they will not have. We cannot be so discourteous as to call them by what in their case would be a nickname. The "churches of the English communion" call themselves Protestant; they fraternize with Protestants; they regard themselves as the bulwarks of the Protestant religion; and Protestants we shall call them, whenever we wish to distinguish them from those whom all ages have designated by the name of Catholic.

Unquestionably the name we bear is a strong presumption in our favor. The body which has always maintained the name and style of a given corporation is *primâ facie* it; and any

body claiming to be it, which does not use, and which has never been known to use, its name and style, is, *primâ facie*, not it. If this is in our favor, and against Protestant Episcopalians, whose fault is it? Is Dr. Jarvis so very modest as to ask us to give up the name and style we have always borne and used, so as to place ourselves on an equal footing with himself? If so, we may, indeed, admire his modesty, but cannot consent to gratify him. He must oust us from our possession, which we have held from time immemorial, before we yield one iota to oblige even him. Whatever advantage the name *Catholic* gives us is rightfully ours; and we cannot surrender it, without being false to God and unjust to our neighbour. Whatever disadvantage "the churches of the English communion" may labor under in consequence of not having, and never having had, the name and style of the *Church of God*, they must submit to it; we forewarn them that we will not do so much as the lifting of a single hair to relieve them. So it is useless to talk about the name. They are named; and, do their best, they will never be able to make the name *Catholic* stick to them. There is often common sense in names.

"We will not, and cannot," says Dr. Jarvis, (p. 117,) "be drawn from our vantage-ground by the wily manœuvres of Dr. Milner. He knew, and his brethren now cannot but know, that there is no debate between us on the terms of the ancient creeds. The Seventh Article of the Synod of London, in 1552—the same with the Eighth Article of 1662—says, 'The three creeds—Nicene Creed, Athanasius's Creed, and the Apostles' Creed—ought thorowly to be received and believed; for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Scripture.' Thus far, therefore, our faith is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the first four General Councils. From this vantage-ground, I repeat, we cannot and will not be driven; and it is an unfair use of terms, to deny us the name of *Catholic*, or to represent the debate between the English and Roman Communions as if *we* were the *heretics*, and they the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church."

Here we see that Dr. Jarvis claims to stand on a vantage-ground. He asserts that his faith is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council. But what is the proof? "We believe the ancient creeds." But that is a point to be proved, not taken for granted. If you believe the creeds in the sense and for the reason the Catholic Church did at the end of the Fourth General Council, you do, so far as her

faith at the time was embodied in them ; but that you do so believe them is not evident from the fact that you *profess* to receive and believe them ; because you may believe them in some other sense, or for some other reason, than hers. You must prove that you hold them in a Catholic sense, and for a Catholic reason, before you can pretend to stand on the vantage-ground you boast.

To believe the ancient creeds, it is necessary, as is evident from their face, to believe the Holy Catholic Church, as we have also proved, by proving that the rule of faith is the word of God *as understood and explained by the Catholic Church*. In the act of faith, then, there must always be belief of the Church. Now, if we turn to the article of the Synod of London cited above, we find that the reason assigned for believing the ancient creeds is, not that they are the creeds of the Catholic Church, — the word of God as understood and explained by her, — but that “ they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture.” In believing them for this reason, there is no belief of the Catholic Church, expressed or implied, but a virtual denial of the Church. If the reason for believing is the most certain warrant of Scripture, the want of such warrant, even if we had the Catholic Church teaching, would be good reason for *not* believing, and therefore the Church teaching counts for nothing. The Doctor’s vantage-ground, therefore, evidently slides from under him.

Moreover, the ancient creeds, at the time mentioned, were held as *creeds*, and no debate whether they were or were not provable by “ most certain warrants of Holy Scripture ” was allowed, *because the Church had spoken, and concluded debate*. Her authority was held to be final, and no one was at liberty to reject it, on Scriptural or any other grounds ; and every one was bound to believe it under pain of anathema. Is Dr. Jarvis free to open the debate ? If he is, he denies the authority of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council, and his faith is not hers. Is he not free ? What binds him ? The ancient Church ? No ; for it is not on her authority he takes the creeds, but on the alleged fact that “ they may be proved by most certain warrant of Holy Scripture.” What, then, binds him ? The authority of the Synod of London, which asserts that fact ? If so, he makes the Synod authoritative, and, therefore, must prove it is the Catholic Church that speaks in it, before he can allege it, or allege, that, in believing on its authority the ancient creeds, his faith

is that of the Catholic Church at the end of the Fourth General Council. He must, then, prove his church to be the Catholic Church, before he can claim the vantage-ground of which he speaks.

Finally, no man believes the ancient creeds who does not believe the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church. But no man who rejects the authority of that Church, separates himself from her communion, and believes a communion which is not hers to be the Catholic communion, does believe her. Consequently, before Dr. Jarvis can be at liberty to affirm that his faith is that of the Catholic Church at the epoch designated, he must prove the Catholicity of his own communion, and that, in believing it, he believes the Catholic Church of the ancient creeds. These considerations may not, indeed, drive the Doctor from his boasted vantage-ground, but they show, at least, that he does not occupy it.

Dr. Jarvis is not at liberty to pursue the line of argument which he sees would be very convenient for him. He wishes to be allowed to assume, since he professes to believe the creeds, that his faith is that of the Catholic Church in the early ages, from that to conclude his orthodoxy, and then from his orthodoxy to conclude his church. But this will not do. The Church cannot be concluded from the faith; for, without the Church, we have no authority by which to determine what is the faith, whether the ancient or modern faith, — to distinguish, where there is and can be no difference. The Doctor misconceives the question at issue. He labors under the hallucination, that Catholics yield him the early ages of the Church, and that the controversy begins only at the end of the Fourth General Council, — that his faith is admitted to be that of the Catholic Church at that epoch, and that it is contended that he is wanting only in regard to certain matters not expressed in the creeds, and which he alleges are subsequent *additions*, but which Mr. Newman calls *developments*, and he cites Mr. Newman's Essay in proof of it. But the work he cites was written, not by a Catholic, but by a member of the communion to which he himself professes to belong, and its doctrine is not Catholic doctrine. Dr. Jarvis may be assured that Catholics yield him not one iota of antiquity, and no more grant that his faith is that of the Church in primitive than in modern times. His vantage-ground is purely imaginary. We hold ourselves bound by the primitive creed, without alteration, addition, or diminution, save its further explication for the con-

demnation of new errors which from time to time arise. We recognize no *ancient*, no *modern* creed ; for the creed of the Church is always, and everywhere, the same and invariable, — never young, never old. The question is simply, What *was* the creed, or doctrine, of the Church in primitive times ? Settle that question, and you unchurch every pretended church which has deviated, or which deviates from it. But that is not a question for private judgment, to settle by private interpretation of the three creeds enumerated and the early Fathers ; but a question for authority, the authority which proposes and defines the faith, — that is, the Catholic Church herself. Evidently, then, the question, Which is the Catholic Church ? must precede the question, Which is, or who has, the Catholic faith ? If Dr. Jarvis had just simply considered that the doctrine is to be taken from the teacher, not the teacher from the doctrine, he could hardly have fallen into the gross blunder of attempting to establish his orthodoxy without the Church, and then the Church by his orthodoxy. In homely language, he puts the cart before the horse.

The question now returns, Which is the Catholic Church ? And this question must be answered without any appeal to the faith, which we can know only by the Church. The controversy into which Dr. Jarvis seeks to lead us is wholly irrelevant, and could settle nothing for him or for us. Which is the Catholic Church ? There is a Catholic Church, — that is settled ; and, between Dr. Jarvis and Dr. Milner, it must be either the church in communion with Rome, or the churches of the English communion. Which of these is it ?

Were we arguing the question, we should plant ourselves on the fact of prior possession, on the presumptions in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, and there stand, till the Protestant Episcopal Doctor had set forth good and valid reasons for ousting us. But we are not arguing the question ; we are only examining Dr. Jarvis's Reply to Dr. Milner. Dr. Milner undertakes both to prove his own church, and to disprove the pretensions of his opponents. There are certain marks of the true church in the Nicene Creed, and which, at least, all who admit the authority of that creed must accept. Dr. Jarvis finds no fault with them, but, so far as we can understand him, acknowledges them to be the true marks of the true Catholic Church. These marks are, Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity ; — "*Credo Unam Sanctam Ecclesiam, Catholicam et Apostolicam.*" The church which possesses all

these marks is the true Catholic Church ; any body, or association, calling itself *the Church*, that wants *any one* of these, is a false church, and to be rejected. Dr. Milner shows that the Roman Catholic Church possesses all these marks, and that no other so-called church does ; at least, he attempts to show this. Dr. Jarvis, to refute him, must show that they are all possessed by the churches of the English communion ; and, if he fail to do so, he must concede that Dr. Milner is right, and that the *Roman* is the *Catholic Church*. Does he succeed or fail ? Let us hear him.

“ Since the Fourth General Council, the state of the Church has been very materially altered. They who equally maintain the great principles of the ancient creeds are now *riven* into *separate* communions. The question is, not whether there *ought to be unity*, but who has *violated* unity. The question is, not whether *holiness* should be the badge of our Christian profession, but which of the contending parties is the *least unholy*. Our object is, to *gather* together in one the *scattered* and *divided* members of Christ's fold ; to *perfect* holiness on earth, that we may enjoy it in heaven ; to *render* the Church truly Catholic, *as it once was* ; and, for that purpose, to *restore* the blessed communion of the apostolic fellowship.” — p. 117. This evidently implies that Dr. Jarvis considers the Church now existing to be destitute of these four marks, and supposes the question to be, not who possesses or does not possess them, but through whose fault have they been lost.

But the question he would raise cannot be entertained, because it presupposes the Church to have ceased to exist. The Catholic Church, without the four marks enumerated, is not conceivable. The Doctor, therefore, cannot go into any inquiry by whose fault the true Church has lost them, for she cannot lose them. If the view he takes were admitted, we should be obliged to say, the Church, the true Church, we are in pursuit of, does not exist. This is implied in the Doctor's carefully chosen language. *Unity*, he tells us, has been violated, — the members of Christ's fold *scattered* and *divided* ; we are to inquire, not what church is *holy*, but which “ is the *least unholy* ” ; and the purpose of the churches of his communion is, to *recover* unity, to “ *perfect* holiness,” to *render* the Church truly Catholic, and to *restore* the Apostolic communion ; — all expressions which necessarily imply that he holds that there is at present no church existing which is One, Holy, Catholic,

and Apostolic ; for, otherwise, he would not be seeking to revive, restore, or to manufacture such a church.

But there is a Catholic Church to-day, as we have seen. Therefore Dr. Jarvis cannot affirm any thing which denies it. What he affirms, then, cannot be predicated of the *Catholic Church*. But it may apply, and he must hold that it does apply, to "the churches of the English communion" ; for, if he held otherwise, he could not assert what he does. Therefore it is a full admission on his part that the churches of that communion want the marks of Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity. Then, by his own admission, they are not the Catholic Church ; and therefore the Roman Catholic Church is the Catholic Church. Thus both points Dr. Milner undertook to make out are conceded, and the argument, so far as Dr. Jarvis is concerned, is closed. Will not Dr. Jarvis write another Reply ?

We could easily obtain the same conclusion by a dozen different processes, each of which Dr. Jarvis would be obliged to admit to be legitimate ; but we refer our readers to Milner's *End of Religious Controversy* itself, in which they will find all that needs to be said, and far better said than we could say it. Having established, so far as required for our present purpose, the two points which, in the argument, the Catholic has to make out, — or having shown that Dr. Jarvis has not invalidated them, but is really obliged to concede them, and virtually does concede them, — our work is done. We will not follow him into his long discussion concerning particular doctrines, for we never will consent to be drawn by Protestants into any discussion of the sort. If the Catholic Church is the Church of God, all she teaches is true, all she does as the Church is right and holy ; and if it is not acceptable to you, that is your fault, not hers. The question, whether she be the Church of God, — the question as it relates to the motives of credibility, to the grounds for believing her to be the Church of God, commissioned by God himself to teach all nations, all things whatsoever our Lord hath commanded, — we are ready and willing to discuss with Protestants ; for this is a question which is to be settled by the authority of reason, speculative and practical, common to them and to us ; but all beyond is the province of authority, and not debatable.

Dr. Jarvis has taken up nearly forty pages of his work with an attempt to convict Bishop Milner of quoting unfairly and mistranslating his authorities. We have examined that part of his

work, and, setting aside his comments, — which are not to be relied on, — we think the authorities, as he cites them, are much stronger in favor of the Catholic, than as cited by Dr. Milner himself. He has not, so far as we can see, convicted the Bishop of unfairness in a single particular, unless it be unfair to cite an author on one subject, without also citing what he says on some other subject not connected with it. As for mistranslation, if by mistranslation is meant a translation which perverts the sense of the author, he has not, even on his own showing, succeeded in convicting the Bishop of a single instance. We have no space to enter into the discussion, which could, moreover, answer no purpose but that of giving us a chance to display our own patristic learning. But we keep our learning for use, not display, and therefore pass over what Dr. Jarvis says on this point. We have no apprehensions for the reputation of Dr. Milner. A charge of unfairness or of ignorance against him, from Dr. Jarvis, does not move us, nor does it tempt us to a retort. Dr. Milner is beyond the reach of praise or blame, and it is a matter of exceedingly small moment to him or to his brethren, what Dr. Jarvis may think of his scholarship. He cared, when living, little for human approbation or censure. He devoted his eminent abilities, solid learning, and enlightened zeal, to the service of God, who is able to protect him and his reputation. Few men who have written in our language have more effectually served the cause of truth and virtue. He was a man without pretension, without show or parade, free from all arrogance and from all pedantry. It was glory enough for any one man to be the author of the *End of Religious Controversy*, — a work to which thousands owe, and tens of thousands will owe, under God, their happy conversion from Protestant error to Catholic truth. Happy was he in being permitted to write it, and honored is he in falling under the displeasure, and being the object of the vituperation, of Samuel Farmer Jarvis, D. D., LL. D., &c.

But enough. We are not disposed to complain of Dr. Jarvis's want of candor, fairness, and justice; for he is a Protestant minister, and men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles. He has probably done as well, being what he was, as he was able; and not without the grace of God can he be other than he is. We close by a single suggestion, which we beg him to weigh well. His embarrassments evidently arise, not from any objections he has to the Church, but from the fact that he cannot become a Catholic without ceasing to

be an Anglican. He sees clearly enough that Anglicanism is not the Church of God, — that it wants every mark of the true Church. But what shall he do? Shall he say it is no church at all, nothing but a human establishment, and no part of the Church of God? So he must say, if he admits that the Catholic Church still subsists in her normal state. But then all who adhere to his communion are schismatics, heretics, fighting against God, and blaspheming his Spouse. Can he say this? In reply, we ask him, Which is the more difficult to believe, that a little handful of Anglicans, in a corner of the world, during three hundred years have been heretics, or to believe that the whole Christian world for one thousand years, and by far the larger part of all who bear the Christian name for thirteen hundred years, have been involved in frightful errors, sunk in gross superstition and idolatry, — that the Church no longer has a normal existence, that she has failed, and that Almighty God has broken his word?

ART. III. — *Pauline Seward: A Tale of Real Life.* By JOHN D. BRYANT. Baltimore: J. Murphy. 1847. 2 vols. 12mo.

WE gave a brief notice of this work in our Review for April last, and an explanation of that notice in the number following; but as neither the notice nor the explanation appears to have satisfied the author, and as it affords us an occasion for throwing out some additional hints on novel-writing and novel-reading, we venture to approach it again; and, this time, we hope, whether we succeed in pleasing its author or not, that we shall succeed in convincing our readers that we have not rashly or wantonly censured it.

Our brief notice appeared in an article entitled *Recent Publications*, and it must be obvious to all who have done us the honor to read that article, that *Pauline Seward*, and the other works named at its head, were made merely an occasion for offering some comments on certain dangerous tendencies in a portion of our Catholic community. Nothing was farther from the intention of the writer than to make those works the principal subject of his strictures; and nothing he said should, or, in fairness, can be, understood as intended to apply to them,

except what is *expressly* so applied. They were introduced because they were to be noticed, and because they afforded an easy transition to the spirit and tendency on which the writer proposed to remark. When they had served that purpose, they were dismissed, save so far as they encouraged, or did nothing to counteract, what was looked upon as censurable. Undoubtedly, in the article itself, there are many strictures which would be far from just, if applied to *Pauline Seward*, or to any one of the other publications unfavorably noticed; but we did not so apply them, and, if the authors have done so, it is their fault, not ours. Authors are bound to be just, as well as reviewers.

It is true, we assume, throughout our article, that *Pauline Seward*, and the other works censured, spring from and conform to the spirit and tendency of the age and country; but we have no reason to suppose that the authors themselves dispute this, or regard it as a reproach. Mr. Bryant publicly advocates religious novels, on the very ground that "the spirit of the age demands them"; that is, as we understand him, on the ground that they are in harmony with that spirit. No well-instructed Catholic can read the works referred to, without feeling and recognizing the truth of our assumption. But it was precisely to this we chiefly objected. We contended, that Catholic works, instead of being inspired by and conforming to the age and country, as distinguishable from the Church, must be written in the true Catholic spirit, which is always a spirit of uncompromising hostility to every spirit but itself. We were certainly wrong in our strictures, if the standard for a Catholic writer is to be taken from the dominant ideas and sentiments of his age and country; but if it is to be taken from the Church, we were certainly right, — unless we mistook the character of the works censured; — and the authors, in complaining of us, do but condemn themselves.

When it was our misfortune and our shame to be in the ranks of Protestants, and to advocate, as we did, in season and out of season, for some twenty years, the modern doctrine of progress, we held that the standard to which one is to conform is always to be taken from the spirit and tendency of each successive age, as modified by one's own particular nation. This spirit and tendency are never stationary, but always moving onwards to some point not yet reached. Hence, we professed always to be of the "movement party." With it were all our sympathies; in it were all our hopes.

What tended to aid it onward, we for that reason approved ; what tended to arrest or retard it, we for that reason condemned, and resisted as well as we could. But when Almighty God, in his great mercy, was pleased to open our eyes to behold the beauty and loveliness of his immaculate Spouse, and through his unbounded grace, without any merits of our own, to permit us to be enrolled among his children, we were taught, that, instead of taking our standard from the spirit and tendency of the age, we must take it from the Church herself. The Church is invariable and permanent,—speaking always and everywhere the same language, and breathing the same spirit,—representing, on the movable and ever-changing scene of the world, the authority of the immovable, immutable, and eternal God. Whatever is variable, mutable, changing from people to people, and from age to age, is not of her, is in fact opposed to her, and to be resisted. So we were taught ; and, being so taught, we could not understand any concord or alliance between the Church and the spirit and tendency of the age or country, regarded as external to her ; and we therefore felt, that, if we would be a Catholic, we must not only not conform to them, but resist them, and wage with them a stern and uncompromising war.

Before our conversion, we had studied both history and philosophy, especially the philosophy of history, civil and ecclesiastical ; and we had been accustomed always to take sides with heretics against the Church, for we found them invariably the movement party of their age and country. Heresies, we said, originate in the spirit and tendency of their epoch, and in the effort to develop the Church, and carry her, in her doctrines and practice, along with them. We have seen no reason to reject or modify this view, which, moreover, the modern philosophers of Germany and France have clearly demonstrated and firmly established. The heresiarch does not set out with the deliberate intention of founding a heresy. No man ever rises up, and, with deliberate forethought, says, —“ Go to, now, let us devise and found a heresy.” The heresiarch is the man of his times, — *of*, not *for*, his times, — and is the one who, better than any other, embodies or impersonates their dominant ideas and sentiments. He begins by taking his standard of truth from the ideas and sentiments which he finds generally received, and with which he is filled to overflowing ; these, he says, are true, and therefore the Church, if true, must agree with them. He then proceeds to develop the Church, —

to explain her doctrines and practice in their sense. But the Church cannot accept his explanations ; she condemns them, and commands him to disavow them ; but he, through pride and obstinacy, refuses, goes out from her communion, and sets up for himself. Here is the history of the rise of every heresy. Study any age or nation, and you will find its peculiar heresy to have originated in the attempt to conform the Church to its dominant ideas and sentiments, or to incorporate them into her teaching and practice. This is evident from the history of Gnosticism, Manichæism, Arianism, Protestantism, or any other heresy you may select. What is Lamennaisism but the attempt to develop the Church, in the sense of the dominant socialism of the day ? What is Hermesianism but an attempt to do the same, in the sense of the dominant philosophy of our times, especially in Germany ? Every age, every nation, necessarily seeks by all its force to develop Christianity, in the sense of its own dominant ideas and sentiments ; and, in every age and nation, the Church is obliged to be on her guard against it. And it is only by her constant vigilance, and her stern and uncompromising resistance to it, that she preserves the original deposit of faith, and transmits it from people to people, and from age to age, untarnished, unaltered, without addition and without diminution.

If we are right in this, — and what Catholic will say we are not ? — the genuine Catholic studies always and everywhere, not to conform his Church to his age and country, but them to her. In them are always the seminal principles of heresy, which only wait the fitting opportunity to germinate and bear their poisonous fruit ; in her alone is the true Catholic spirit, which, developed, ripens into the saint. The only conformity the Church can practise is that of shaping her practical measures so as, amid all the changes around her, to maintain her own independence, freedom, and vigor of action, and so as the most effectually to resist and overcome their evil influence. We are not so simple as to suppose, that, in saying this, we are saying any thing new or wonderful, or any thing which every Catholic does not know, at least as well as we ; but we do suppose that we are stating an important truth, one not to be disregarded without incalculable evil, and which the whole force of every age and nation tends directly to make us disregard, or at least to misapprehend ; therefore, a truth which needs to be constantly repeated, and guarded with the most jealous eye by all the faithful. Nothing can be more hurtful to

Catholic life, and therefore destructive to the souls of men, than to neglect it. What, then, ought to be said of works which spring from forgetfulness of it, which are inspired by the spirit of the times, and therefore, as far as their influence goes, tend to strengthen the great enemy which the Church is obliged ever to combat? They strengthen what is always too strong. Breathing the spirit of the times, chiming in with popular ideas and sentiments, they excite in the great majority of the faithful no alarm; they seem sound and orthodox, and their deadly poison is sucked in without the least suspicion. Works which assail popular ideas and sentiments have comparatively little power to do harm, for the public is on their guard against them. The danger comes from those works which give expression to what is already working in the public mind, which appeal to what the public are predisposed to adopt and accept, and appear to give a religious sanction to what is already strongly desired. Is a Catholic reviewer to be censured for cautioning the public against such works? and are their authors to regard themselves as outraged, if he ventures to tell them that their works do harm, that they should either not write at all or write different works, — works which, instead of aiding the development of tendencies already popular, and exposing their readers to all dangerous influences, shall tend to arm them to resist them? Does he, in this, transcend his legitimate province?

So much we have thought proper to say, that our readers may understand our general principle of criticism as a Catholic reviewer. The Church is our rule of art, as well as of faith and morals. In proceeding to the special consideration of the work before us, we repeat, from our former notice, that we by no means consider *Pauline Seward* as the worst of its class, but, in fact, one of the least objectionable. It is, as we then said, the most interesting and the least objectionable of any of the Catholic novels written on this side the water that have appeared since *Father Rowland*. It is not without solid merit; it contains much valuable instruction, many judicious reflections, and several well-merited censures and well-timed rebukes. Nevertheless, it has some grave faults, and principally faults into which the author has fallen, as it seems to us, in consequence of not knowing, or not considering, that between religion and the secular spirit there is, and can be, no other relation than that of uncompromising hostility.

We do not complain specially of the author for having so

far conformed to the fashion of the day as to borrow from it the form of his work. There are works which are sometimes, though not properly, called *novels*, to which we do not object, nay, which we prize very highly. An author is not censurable for choosing the form of a fictitious narrative, and he may often do so with great propriety and effect. But the "novel of instruction," as it is called, designed to set forth a particular doctrine, system, or theory, whether sacred or profane, in an artistic point of view, is, in our judgment, always objectionable. The form of the novel is never proper in those works which are addressed specially to the understanding, and is allowable only in those designed rather to move and please than to enlighten and convince. The novel must always have a story, a plot of some sort, from which its interest arises, and in which it centres. But the interest of a story is diverse from the interest excited by a logical discussion, and not compatible with it. The one demands action, movement, is impatient of delay, and hurries on to the end; the other demands quiet, repose, and suffers only the intellect to be active. It is impossible to combine them both in one and the same piece so as to produce unity of effect.

Especially is this true of what are called *religious* novels. The aim of these novels is to combine a story of profane love with an argument for religion. But the distance between the interest of such a story and that of a theological discussion is much greater than the distance between it and that of any secular or profane discussion. No two interests are more widely separated, or less capable of coalescing, than the interest of profane love and that of religion. Persons in love, or taken up with love-tales, are in the worst possible disposition to listen to an argument for religion, or to appreciate the sublime and beautiful truths of the Gospel. Love is a partial frenzy, and lovers are always only just this side of madness. Reason is silenced, and passion is mistress. The only religion lovers can understand or relish is the religion of the natural sentiments and affections, that is to say, no religion at all. Nothing is more absurd than for a novelist to mingle in his work a story of profane love and a story of religious conversion, two things which will no more mix than oil and water.

Every subject should be allowed to speak in its own natural language. The natural language of the understanding, and therefore of all works primarily intended for it, is prose. The novel, though unrhymed, is not properly a prose compo-

sition ; it belongs, according to the critics, to the department of poetry, and should, therefore, conform to the essential laws of poetry. The primary object of poetry is, not to instruct, but to move and please. It addresses the sentiments, affections, imagination, rather than the understanding. Whenever the author reverses this, and seeks, under the poetical form, first of all to instruct, to bring out a theory, or to defend a doctrine, he ceases to be the genuine poet, and becomes the doctor or philosopher, and fails to preserve the requisite congruity between the matter and the form of his work. Most readers, we apprehend, find even Dryden's *Hind and Panther* a heavy book, notwithstanding its brilliant imagination, keen wit, various learning, sound and deep theology. No one can read *The Disowned*, *Paul Clifford*, *Rienzi*, or *The Last of the Barons*, by Bulwer, without feeling the author's moralizing and philosophizing an annoyance, however much he may admire them in themselves considered. They retard the action of the piece, and are usually skipped by the reader. An author may introduce variety, even diversity, in the same piece, but never at random. He has no room for caprice. The diverse elements he addresses must be of the same general group, and capable of coalescing and conspiring to unity of effect. He must follow the law and adhere to the relations which Nature herself establishes.

Let it not be supposed, that, in objecting to the heterogeneous compound of profane love and theology in the same piece, or to the "novel of instruction," that we are contending that all works should be grave and didactic. Poetry has its place as well as prose. The Holy Ghost has not disdained to address us in the language of poetry, and the Church adopts it when she chants the praises of the Most High. Æsthetic works may be as desirable and as profitable as logical works. There is no essential element of human nature that needs to be neglected, or that may not be legitimately addressed. On this point we have no quarrel with novelists or poets. That all the elements of our nature may be turned to a religious account, and made to work in the service of God, is no doubt true ; and here we agree perfectly with the *religious* novelist. His aim is to enlist our whole æsthetic nature in the service of religion. This is a just and noble aim ; and, so far as he gives us works which realize it, we applaud him and commend them.

But here is the point on which we are liable to err, and on

which all our religious novelists, properly so called, do err, and fatally err. Let us see if we can understand the matter. The novel belongs to the sphere of art, and is subject to the laws of art ; the religious novel, to that of religious art, and is subject, not only to the laws of art, but also to those of religion. It is the subjection of art to religion that makes it religious art. It is very possible to intend to be, and to fancy we are, in the sphere of religious art, when, in point of fact, we are only in that of secular art. We must have a clear view of the radical distinction between the two classes of art, or we shall not be able to say in all cases which is which. What, then, is the radical distinction between religious art and secular art ? Both are æsthetic, both have for their primary object to move and please, and both move and please substantially the same elements of human nature. So far they agree ; wherein do they differ ? They differ precisely in that in which what is religious differs from what is secular. The principle of the secular is the natural, and that of the religious is the supernatural. The two species of art, then, differ in this, that in secular art, the principle of the effect, or that which moves and pleases, is the expression of the natural ; in religious art, it is the expression of the supernatural or divine.

Secular art embodies only the natural, and it moves and pleases the sentiments and imagination by representations of the objects to which they are naturally inclined, or which are naturally fitted to excite and gratify them ; its tendency is, to exalt and endear the natural, — to render our natural life more attractive and intense. Religious art moves and pleases the sentiments and imagination by representations of a beauty and worth which is superhuman, above nature ; and its tendency is, to lift them out of the natural order, to exalt us to a higher than our natural life, and to render more easy and intense the supernatural life of religion. When the effect produced proceeds from the representation of nature, it is not religious, and the piece does not belong to religious art, although the artist may have aimed to serve religion ; because the natural or the human never by a natural cause does or can slide into the religious.* Religion is never a development of nature, or the

* Our readers must not suppose that we mean to deny to the religious artist the use of natural objects. He is at liberty to range through the whole of nature, and we are aware of nothing in nature that he may not lawfully use. All we contend is, that he cannot use natural objects as nature, and that they serve his purpose only as he supernaturalizes them, by informing them with his own supernatural life.

natural exercise or affection of the human. It is always supernatural and divine. Pelagianism is a heresy. No motion or affection of sentiment, imagination, reason, or will, not from a supernatural principle as well as for a supernatural end, is a religious motion or affection ; otherwise, the infused habit of grace would not be necessary to the religious life. The religious act is done not only *for* God, but *from* God. By his infused grace, God is in the actor, as the principle from which he acts, no less than before him, as the end to and for which he acts. It is in this we find the distinction between the religious life and the secular or natural life, — the life we live by nature. No life lived from nature is religious in the Catholic sense ; for God, not as author of nature, but as author of grace, is the beginning and end of religion, and in it we live from him, through him, for him, and to him, to whom belongs all the glory.

This being true of religion, it must be true also of art, in so far as it is religious. Art is the expression of the interior life of the artist. In his works the artist projects himself. The beauty he expresses or embodies in them he has first taken in and made integral in his own life, and in them he is simply attempting to realize without what he has already realized within. Such his life, such his art. Hence the reason why there is no Protestant religious art to which we can award the palm of excellence. Protestants are not deficient in natural endowments ; they do not want opportunity, instruction, or application, nor even the power to perceive and appreciate natural beauty ; but they cannot be artists of a high order, because they have not the true and beautiful in their own life. Their life partakes of the defects and deformities of their religion. It has no unity, no wholeness, no harmony ; it is broken, incomplete, discordant, cold and weak, pale and sickly ; and so is and must needs be their art. They may feebly imitate, faintly copy, but can produce no masterpiece. No man can express what is not in him. The artist must first incorporate into his own life that which he would embody in his art. Every painter, whatever else he paints, paints himself, as every writer, whatever else he writes, writes himself. The art does not make the life, but the life the art. The vast treasures of Catholic art, which the ages have accumulated, in so far as truly Catholic, are only the expression of the interior divine life of the Church, which her children live by their communion with her, and which was as perfect

before the expression as afterwards. Religion preceded the Gregorian and produced it ; the Church preceded St. Peter's and built it. The Church has produced and fostered art, but not for the sake of art, nor yet, as some would persuade us, for the sake of pressing the senses, sentiments, and imagination into her service, but for the sake of communicating, through every possible avenue, her own supernatural life. The life was in her ; she would communicate it, and she embodied it in the chant, the cathedral, the picture, the statue, the hymn. Men beheld, and were ravished.

Religious art, it follows, must be the expression of the religious life, and the principle of the life it quickens or fosters must be the same with the principle of the life it expresses. As, in secular art, the artist expresses or embodies the life of nature, so, in religious art, the artist expresses or embodies the supernatural life of God. This supernatural life, thus expressed, tends to quicken or strengthen, in those who contemplate the expression, a life like itself, proceeding from the same principle and tending to the same end ; and it is in this way, and in this alone, that art serves the cause of religion. But the artist can express no life which he has not ; if he lives not the life of religion, his art, whatever its theme, or whatever the end he had in view, will remain secular art, and tend only to nourish the life of nature. The theme does not determine the quality of the art. Sacred words may be set to profane airs ; masses may be sung which recall the opera ; there are Madonnas which might have been portraits of the artist's mistress ; and we have seen prints from Paris intended to be pious, in which we detect only a human life, and which have little power to kindle devotion. No matter with what skill and genius the artist works, no matter for what purpose, no matter what subject he selects, his work is religious only as it conforms to the conditions of religious life, proceeds from and expresses the supernatural principle of that life.

It is here that religious artists in general, and religious novelists in particular, seem to us to err. We restrict our remarks to the latter. Religious novelists seem to us to suppose that it is lawful to apply to nature its natural stimulants, if the purpose of the artist be to aid religion, or if, at the same time that he offers them these natural stimulants, he presents the understanding some grand and solid arguments for the Church ; to proceed on the assumption, that nature, as nature, nature without elevation or transformation by grace, may be pressed into the

service of God, and made to contribute to a religious end. They appear to overlook the essential incongruity between nature and grace, and to be unaware that the affection of sentiment and imagination by natural causes is wholly repugnant to that supernatural affection which alone is religious, and that, just so much as we have of the one affection, just so little must we have of the other. They appear to think that nature and grace are both of the same order, that they may be yoked together and draw peaceably to the same end. But this is only another phase of that spirit of secular conformity to which we have already called attention, or rather, it is the very principle and root of that conformity, which the Church cannot countenance, and which she does and must everywhere anathematize and resist.

Religion has always and everywhere three deadly enemies to combat, — the world, the flesh, and the devil. With these she must wage war to the knife in what is great and in what is little. Their spirit, wherever and in whatever guise it may appear, is opposed to her. But the natural in man, since the fall, inclines always to them. By the fall it has been turned away from God, and inclined to evil. Hence it is, that religion always, and in all things, is obliged to resist nature, for the world and the devil tempt and injure us only in and through it. She is never that to which nature inclines, but is always that from which it is averse, and which it resists. Between it and her there is and can be no alliance, no peace, no truce. It is only in so far as she transforms it, lifts it into the supernatural, and as it is held there by the power of Almighty God, that she can employ nature, or that it can serve her. She can never use it as nature, never trust it to itself, never let it have its own head in any thing. She must be not only supreme, but exclusive, or she cannot be at all. She can form no copartnership, even though placed at the head of the concern. Hence the stern and rigid rule of life enjoined by our Lord, and which all who would be his disciples must follow. We are to deny ourselves, to crucify, annihilate nature, to live never, in no thing whatever, our own life, — that is, the life of nature, — but always, and in all, the new, the divine life of Christ our Saviour, who is our true life, the only life we can live whose end is not death. To this rule there is no limitation, no exception. “If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall

lose it ; and he that shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." — St. Matt. xvi. 24, 25.

In this we cannot be wrong. The aim of the Church is, to liberate us from nature, and to subject us to grace, which is true freedom. "If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed." — St. John viii. 36. The saints are those in whom this freedom has been consummated. They are they who have crucified nature, heroically resisted and overcome it ; they who have trampled on it, denied themselves all the consolations, pleasures, and delights which proceed from it, or from its natural exercise. They have scorned and treated as evil all its delectations ; they have allowed themselves no consolations, no delights, no enjoyments but those derived from divine grace, and have persevered unto the end in trampling on the life of nature, and in living only the supernatural life of God. They have loved God, not only supremely, — "above all things," — but exclusively, — "with the whole heart and soul." We know they have been right, for the Church declares it in the act of their canonization ; we know that there is no attaining to Christian perfection but in following their example. Art is Christian only as it has the same aim, only as it triumphs over nature, and tends exclusively to liberate us from nature, and to raise us above it. In so far, then, as it appeals to nature, proceeds itself from nature as its principle, and produces by its representations of nature natural affections, it is not only not religious, but actually irreligious, tending to make us more enamoured of our natural life, and therefore more averse to the religious life.

This may strike hard at all profane art, and imply that it is not only not useful, but actually hurtful, to religion ; but if so, we cannot help it. It is not we who make all secular influences, as such, prejudicial to religion ; and we could not alter the fact, were we to contend to the contrary. Our life here has but one purpose, — to gain heaven. This is undeniable. We can, then, lawfully live only for heaven. We cannot live for this and for something else, too. This is not merely the *principal*, but it is the *only* end of our present existence. Is not this what we teach our children in the catechism ? "*Ques.* Who made you ? *Ans.* GOD. *Ques.* Why did he make you ? *Ans.* That I might know him, love him, and serve him in this world, and be happy with him for ever in the next." Here is the end, the only end, for which God made us. Words cannot alter it. The fact is so, and so it

will and must be. We may, if we choose, neglect this end, and live and labor for some other end ; but we have no right to do so, and cannot without acting contrary to the will of God, disobeying his commands, and falling under his displeasure, his wrath, and condemnation. But this end, we know, is gained, not by following nature, but by resisting and crucifying it, — resolutely, heroically, by divine grace, refusing to live its life, or to derive any pleasure from it. As our end is one and supernatural, and to be gained only by supernatural means, where is the need of what is profane, and what other than a hurtful purpose, as far as it goes, can it be expected to serve ? “Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things ; BUT *one thing is necessary.*” — St. Luke x. 41.

If heaven were the development of our natural life, or if it were to be gained by the natural cultivation of our natural powers, the case would be different. Then secular art and literature might not only not injure us, but even be serviceable to us ; we could then join with M. Audin in his glorification of the *Renaissance*, agree throughout with Digby in his *Ages of Faith*, and even find something to sympathize with in the sentimentalizing about Catholic art of Puseyites, and Anglican Ecclesiologists, who seem to suppose that they approach the faith in proportion as they restore to their ministers orthodox vestments, and provide them with a table fashioned after an altar. But no natural cultivation of our natural powers, scientific or æsthetic, advances us a single step towards heaven. To be able to admire Catholic architecture and music, or even to delight in our ascetic literature, is no necessary indication of Catholicity. The Unitarian does not make his meeting-house a church by inserting triplet windows, and surmounting it with a cross ; nor evince, by so doing, that he is approaching that “faith without which it is impossible to please God.” The unlettered rustic, or the rude savage, is as near heaven as the erudite scholar, the profound philosopher, or the accomplished artist. Indeed, mere human culture, without grace, only removes one the farther from God, and increases his difficulty of fulfilling the great and only purpose of his existence here. “Amen, I say unto you, unless you be converted, and become as little children, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” — St. Matt. xviii. 3. “For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and the prudence of the prudent I will reject. Where is the wise ? Where is the scribe ?

Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For, seeing, that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe." — 1 Cor. i. 19 – 21. "And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not in the loftiness of speech or of wisdom, declaring to you the testimony of Christ; for I judged not myself to know any thing among you but Jesus Christ and him crucified. And I was with you in weakness, and in fear, and in much trembling; and my speech, and my preaching, was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power; that your faith might not stand on the wisdom of man, but on the power of God. Howbeit, we speak wisdom among the perfect; yet not the wisdom of this world, neither of the princes of this world, who are destroyed." — *Ib.* ii. 1 – 6. They who are foremost in natural science, wisdom, and refinement are usually the last to discover and yield to true religion. They seek afar for what is nigh them, and where the good they seek is not to be found. The way of the Gospel is too simple and easy for them, and they scorn it. What they seek for, and rarely find, God reveals to the simple. "Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones." — St. Matt. xi. 25. In giving us heaven, if we are so happy as to merit it, God does not reward what we are, become, or do by nature; he rewards in us simply his own supernatural gifts, — crowns his own grace: — "*Ergo coronat te, quia dona sua coronat, non merita tua.*"* Grace is all; nature, or its natural cultivation, which is a purely human work, is nothing. We live, therefore, for heaven, only as we live the life of grace; then there is no legitimate life for us but the life of grace; for to live for heaven is the only legitimate purpose of our existence here. All, then, not of grace is not only not to be sought, but is hostile to us, is a clog, a hindrance, to our spiritual progress. Have not the saints told us so? Is not this wherefore they turn their backs on nature, and trample on its pleasures? And has not the Church sanctioned both their words and their deeds by canonizing them, and proposing them to our love and veneration?

Doubtless, some will say, to evade the force of this, which is so clearly warranted by the lives of the saints, that all Chris-

* S. Aug. *Enarrat. in Psalm.* cii. n. 7.

tians are not saints, and that we cannot expect all to become so. This, unhappily, is too true ; but it is no reason why we should not labor to induce all to strive to attain to the full measure of heroic sanctity we love and venerate in the saints. The smaller the number aiming at Christian perfection, the smaller the number that will reach it ; and we who come short of it in our aims have but too much reason to fear that we shall come short of heaven in our attainments. All may attain to perfection, if they choose. Nothing hinders us but our love of the world, our attachment to creatures, our unwillingness to give up all we have and are for God, who gave up his own life for us. If we fall below the true standard of perfection, it is solely because we do not choose to reach it, — because we content ourselves with imperfection, and do not do as well as we might, and as the Church wishes and exhorts us to do. Our sole business here is, to strive after Christian perfection ; and we have, if we do not refuse it, the assistance of the infinite God to gain it. Never should Christians aim at less. Never should we, who write for the faithful, propose less. Nor should we, who are not in religion, suppose that imperfection is more commendable in us than in those who are ; perfection is for us as well as for them, and the law of its attainment is the same in both. Whether, therefore, we live in the world or out of it, we must be careful not to live the life of the world, — make it our constant study, grace assisting, to deny ourselves, to crucify nature, to despise alike its pains and its delectations, and to live, not only chiefly, but exclusively, the supernatural life of God. All that is not for this supernatural life is against it. “He that is not with me,” says our Lord, “is against me.” — St. Matt. xii. 30.

We have now an infallible rule for judging all artistic productions, to whatever species of art they belong, whether to architecture, music, painting, sculpture, poetry, or eloquence. All that is profane, or not religious, is hurtful in a greater or less degree ; and none is religious, save in so far as it embodies the supernatural life of religion, as the principle of the interest it excites or of the gratification it affords. With this rule before us, it is easy to determine the worth of *Pauline Seward*, now in hand. If it comes within the sphere of Christian art, we have no grave objections to urge ; if it remains, notwithstanding the purpose of the author, within the sphere of profane art, we must, if we value religion, renounce it. The author may be saved, so as by fire, but his works must be consumed. In

order to judge *Pauline Seward* properly, we must eliminate the argumentative and didactic portion, and consider only the æsthetic portion; because it is obvious, at a glance, that its interest does not arise from the logical discussion carried on, nor from the formal instruction on faith and theology conveyed. The author evidently does not rely on these for the interest of his work; for if he did, he would not have adopted the form of the novel. He has introduced the other matter, because he felt, that, if he had confined himself to these, and written merely a grave and formal argument for Catholicity, or against Protestantism, it would have wanted the interest necessary to make it generally read. These are not inserted to relieve the story, but the story is introduced to relieve these. The æsthetic portion is, therefore, unquestionably, that which is relied on as the principle of its interest, and the author's study has evidently been so to blend the æsthetic with the logical and didactic, that the reader shall not be able to secure the pleasure afforded by the one, without taking in the instruction afforded by the other.

As to the quality of the æsthetic interest and gratification of the work, there really can be but one opinion with those who take the trouble to analyze it. We are unable to find, in this respect, any essential difference between *Pauline Seward* and the common run of profane novels. Undoubtedly, it stops short of the extreme to which some of them go; but the difference is solely one of degree, not one of kind. We readily admit that we can find in Bulwer, James, Dickens, and others, many things offensive to faith and morals, which we do not find in Mr. Bryant; but we find nothing in his novel, so far as it is not grave and didactic, which we do not, in principle at least, find in them. Indeed, it must needs be so, from the very principle on which the writer consciously proceeds in its composition. He finds the public enamoured of novel-reading, that novels are the works in the greatest demand, and in which interest is most generally taken. He seeks to seize upon this very interest, and to turn it to a religious account. "If I write," we may imagine him to say to himself, "a purely religious work, which shall have only a religious interest, nobody will read it, and nobody will profit by it; I must, therefore, consult the public taste, and afford the public the sort of interest and gratification it demands; only I will seek to moderate the degree, and, at the same time, make my novel the vehicle of some useful, moral, and religious instruction." The

work is, by its very design, an attempt to yoke together nature and grace, to make them draw together in the same team. But "thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together." — Deut. xxii. 10. What is here forbidden is, in its mystical sense, precisely what the author has proposed to do. If he proposed to combine the interest of the ordinary novel with religious instruction, it was not possible for him to execute his design without making his novel, in so far as a novel, the same in kind with the profane novels of the day.

If we descend to details, we shall find that he has so made it. The scene is laid, and the characters are drawn, with obvious reference to the ordinary *novel* interest they may excite, and the natural gratification they may afford. If not, why is the scene laid in Mordant Hall, amid regal magnificence, and all the paraphernalia of wealth and fashion? Why so much attention bestowed on the rank and worldly position of the chief actors, — so much care taken to endow those we are to like with all the personal beauty and natural attractions, and to furnish them with all the worldly advantages and accomplishments, which the author's experience or imagination could suggest? Why, but because the author is aware that the great mass of his readers are fond of the world, hankering after wealth and fashion and worldly distinctions, and are gratified to be permitted to feast upon them, if only in imagination? Suppose the scene had been laid in some poor man's hut, and the characters introduced to have been only very ordinary characters, in whom the reader could find only a spiritual or religious pleasure, — would not the quality of the interest of the work have been wholly changed? The reader is deeply interested in Pauline, but how much of that interest is personal, and would be lost, if, without any change in her spiritual character, all else were changed? Suppose her deprived of her personal attractions, her marvellous beauty, her extraordinary understanding, and polite accomplishments, her exquisite taste and manners, and to be some poor, ill-bred, ill-favored, weather-beaten, hard-working rustic, knowing nothing of the great world, and familiar only with her ewes and lambs, poultry-yard or potato-patch, destitute of every particle of romance, ignorant as the child unborn of the fact that she has nerves, or that it is a lady-like quality to swoon or faint at every mishap or sudden emotion, too constantly employed in providing for the stern necessities of existence, to be poetic or sentimental, — suppose her this, and suppose the question of her

soul's salvation one day arises in her mind, and she undertakes to find out the true Church of God, and to comply with the demands of her Saviour, would not the interest excited by the story of her conversion, though not less to a right-minded person, be of an entirely different order from that which we now feel in the conversion of the marvellous daughter of the lordly Calvin Seward?

The episode of "Little Marie" has much sweetness and tenderness. No one will dispute that "Little Marie" is a sweet and interesting child, and none the less so for her striking family resemblance to Oliver Twist and Bulwer's Fanny, half-sister to Alice; but how much of the interest she excites is religious? how much purely natural? Give her the same spiritual character she now has, but let her be without her natural sprightliness and beauty, and let it really be understood from the first that she is some pauper's daughter, just run away from the workhouse, and how much of the interest we now take in her would remain? We know, as soon as she is introduced, that she is the child of distinguished parents, that she has had a beautiful and accomplished mother, that some terrible reverse has happened to her, that a mystery hangs over her, and perhaps connected with her is a story of dark and powerful crime. All this every novel-reader foresees, and is certain of the moment she seeks refuge from the October snow-storm in Philadelphia, on the steps of Mordant Hall. We detect nothing of purely religious interest in all this.

The conversion of Pauline is an affair in which the reader takes some interest, but it is rather the interest of curiosity, and of simple humanity, than of religion. We see the girl is troubled in her mind, and we are afflicted that any sorrow should corrode the heart of so sweet and beautiful a creature; she is engaged in solving an intellectual problem, and we wish her to succeed; we are aware, that, if she becomes a Catholic, as we know beforehand she will, it will affect her worldly position, and we are curious to see how she will behave herself, how she will bear the loss of her former friends and associates; but we are made to feel little or no interest in regard to the danger she is in of losing her soul while out of the Church, or the infinite blessing she will receive by being converted and persevering in the love of God to the end. Her conversion is so managed as to make the reader half feel that it is the Church who needs her, not she who needs the Church.

Eugene Neville's conversion interests us chiefly by its rela-

tion to his union with Pauline ; and when both are happily converted, we feel much more impressed with the fact that two lovers may now marry and enter into domestic bliss, than that two souls are snatched from perdition. The story of Charles Neville, full of dark interest, is, as to its substance, virtually what one may read in almost any novel or magazine he takes up at random. It is the story of an ill-assorted marriage ; cruelty, crime, abandonment, on the part of the husband, — patience, suffering, destitution, and death of the angel wife, leaving a poor orphan child to be sent to the almshouse.

The author dwells too much on the worldly sacrifices which one makes for religion. His heroine says she does not count them, but we see that she does. He appears to think it a great thing that she found courage to stammer out an avowal of her faith in presence of her lover, who detested it. We have heard of Christians, — men, women, and even children, — who avowed their faith, without stammering too, when they knew by avowing it they would be immediately put to the most excruciating tortures and death. What is it to lose wealth, social position, father, and lover, even to beg, to starve, and to die in the street for religion ? Does not one thus gain God for father, Jesus Christ for lover, and heaven for an everlasting home ? If we are Christians, why do we keep up such a mighty pother about the petty vexations and inconveniences we may be called for a moment to endure here ? The terrible struggle through which the author carries Pauline may be very natural, but why make so much of it ? Why not fix the attention on the grace which sustains, and the heaven which rewards, rather than on the pains that rebellious nature may suffer in being reduced to subjection, or, more properly, in having its head crushed ? Why not leave morbid anatomy to the physicians and surgeons ?

Poor Pauline's father is terribly angry when he finds she has become a Catholic, and disowns her as his daughter. No doubt of it ; what better could be expected of the Presbyterian worldling, who cared for nothing but his social position and importance, and the worldly rank and influence of his daughter ? But why represent Pauline as ready to fall on her knees and ask his forgiveness ? What in the world had the poor girl done that needed his forgiveness ? Was it becoming a Catholic, professing her faith openly, or being unwilling to wed a man who despised the Church of God ? We see nothing for which she needed to ask pardon, except for having

even debated the question whether she should or should not consent to marry Eugene, and intimating that she might, if he would engage to respect her religion. For this she did need to ask pardon, not of her father, but of God. Every Catholic, man or woman, should regard marrying out of the Church as a thing not even to be thought of. Does the good Catholic ever debate a moment whether he will or will not do what the Church abhors?

The author has interwoven with the story of Pauline's conversion several love-stories, from which a considerable portion of the interest of his book arises. In these, it is due to him to say, that he has kept within the limits of conventional morality, and would not deserve any special censure for them, if profane love could ever be a proper subject for a popular work. He has observed a certain moderation, we own, in treating this dangerous topic, but the love of which he treats is in kind precisely that which makes up the common staple of profane novels, — the same that one finds in Bulwer, James, Dickens, or any popular novelist of the day, — and it is idle to object to the extent to which others may push a principle which we hold in common with them. The evil is not simply in more or less, but it is in introducing profane love at all, as a source of interest, in a work intended for general reading. No Catholic father is delighted to see his sons or his daughters reading stories of love and marriage; the ideas and fancies such stories rarely fail to suggest are sure to come soon enough without the aid of books. We do not recollect a story of profane love, after the fashion of modern novels, written by one of the saints, nor a spiritual writer who recommends the reading of such stories as aids to devotion, or as helps against temptations. "It is necessary," says St. Liguori, whose authority we must think is not inferior to that of the author of *Pauline Seward*, "to abstain from reading bad books, and not only from those which are positively obscene, but also from those which treat of profane love, such as certain poems, *Ariosto Pastor Fido*, and all such works. O fathers! be careful not to allow your children to read romances. These sometimes do more harm than even obscene books; they infuse into young persons certain malignant affections which destroy devotion, and afterwards impel them to give themselves up to sin. 'Vain reading,' says St. Bonaventura, 'begets vain thoughts and extinguishes devotion.' Make your children read spiritual books, ecclesiastical histories, and the

lives of the saints. And, I repeat it, do not allow your daughters to be taught letters by a man, though he be a St. Paul, or a St. Francis of Assisium. The saints are in heaven." *

What a saint forbids fathers to allow their children to read, and what, if read, tends to extinguish devotion, no Catholic should ever permit himself to write. There are subjects which, if treated at all, must be treated only professionally and for the professional. The very fact, that love is a subject that awakes so general an interest in the great majority of readers, and is so easily made available by an author to carry off a very dull book, is itself a sufficient reason why it should never be made in any degree the subject of popular literature. It is strange that any person, instructed at all in religion, and not altogether ignorant of human nature, should for a moment think to the contrary; and how our pious authors can reconcile it to their consciences to send out works which cannot fail to deepen the malignancy of religion's most unmanageable and deadliest foe is what we are not able to understand. No matter how small the flame, how skilfully or delicately we apply it to a heap of tow, the tow will be fired and consumed. As a father, as an humble Catholic, we entreat our authors to choose some other subject than that of profane love on which to write.

These remarks are sufficient to justify our former unfavorable judgment of *Pauline Seward* as a Catholic novel. But even the graver portions of the work are not free from faults of a very serious character. The author, in his second volume, chapter xix., expressly, or by necessary implication, maintains that the Church has received no promise of impeccability, — that, acting as the Church, she can do wrong, has done wrong, and extensively adopted measures which involve a false and even an abominable principle in morals; and he defends her by appealing from what she once was to what she now is, and offers the circumstances and intelligence of the age, especially in this favored country, as a guaranty against her future misbehaviour. We can conceive nothing more anti-Catholic than this. It involves a denial of the infallibility of the Church as a teacher of morals; it denies her sanctity, asserts her reformability, and finally raises the age and country, in point of morals, above her, and makes them, instead of her,

* *Instructions on the Commandments and Sacraments.* Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1847. pp. 152, 153.

our reliance for the maintenance of justice. If this does not surrender the whole argument, and make it both impious and absurd to attempt to defend her as the Church of God, we know not the meaning of our mother tongue.

We are far from supposing the author was aware that he was saying all this ; we freely acquit the young gentleman of all anti-Catholic intentions ; but this, though every thing for him, is nothing for his book. In judging him, we must judge him according to his intentions ; but in judging his book, we must judge it according to the obvious and natural sense of its language. It is true, his language is loose, and, in some cases, we may charitably suppose the author does not mean all that he says ; but, though we understand very well the meaning and duty of charity when judging of persons, we do not understand them in relation to books. A newspaper editor or a reviewer, obliged to publish at stated periods, often compelled to write in haste, and to publish his article before giving it its last finish, may rightfully demand a charitable construction of his language, and that the reader give it an orthodox meaning whenever it is by any means possible, without absolute violence, to do so. But authors can claim no such charitable construction. Every man who can take his own time to publish, who is under no obligation to hasten his publication, must submit to the law of rigid justice, and has no right to feel aggrieved, if, under that law, his works are condemned. Who compelled him to send out his work in a crude and unfinished state ?

We do not expect every man who writes to be perfectly master of the whole field of Catholic theology ; but we do ask of every author, whatever the subject of his book, to study to know enough of it not to run athwart sound doctrine. There is scarcely a popular book or pamphlet that reaches us, which does not contain propositions heretical, smacking of heresy, erroneous, rash, or offensive to pious ears. Men and women, with a little knowledge, and much zeal, full of notions caught up from the age and country, sit down and dash off a novel, a pamphlet, or an oration, and send it out as Catholic, when the best we can say of it is, that it is "neither fish, flesh, nor fowl, nor yet good red herring." But we will not dwell on the evil of such works. No one has a natural right to attempt to edify the faithful from the press, any more than he has from the pulpit. We have no right to publish on religion without permission ; and if the Church, through her

proper officers, grants us the permission, and allows us the great honor of laboring, in however humble a capacity, in her sacred cause, both duty and gratitude should lead us to do our best, and, above all; to abstain from saying aught displeasing to her, or embarrassing to any of her real friends. If we do not know Catholic faith and theology well enough not to compromise either, our business is to hold our peace, — the Church will not suffer from our silence, — nor shall we endanger our salvation by not speaking.

Mr. Bryant is not worse than many others ; he is far better than some. It was never our intention to single him out from his class, as especially deserving of censure. We, in the main, think very well of him. He has fair talents, respectable learning, honest intentions, and a commendable zeal. But, as with ourselves, he did not tarry long enough at Jericho. His errors seem to us to arise from his having forgot, when he was about to put on Catholicity, to put off Protestantism ; and in his consulting the effect his work might have in enlisting the attention of here and there a Protestant, rather than its probable influence on our own Catholic youth, who, after all, will be its principal readers. The conversion of a Protestant is a great thing, but is gained too dearly if at the expense of a dozen Catholics. We may be wrong, but we adopt as our rule, to consider first of all the effect our writings will have on the faithful themselves, and, after that, the effect they may have on others. We all know that the work of converting those without is not, in this country, perhaps not in any country, the only spiritual work of mercy there is for Catholics to do. The conversion of a bad Catholic is as great a work, and one which causes as much joy in heaven, as the conversion of an infidel or a heretic ; and the preservation of our Catholic youth is as important as the gathering in of those without. As yet, we know, or may know, that, numerous as are the conversions from without, they at least no more than compensate for our losses. We are, then, it seems to us, to estimate works principally by their influence in making our youth abhor heresy and unbelief, love and practise their religion, and look with horror on the bare thought of forsaking it.

The principles we have laid down, and the remarks we have made on *Pauline Seward*, sufficiently indicate what a Catholic should think of *novel-writing* and also of *novel-reading*. If no dangerous topic is made the subject of its interest, if it be the expression of the religious life of the author, if it make

the supernatural its principle and end, the work, though in the form of a novel or fictitious narrative, may be written and read without detriment, nay, with profit, to religion, and that, too, even when its subject is not expressly a sacred subject, and nothing is said directly of or for faith or piety. But all other novels, even though professedly religious, we must regard as dangerous ; and the fewer we have of them, and the less they are read, the better. Instruction on other topics than religion proper, they who live in the world undoubtedly need, and should have ; but a profane art is not needed, and we see not how one who is Catholic to the core can aid in its production.

ART. IV. — *Organization of Labor and Association.* By MATH. BRIANCOURT. Translated by FRANCIS GEO. SHAW. New York : Wm. H. Graham. 1847. 16mo. pp. 103.

UNLESS the estimable and accomplished translator has greatly improved upon his author, M. Briancourt is one of the most agreeable writers attached to the school of Association with whom we are acquainted. He appears to be sincere, earnest, gentle, and philanthropic ; and he writes with ability, ease, vivacity, and grace. His pages have, comparatively, little of that barbarous terminology which renders the writers of the Associationists, in general, so forbidding to all but adepts. If we had the least conceivable sympathy with his doctrines and schemes, we could read him with pleasure, and, at times, with admiration ; and we cannot but regard his little work as the best summary of the plans and hopes of his school which has as yet appeared.

But the more able, skilful, and fascinating is the writer, the more dangerous and carefully to be eschewed are his writings, if devoted to the propagation of false and mischievous theories. Error, though reason be free to combat it, is never harmless, any more than poison, because its antidote may be known and at hand. It may, upon the whole, be more prudent to allow it free course, than, by attempting its suppression by force, to run the risk of also suppressing the truth ; but however that may or may not be, the publication of error is

always an evil which no freedom of its contradictory truth can ever wholly prevent or overcome. No man ever puts forth a system of unmixed falsehood ; and the currency his error gains is always by virtue of the truth he mixes with it, and which he misinterprets and misapplies. To unravel his web of sophistry, to pick out his tangled yarn, or separate what is true from what is false, is a task of no small difficulty, and requires a patience of investigation, habits of nice discrimination and of close and rigid reasoning, which can be expected only from the gifted and thoroughly disciplined few, and rarely even from these. An error may be stated in a few words, in a popular form, and clothed with a brilliant and captivating dress, which, nevertheless, is not to be refuted, nor its truth, which gives it currency, separated from the falsehood which renders it mischievous, without long, elaborate, and abstruse reasoning, subtle distinctions, and exact definitions, beyond the capacity of the generality, usually held by them in detestation, and of which they are always impatient. But even if the refutation could be presented in a popular form, the majority of those who have embraced the error would not profit by it. Having adopted the error and committed themselves to it, they are unwilling to listen to any thing which may be urged against it, lest perchance it may disturb the tranquillity of their conviction, mortify their pride, or affect unfavorably their reputation. Hence it is that nothing is more difficult than to recall or repress an error once fairly in circulation. Hence it is that we can never allow ourselves to commend a work, however kindly disposed we may be towards its author, which, in our judgment, or according to the rule of judgment we are bound to follow, teaches a false doctrine or proposes a visionary scheme. The reading of such works, when not absolutely hurtful, is unprofitable, and no man can justify it, unless it be to refute them, and guard the public against their dangerous tendencies. The Associationists, then, must not be surprised, if we notice Mr. Briancourt's work only to censure it.

That Mr. Briancourt's doctrine is unsound, no argument is needed to prove. No man, who proposes a doctrine which reverses all that has hitherto been regarded as settled, is ever entitled even to a hearing. He who, on his own authority, gives the lie to all men, of all ages and nations, gives to every man the best of all possible human reasons for giving the lie to him. If reason is to be trusted, the reason of all ages and nations overrides his ; if it is not to be trusted, he has no authority for

what he proposes. He places himself in an awkward position, who, asserting the authority of reason, yet opposes his own reason to the reason of all men. He must be a bold man, a man of unbounded self-confidence, the very sublime of egotists, who dares pretend, that, on his reason alone, the whole world may be rationally convicted of having blundered. They have all the attributes he can claim ; why, then, assume that they have all blundered, and that he alone has hit upon the truth ? Truth is revealed to the humble and childlike, not to the proud and arrogant ; and who is prouder or more arrogant than he who claims to be superior to all men, to be the only man of his race who has perceived what is true and good ?

Discoveries, like the one Fourier professes to have made, are not in the order of human experience. There is nothing to be found in the experience of the race analogous to them. Discoveries, which reverse what the race had hitherto regarded as the settled order, have never yet, so far as history goes, been made in any department of life, — in religion, in morals, in politics, or in social and industrial arrangements. Every man, who has come forward with any such pretended discovery, has failed to gain a verdict in his favor, and in the judgment of mankind has been finally condemned either as deceiving or as deceived, or both at once. M. Charles Fourier, a man, if you will, of an extraordinary intellect, and of philanthropic aims, — although, we confess, we find in his writings only wild extravagance, and a pride, an egotism, which amount very nearly, if not quite, to insanity, — professes, not, indeed, to have *invented*, but to have *discovered*, the law of a new social and industrial world. This law he professes to have drawn out and scientifically established in all its ramifications ; and he and his followers propose to reorganize society and industry according to its provisions. Similar pretensions have often been made, now in one department of life, now in another ; but has one of them ever succeeded ? Is there one of them that has not been finally adjudged, at best, to be only visionary ? Is there on record a single instance of a fundamental reorganization of society, industry, or even of government, that has ever been effected ? Have not all who have labored for such reorganization been opposed by their age and nation ? And can the Associationists name an instance in which posterity has reversed the judgment of contemporaries ? They cannot do it. We are aware of the instances they will cite ; but not one of

them is to the purpose. Why, then, suppose the whole order of human experience is reversed, or departed from, in the case of M. Charles Fourier? The fact is, *fundamental* changes in the religious, moral, social, political, or industrial order of mankind — changes which throw off the old order, and establish a new *order* in their place — never have been, and, it requires no great depth of philosophy to be able to say, never can be, effected, unless by the intervention of a supernatural cause. When attempted, they may go so far as to break up the old order, never so far as to introduce and establish a new order. Man can be a destroyer; he can never be a CREATOR.

But these considerations, however conclusive in themselves, will not, we are aware, have much weight with the Associationists. The Associationists are accustomed to other principles of reasoning; they have, underlying their speculations, a philosophy of man and society which creates in their minds a presumption in favor of Fourierism. With them, it is an argument in favor of a proposition, that it is novel; and an argument against it, that it is ancient. Nothing seems to them more reasonable beforehand, or more in accordance with what the order of human experience authorizes them to expect, than that such a discovery as Fourier's should be made, and that the changes he proposes should be practicable. It is useless, so far as they are concerned, to controvert them on this point, — and if we would reach them, with the hope of doing them any good, we must enter with them into an examination of their doctrine or scheme, upon its merits. This we willingly attempt; for several of the more distinguished Associationists in this country have been our intimate personal friends, and we regard them as sincere, and as honestly desirous of doing all in their power for the benefit of their fellow-men. We believe they are men who have a certain loyalty, and who have no bigoted attachment to this or that method of serving mankind; but are willing to change the method they now insist upon for another, the moment they see a good reason for doing so. We do not believe them unwilling to look upon the question as still an open question, or that they have much of that foolish pride which binds persons to a cause simply for the reason that they stand committed to it before the public. We propose, therefore, in what follows, to enter somewhat into the merits of their doctrine and schemes; and, as what we shall say is said in good faith, we trust they will receive it in good faith, and frankly accept it, or show us good reasons for rejecting it.

We begin by asking, What is the end the Associationists propose, or what is it they seek to effect? The means we understand very well; they are, the organization of labor and association, according to a given plan. But before we can decide on the means, we must understand the end proposed, so as to be able to determine whether the end is desirable, a good end. After that, we may proceed to determine whether the means are adequate, whether, by adopting them, we can, in all reasonable probability, secure the end. Unless we know what is the end proposed, and know whether it be good or not good, we walk by conjecture, not by science. But the Associationists propose their doctrine, not as a theory, or as a system of belief, but as a *science*. They must, then, in the outset, show us clearly the end proposed, and establish, not conjecturally, not hypothetically, but *scientifically*, that the end is good, and, therefore, one which it is lawful to seek.

1. What, then, is the specific end they propose? We do not find in their writings as clear, distinct, and specific an answer to this question as is desirable. They answer generally, not specifically. Their answer, as we collect it, is, — “The end we propose is, to remove the obstacles which now hinder the fulfilment, and to gather round man the circumstances which will enable him to fulfil, his destiny on this globe; or, in a word, to enable man to fulfil the purpose of his present existence.” Thus stated, we of course have no objection to the end proposed. The good of a being is its destiny, or the end for which it exists; and to seek to enable a being to fulfil its destiny, or gain that end, is to seek its good. So the end for which man exists in this world is his good in relation to his existence here; and to labor to enable him to gain that end is to labor for his good, and his only good here. Thus far, we have, and can have, no quarrel with the Associationists.

But a general answer to a specific question is no answer at all; for the general has formal existence only in the special. We must, therefore, ask again, What is the *specific* end proposed? To answer, To remove evil, and to secure good, is not enough; for the question remains, What *is* evil? what *is* good? Evil, you say, is that which prevents, or in some way hinders or retards, the fulfilment of one’s destiny. Very true; but what is it that does that? This is the question we want answered. We find in the writings of the Associationists graphic descriptions of the actual state of society, — what they call *civilization*, — and brilliant pictures of the life men

will live in *Harmony*, or the new world they propose ; and it is from these we must collect what, in their view, is evil, or opposed to man's destiny on this globe, and what they suppose is good, that is, the fulfilment, or favorable to its fulfilment. In regard to the latter, we find the chief place assigned to wealth and luxury, two things which Fourier asserts positively, again and again, are absolutely indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny ; in regard to the former, we find enumerated, among the evils of civilization, the *poverty* of the great mass of the people, and *unattractive* labor. It is fair, then, to say, that poverty and unattractive labor are *evils*, in the judgment of the Associationists. Labor itself they cannot regard as evil, because they propose to continue it in their new world. The evil, then, is in its unattractiveness, — that is, in our being bound or forced to labor against our inclinations, or to do that to which we are more or less averse. But this can be evil only on condition that it is an evil to be under the necessity of acting against our inclinations. If this be accepted, good is in being free to follow our inclinations ; evil in being compelled or bound to act against them. On what authority does this principle rest ?

Moreover, is it certain that poverty, in itself considered, is evil, or opposed to our destiny ? Where is the proof ? Wealth and poverty are both relative terms, unless the term poverty be restricted to those who have not even so much as their will which is their own, and then we should be obliged to predicate wealth of all who possess something, however little. But the Associationists do not so restrict the sense of the word, for they include in the number of the poor people who have something of their own, at least their will and bodily activity. What, then, is the real distinction between wealth and poverty ? Where draw the line, so that the rich shall all be on one side, and all the poor on the other ? John Jacob Astor is said, when told of a man who had just retired from business with half a million, to have remarked, that he had no doubt but the poor man might be just as happy as if he were rich ! To John Jacob Astor, the man worth half a million was a poor man ; to most men, he would be a rich man. One man counts himself poor, in the possession of thousands ; another feels himself rich, if he have a coarse serge robe, a crust of bread, and water from the spring. Which of the two is the rich, which the poor man ? If the Italian *lazzaroni*, the scandal of thrifty Englishmen and Yankees, have

what contents them, or are contented with what suffices for the present moment, unsolicitous for the next, wherein are they poorer than our "merchant princes," who have a multitude of wants they cannot satisfy? and wherein would you enrich them, by increasing their possessions, if you increased their wants in the same ratio?

But pass over this difficulty. Suppose you have some invariable standard by which to determine who are the poor and who are the rich; whence does it follow that poverty is in itself an evil? Many emperors, kings, princes, nobles, and innumerable saints, have voluntarily abandoned wealth, and chosen poverty, even made a solemn vow never to have any thing to call their own. Is it certain that these have acted a foolish part, abandoned good, and inflicted evil on themselves? If not, how can you say poverty is in itself an evil? Do you say, poverty breeds discontent, and leads to vice and crime? Is that true? Does it do so in all men who are poor? Did it do so in St. Anthony, St. Francis of Assisium, St. John of God, St. Thomas of Villanova, St. Philip Neri, and thousands of others we could mention, who observed evangelical poverty to the letter? Are all the poor discontented, vicious, and criminal? No man dares say it. Then what you allege is not a necessary result of poverty, and must have its efficient cause elsewhere, in the person, or in some circumstance not dependent on wealth or poverty. In the world's history, poverty, vice, and misery are far from being inseparable companions; and so are wealth, virtue, and happiness. Was wealth a good to the rich man mentioned in the Gospel? Was poverty an evil to the poor man that lay at his gate full of sores, begging to be fed with the crumbs that fell from his table?

We might go through the whole list of physical evils drawn up by the Associationists, and ask, in relation to each, so far as it is physical, the same or similar questions. Whence, then, the certainty that what they propose to remove, as evil, is evil? Whence, then, the proof that the end they propose is a good end? Suppose — and the case is supposable — that what are called physical evils are dispensed by a merciful Providence, designed to be invaluable blessings, and are such to all who receive and bear them with the proper dispositions; could we then pronounce them evils? Would it not follow, that in themselves they may be indifferent, and that the good or the evil results from the disposition with which they are received

and borne ? Now this may be the fact. If it is, then the good or the evil depends on ourselves, and we may make them either blessings or curses, as we choose. Then to remove evil would not necessarily be to remove them, but to cure that moral state which makes a bad, instead of a good, use of them.

It is easy to declaim, but it is important that we declaim wisely ; and to be able to declaim wisely, we must know what to declaim against. It is easy to harrow up the feelings by eloquent descriptions of physical sufferings, and no doubt physical sufferings are often an evil of no small magnitude ; but this is nothing to the purpose. Is the evil in the physical suffering itself, or in the moral state of him who causes or suffers it ? Suppose we transport ourselves to the early ages of our era, and take our stand in proud, haughty, imperial, and pagan Rome ; suppose we assist at the trial, tortures, and martyrdom of the persecuted Christians, behold them cast to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre, see them broiling slowly on gridirons, their flesh torn off with pincers, or their living bodies stuck full of splinters besmeared with pitch, lighted, and ranged along the streets of the city by night, as so many lamps. Here is physical pain. Ingenuity, aided by diabolical malice, has done its best to refine upon torture, to produce the greatest amount possible of physical suffering. Yet what is it that excites our horror ? This pain beyond conception of the Christian martyrs ? Not at all. We glory in it ; we bless God for it ; and so do the sufferers themselves. They *choose* it, voluntarily submit to it, and joy in the midst of it, and would not have it less for all the world. There is no joy on earth so sweet, so great, so ecstatic, as that of the martyr. The horror we feel is not at the physical suffering, but at the malice which inflicts it, — not at the fact that the martyrs are enabled heroically to win their crowns, but at the refined cruelty which delights to torture them. It is very possible, then, to conceive the most exquisite physical sufferings, the most excruciating tortures, and the most cruel death, as even a great and invaluable good to those who suffer them. Their presence, then, is not necessarily an evil to the sufferer, and consequently exemption from them not necessarily a good. For the same reason, it does not necessarily follow that the wealth, and luxury, and other things you propose, are necessarily in themselves at all desirable. You must go farther ; and before attempting to decide what is good or what is evil, tell us **WHAT IS THE DESTINY OF MAN** ; for it is only in re-

lation to his destiny, that we can pronounce this or that good or evil. "Am I not a happy man?" said Cræsus to Solon, after showing him his treasures. "Whether a man is happy or not," replied the Athenian sage, "is not to be known before his death."

What, then, according to the Associationists, is the destiny of man, his *final* cause, or the end for which he exists? They have much to say of man's destiny; but we do not find, in those of their writings which we have consulted, any very satisfactory or even intelligible answer to this question. We are told, at one time, that man's destiny is, to live in harmony,—that is, in association as they propose to organize it. But this is no answer; for it only asserts, in other words, that man is able or fitted by nature to adopt the means of fulfilling his destiny. Besides, it defines the destiny of the race rather than the destiny of the individuals, without which the race is only an abstraction. At other times, we are told that man's destiny is, to harmonize the globe which he inhabits with itself, to harmonize it with the sidereal heavens, and the sidereal heavens with the universe, so that all discord shall cease, and there shall be universal harmony; that is, man's destiny is, to complete the works of the Creator, and give them their last finish. The final cause of man is, then, to assist the Creator in completing the work of creation, that is, that he may constitute a portion of the First Cause! This, however, we understand to be only a fanciful speculation, for which the school, as it exists in this country, does not hold itself responsible.

The more modest of the members leave these lofty speculations by the way, and tell us that their object, and their sole object is, by the organization of labor and association, to enable man to fulfil his destiny on earth. But what is this destiny? We can find no specific answer. But they lay down, as their grand principle, *ATTRACTIONS PROPORTIONAL TO DESTINY*. According to them, we may, therefore, conclude man's destiny in this world is that towards which he is attracted by his nature, or which is indicated by his natural inclinations and tendencies. If we understand them, they undertake to give the law of attaining our destiny, rather than any clear statement of what is that destiny itself. But as the attractions are natural, and as they are the index to the end, and the law of its attainment, the end must itself be natural. If, then, we assert that they hold, that, when man has developed and satisfied in harmony his primitive or fundamental passions,

or *stimulants*, as M. Briancourt calls them, he has fulfilled his destiny in this world, we may presume that they will readily admit our assertion to be correct. Then the destiny of man in this world is, the harmonious or orderly development and satisfaction of his whole nature. We will strike out from this "the development of his nature," because development can never be an end, since, by its nature, it is necessarily only the means or process of gaining the end. Then the answer will be, simply, Man's destiny on earth is, to satisfy his nature; that is, to obtain and possess, in all their variety and fulness, the natural objects indicated by his nature, and towards which he is naturally stimulated. This is nothing but our old acquaintance, the Epicurean philosophy, decked out in the latest Parisian mode. We can now *east* ourselves, and take a fresh departure.

But, to be just to the Associationists, we must observe, that they understand by *nature*, not merely our sensual inclinations and tendencies, but also our intellectual, social, domestic, and æsthetic passions or tendencies. Moreover, they do not teach, that, in gaining the end to which we are attracted, we are to follow blindly our natural inclinations and tendencies, or that we are necessitated by them. They are the index and the law, and we have reason and free will, as instruments by which to follow the law and secure the end. Nor do they teach that it will do to follow without restraint all our inclinations and tendencies *as they are actually developed under civilization*; for they are now developed disproportionately, in violation of harmony, and it may require several generations in association before it will do to give them all their full liberty; nevertheless, the end is in the natural order, and is the orderly satisfaction of nature by natural objects.

But on what authority rests this assumption, that our destiny as human beings in this world is the natural satisfaction of our nature? We do not find this proved in any of the writings of the Associationists which have fallen under our notice. M. Briancourt asserts it, in asserting the central principle of the school, — "Attractions proportional to destiny"; and he no doubt supposes that he proves it, in proving this principle, the grand discovery of Fourier; but we do not find that this principle itself is proved, at least, in the case of human beings, the only order of beings concerned in the inquiry. The school may have proved it of minerals, vegetables, and the different orders of the animal kingdom; but that is nothing to

their purpose ; for we cannot conclude the attributes and destiny of one genus from those of another. Because this or that is true of a pig, for instance, we cannot say, it is *therefore* true of man ; nor that the fact that it is true of the pig affords even a presumption that it is true of man ; for man is essentially different from the pig. To say, because it is true of other genera, that attractions are proportional to destiny, it must be true of human beings, is either a plain *non-sequitur*, or the denial that there is any essential difference between man and them. If there is no essential difference between man and a mineral, a vegetable, a pig, we concede your conclusion ; if there is, we deny it. But the former we are loath to admit ; and although our modern philosophers have done their best towards making it at least practically true, we must as yet hold on to the old doctrine that man is generically distinguished from all other orders of creatures, although he may have many attributes in common with them all.

If, as we presume it will be conceded, man is essentially distinguishable from the animal world, if he forms a genus of his own, nothing can be concluded of him, in so far as he is peculiarly man, from any other order ; consequently, whatever is affirmed of him must be specifically proved of him. It may be, that all other orders of creatures on this globe have a natural destiny, and yet the Creator have appointed him to a supernatural destiny. It may be, as the Church teaches, and the Christian believes, that the end for which God designed and made him is not that to which he is directed and drawn by his nature, even in its purity and integrity, but an end to which, since the fall, his nature is even averse, and which can be gained only by denying and crucifying his natural inclinations and tendencies. This may be, — that is, it is conceivable ; and if true, it will not do to say, *a priori*, of man, that attractions are proportional to destiny, or that they at all indicate either it or the law of its attainment. Now it is possible that this constitutes, in part, the essential difference between man and animals. If so, the whole doctrine of the Associationists falls to the ground.

The Associationists must not misapprehend the question we raise. We are travelling no more than they out of life in this world. We understand them to confine their view to man's destiny here on this globe ; we are not, at this moment, extending ours beyond it. We agree perfectly with them, in what we presume to be their principle, namely, that there is no contradiction

between our destiny here and our destiny hereafter, and that the surest method of gaining our end in the world to come is, faithfully to fulfil our destiny in the world where we now are. We raise no question between our present good and our future good ; for we suppose the principle of both to be the same. Nor do we raise a question as to foregoing our good in this life, for the sake of gaining a good hereafter ; for we have never been taught that our true good here is at all incompatible with beatitude in heaven. The Christian who denies himself, chastises, mortifies the flesh with its deeds, crucifies his natural inclinations, is not supposed to deprive himself of any good here, and he perhaps enjoys, even in this life, a hundred-fold more than the Associationists in their most brilliant and ravishing day-dreams even venture to promise. We suspect that the life they promise would have had very few attractions for St. Francis of Assisium, St. Anthony, St. Benedict, or St. Bernard, even as to this world. The question lies between *the life of nature*, as contended for by the Associationists, and *the supernatural life*, which the Christian professes to live. The Christian lives his supernatural life even in this world, and its enjoyment is an enjoyment here, as well as hereafter. Both lives may therefore be considered as lived on this globe, yet differing as to their principle and end. The Christian view is, that God made man, whether you speak of this world or of that which is to come, for a supernatural destiny ; the Associationist view is, that man is made, at least so far as this world is concerned, for a natural destiny. The question is between the two. If the Christian is right, the Associationist is wrong, and his effort to provide for the gaining of a natural destiny, for a life in accordance with natural inclination and tendency, is directly at war with man's true destiny on this globe, and therefore with man's true good, not only his true good hereafter, but his true good here.

The Associationists, of course, do not believe the Church ; but that is not the question. They profess to walk by sight, by science, and therefore they must demonstrate that she is wrong, or have no right to assert science as their doctrine, that man's destiny on this globe is a natural destiny, or that the end of our existence here is attained by living a natural life. But they have not demonstrated this ; they have, at best, only proved that this is or may be true of various animal tribes ; but they have not proved at all that it is true of man. At best, then, their doctrine is but an hypothesis, a belief, for which

they do not, and cannot, even pretend to have infallible authority.

The Associationists tell us that they have proved their doctrine by analysis of human nature, and that therefore it is science. But proved what? Conceding them all they can pretend to have proved by analysis, it is only that the primitive passions or stimulants they assert are psychologically true, — from which, at best, they can conclude only what *would be* man's destiny, in case his destiny were natural; but that it is natural, the precise point to be proved, they have not proved, for it can never be concluded from nature. Nature can guide us only on the assumption that the end is natural. When the question comes up, Is the purpose of our existence natural, or supernatural? nature has nothing to say one way or the other. This is a question which science can never answer; for science can never travel out of nature. It is idle, then, for the Associationists to tell us their doctrine is scientifically established. Whether the end for which Almighty God placed us here is natural or supernatural it is impossible to know without a supernatural revelation, and to a supernatural revelation, declaring our destiny here to be natural, the Associationists do not pretend.

These remarks show clearly enough that the Associationists are unable to answer the first question in order, namely, What is man's destiny on this globe? Then they are unable to legitimate the end they propose; then unable to say, that what they call good is good, or what they call evil is evil; and then, finally, whether, even by complete success, they would or would not benefit their fellow-men. This deserves their serious consideration. If, as we have said, what the Church teaches and the Christian believes is true, they are certainly wrong as to man's destiny here, as well as hereafter. It will not do for them to reply, that they do not believe the Church, and that her authority is not sufficiently proved to them; because they must be able to assert their system as a science, or they have no right to assert it at all. They must, then, disprove the teaching of the Church. So long as there is a possibility that the teaching of the Church may turn out to be true, they cannot assert their own doctrine; for, in the nature of the case, they can conclude its truth only from the destruction of the negative.

2. This uncertainty as to man's destiny here, which the Associationists do not and cannot remove, attaches, of course,

to the means proposed to enable us to fulfil it. The school adopts, as we have seen, as its fundamental principle, "Attractions proportional to destiny." Hence, by ascertaining and providing for the attractions, they determine and provide for the destiny. On this principle rests their whole fabric of Association. If this be true, their Association may or may not be adequate ; but if not true, the whole scheme is evidently altogether inadequate, because natural attractions can be proportional only to a natural end, never to a supernatural end. This is conclusive against the scheme, till its advocates are able, by a supernatural authority, to prove that our destiny in this world is a natural destiny ; for it requires no argument to prove that Association, organized with express reference to a *natural* destiny, must be unavailing — if nothing worse — for a *supernatural* destiny.

But even if the end of man in this world were the satisfaction of his nature, the means proposed would be inadequate. The assumption of the Associationists is, that our nature can be satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which it directs and draws us. But this is not true, as we have shown in a foregoing article in the present number of our Review, pp. 13–15. The arguments on which the Associationists rely to prove the contrary are inconclusive, because they are all arguments from one genus to another. When the premises and conclusion are not in the same genus, nothing is concluded. It may be true, as M. Briancourt proves, that, if a pig gets what his nature seeks, he will be satisfied, stop squealing, and lie down and sleep, till renewed appetite awakes him ; and the same would, no doubt, be true of man, if man were a pig, and might become true of him, if he, by some Circean art, could be transformed into a pig. But it so happens that man is not a pig, and cannot, if he is to retain his essential nature as man, be changed into one. We cannot predicate indifferently of the two. Man is never satisfied by the possession of the natural objects to which he is naturally drawn. All experience proves it ; the experience of each particular man proves it ; else wherefore this deep wail from the heart of every one who lives simply the life of nature, this outbreak of despair, *Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas* ? Build man the most splendid palace ; lavish on it all the decorations of the most perfect art ; furnish it with the most exquisite and most expensive taste ; lodge him in it on the soft, voluptuous couch ; spread his table with the most delicate viands and the rarest

fruits ; refresh him with the most costly wines ; regale him with the richest music ; rain down upon him the most fragrant odors ; ravish him with beauty ; gratify every sense, every taste, every wish, as soon as formed ; and the poor wretch will sigh for he knows not what, and behold with envy even the ragged beggar feeding on offal. No variety, no change, no art, can satisfy him. All that nature or art can offer palls upon his senses and his heart, — is to him poor, mean, and despicable. There arise in him wants which are too vast for nature, which swell out beyond the bounds of the universe, and cannot, and will not, be satisfied with any thing less than the infinite and eternal God. Never yet did nature suffice for man, and it never will.

This great and solemn fact, which it is vain to attempt to deny, — a fact deep graven on all hearts that have experience, that have lived the natural life, — should lead thoughtful men to ask, — nay, it does lead thoughtful men to ask, — if, after all, it be not a mistake to attempt to satisfy ourselves with the vain and perishing things of this world ; if the inability to find our satisfaction in nature be not a strong presumption that our Creator did not design us for a natural destiny ; if, in fact, he did not intend us for an end above nature ; and therefore, that our precise error is in seeking a natural destiny in opposition to his design, in neglecting our true destiny for a false destiny, that is, neglecting true good and pursuing real evil. We should suppose that this universal experience of all men would have created, at least, a doubt, in the minds of our friends, as to the soundness of their assumption of the natural as the true destiny of man on this globe.

The Associationists, doubtless, will reply, that they do not mean to deny the supernatural destiny ; that they leave to man all the satisfactions of religion ; that there is no incompatibility between the supernatural life of the Christian and the natural life of *harmony*. But in this they are mistaken. The principle, the means, and the end of their life are natural ; but the principle, the means, and the end of the other are supernatural, and no man can possibly live both lives at once. This is what our Lord meant, when he said, “ You cannot serve God and mammon. No man can serve two masters.” When you propose nature as the end, and organize Association expressly in reference to it, you do not leave man free to propose God as his end, and to live solely the supernatural life. Moreover, you exclude religion from the Association. You recognize nothing that has the least resemblance to religion. It has with

you no substantive existence ; for, as M. Briancourt defines it, it is nothing but the reflection in their harmonic relations of all the primitive stimulants, as light, which is itself no color, is the reflection of all the primitive colors in perfect harmony.

Furthermore, the Associationists cannot admit the necessity of religion without abandoning their system. Their system is founded on the principle, that attractions are proportional to destiny ; and if what pertains to the natural order is inadequate to satisfy nature, their system is false. The admission of the necessity of any thing transcending nature as a principle, a means, or an end, would be the denial of the sufficiency of nature ; therefore, that attractions are proportional to destiny ; therefore, the denial of the whole scheme of Association. The Associationists are not at liberty, when we have shown them from experience that nature does not suffice for nature, to defend themselves by saying, Then bring in the supernatural ; for they are not at liberty to abandon the essential principle of their system, and still continue to assert it.

And, finally, if the system is insufficient in itself, if under it, as under civilization, our destiny is not attainable without the supernatural, the system is useless, for the supernatural alone is sufficient. The man who lives the supernatural life of the Christian has God, and therefore all. He despises the life your Association proposes. Your wealth and luxury, your palace and grounds, your flower-gardens and ball-rooms, your song and dance, your statues and pictures, your scientific reunions, and your "Æsthetic Teas," are to him vanity, yea, less than vanity, and nothing. He holds them in utter contempt, and tramples them beneath his feet, and weeps tears of pity and tender compassion over those poor creatures who can esteem them. The epicurean and the saint, though for different reasons, both exclaim of all the world can give, *Vanity of vanities, all is vanity !* The former, because he has grown weary of it, and found it impotent to fill up the vacuum in his heart ; the latter, because he is full without it, because he has no need of it, because it can offer him nothing, and serves only to distract him from God, and hinder his divine life.

But we have objections to the adequacy of the means proposed, of a kind which will have more weight with our friends, the Associationists. The means proposed are intended, besides other things, to remove the evils of poverty, that is, the moral evils occasioned in the community by poverty ; for of the

physical evils we say nothing. There is no question but poverty occasions discontent, envy, and repining, and these again lead to crimes against both person and property. But it occasions these evils only when it is contrasted with wealth. There is no more discontent, envy, or repining, where all are alike poor, than where all are alike rich. The hovel is a hovel only as contrasted with the palace which rises by its side and overtops it. The remedy here is either internal or external. The internal is moral, religious, which raises the poor to the supernatural life, gives them all the most favored have or can have, and leads them to look upon all the distinctions of rank and wealth as of no value, and to trample the world beneath their feet. He who asks nothing from the world envies never those who possess it, and repines never that he is poor. This remedy is the one the Church approves, and labors always to apply; and it checks alike the envy and repining of the poor, and the pride and insolence of the rich, enabling both to live together in mutual peace and charity,—in harmony. But this remedy the Associationists reject, even with scorn. They propose an external remedy. But the external remedy can be a remedy only so far as it removes the occasion; and to do that it must establish an equality of fortunes, or at least, so arrange matters that wealth and poverty shall never be in juxtaposition, or seen in contrast.

But if we consult the plan of the Associationists, we shall see that they propose nothing of the kind. They recognize property and inequality of property in like manner as they are recognized in our present social order; and, what is still more to the purpose, they bring together the extremes of wealth and poverty in the same phalanx, and lodge them in the same phalanstery, so that one cannot go in or go out, rise up or sit down, without having the violent contrast forced upon his attention, to exalt his pride or madden his envy. That is, they propose to cure the evil by increasing what they regard as its cause!

It is of no avail to allege that none in Association will be very poor, that there will be none who cannot by their own labor procure all the necessities and chief comforts of life; for the evil in question does not arise from the consideration that I have *little*, but that my neighbour has *more*. So long as in your Association one has *more* than another, you have not removed the occasion of the evil you deplore. No matter, if my plain apartments are sufficient for my protection, when

only a little lathing and plaster divide them from the gay and elegant and luxuriously furnished apartments of my neighbours ; no matter that my one dish suffices for my physical necessities, so long as, in the room next to mine, my neighbour — a stupid fellow, I may think, not half as good as I — sits down to his dinner of twenty dishes. Since all these violent contrasts, all the distinctions of wealth, exist in the Association, and are perpetually under the eye, in the face and nose, of every one, meeting him at every turn he takes, the occasion of the evils exists there in even a greater and a more offensive degree than it does in the present social state ; and as long as you do not by the Association remove the occasion, how can you say that by it you cure the evil ? Do not refer us to moral influences which may be operative, for that is to abandon your system, and fall back on that which you condemn and anathematize. Your system is, to correct the internal by the judicious organization of the external ; and if you are obliged to appeal from the external to the internal, to supply the defects of the organization, you acknowledge what we are endeavouring to prove, namely, the inadequacy of your means.

Again ; the mother evil of our present industrial system, according to the Associationists, is COMPETITION. Indeed, to read their writings, one is inclined to believe that they regard competition in business as the cause of nearly all the ills that flesh is heir to. Their grand argument for Association is, that it will entirely do away with competition and its attendant evils. Whether their view of competition is correct or the reverse is not now the question. The question is, Does Association, on their plan, remove it, or, what is the same thing, afford no motive or scope for it ? If not, their means are inadequate. Competition results from the inequality of fortunes, the freedom and the desire to accumulate. Where these three causes coexist, competition is possible and inevitable. Association, then, to remove competition, must take away these causes, at least some one of them. The desire to accumulate can be suppressed by external means only by an organization in which wealth can secure, or aid in securing, to its possessor no personal or social advantage, or what is regarded as an advantage by him or by others. This can never be the case where wealth and luxury are held to be important, essential to the fulfilment of one's destiny, and where the proprietor has the free use of his property. Grant, then, the desire, and allow the freedom, to accumulate, and you have competition, because property is in its nature exclusive.

Now all these conditions of competition must coexist in Association, because the Association is based on individual and not common property. There is inequality of property, and of course the distinctions which always do and always must accompany it. There is freedom to possess and use, and there is freedom to acquire, to hoard, or to display. There are objects forbidden to the poor, and accessible only to the rich. There are, then, all the motives to accumulate, and the same opportunity to acquire individual property, and to purchase pleasures or distinctions by it, which are furnished by existing industrial arrangements. What, then, is to hinder competition in the bosom of the phalanx itself?

But pass over this, and consider the phalanx as a copartnership, or a huge business firm. There must be buying and selling between it and other firms; for we do not understand the Associationists to propose to stop all exchange, all trade and commerce. What, then, is to hinder competition between phalanx and phalanx, any more than now between one business firm and another? Is competition between firms less injurious than between individuals? — between large firms than between small ones? Indeed, is it not notorious that the rivalry of large bodies is more unprincipled, altogether less scrupulous, than that of individuals? Who needs to be told that a man, sheltering himself under the shield of a corporation, will do, without scruple, what he would recoil from doing in his individual capacity? What, then, under your system, is to prevent perhaps the most ruinous competition the world has ever witnessed? Phalanx may seek to circumvent phalanx in business, and every few days we may hear the crash of one or another, each burying eighteen hundred or two thousand people under its ruins! There is nothing in your system, so far as we can see, to prevent this disastrous result. Men in the Association have the same passions as out of it, and these passions will operate in the same way, if they have the liberty and the occasion.

We are aware that the Associationists suppose that they will keep down the spirit of rivalry by the various intellectual, social, domestic, and æsthetic influences which they expect to be operative in Association. But they recognize the spirit of rivalry, or competition. Let this be remembered. True, they count on turning it into other channels. Thus, by making shoeblacks the Legion of Honor, they fancy that the ambition will be to be shoeblacks; just as if the cross of honor

will not cease to be an object of ambition the moment it is conferred on the shoeblack ! The cross of honor is valued because it is bestowed as the reward of honorable or heroic deeds. It does not confer the honor, it signalizes it ; and never will men become shoeblacks for the sake of it. It is impossible, by any artificial methods, to raise menial arts to the rank of the liberal ; or menial services to the rank of the heroic, by conferring on them the insignia of the heroic. If you want the liberal and refined to be willing to perform the most menial and disgusting duties, you must propose the Cross of Christ, not the Cross of the Legion of Honor ; the crown of immortal life, not the crown of laurel.

The Associationists, whatever influences or arrangements they may depend upon, must allow the individual the dominion of himself, and the freedom to follow the bent of his genius. They must allow the former, or they reduce man to complete slavery, and make the phalanx the grave of the individual ; and the latter, or deny their grand principle of attractions proportional to destiny, and also their other principle of attractive labor, since no labor or employment against one's natural bent is or can be attractive. They do allow the first, otherwise individual property would be a mockery ; they allow the second, otherwise their distribution of the phalanx into groups and series would be an absurdity. Allow a man freedom to follow his natural bent, that is, the passion or group of passions which are naturally predominant in him, and that passion or group will grow by indulgence, and soon gain the complete mastery over all the rest, and subordinate them to itself. Besides, the whole tendency of the Association is to this result. Its grand principle is, to follow the natural order and the natural attraction. The harmonious development our friends speak of is not a precisely similar development in every individual, but the harmonious development of each individual in accordance with his naturally predominant tendency or tendencies. To understand it in any other sense would be to make them inconsistent with themselves. Consequently, whatever influences they may bring to bear on the individual, they must tend to harmonize all in him with his naturally predominant passion. If, then, we suppose one whose strong natural tendency is to acquire property, his whole nature will be subordinated to this tendency, and he will follow it to the full extent of his freedom and capacity. If we suppose two such, we have competition.

As for social influences, these, in a community which starts with the assumption that wealth and luxury are absolutely indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny, will not be likely to check or discourage the efforts without which wealth and luxury are not to be had. The domestic influences will be no less favorable to the accumulation of wealth than now; for the father bequeaths his property to his children, and where there are inequalities of fortune, wealth will confer distinction. The æsthetic influences are of no account for good. All the world are not artists, and it is by no means certain that every phalanx will be a school of art; and if it should be, it must be borne in mind that its art will be purely secular, and purely secular art leads to nothing better than effeminacy and licentiousness. It would, then, check the tendency to accumulate, if at all, only by producing no less an evil of another sort. It would be well for modern rhapsodists to recollect that the artistic epoch — we speak not of religious art — follows, but has never yet been known to precede or accompany, an heroic epoch. It marks a decline, and usually is or ushers in an age of corruption. The shrine of natural beauty stands always in the vestibule of the temple of Venus, when not in the temple itself. Avarice, again, is no unnatural pendant to voluptuousness. We place no confidence, therefore, in your æsthetic influences, even to restrain competition, — especially, since wealth will be needed as the minister of voluptuousness.

It is unnecessary to pursue further this branch of the subject. All our primitive tendencies are exclusive, and mutually repellant. They almost always exist in excess, and every one of them grows by indulgence. Philosophy and experience alike testify that their harmonious action is never possible, unless by their subjection to reason. But this subjection is contrary to the principles of the Associationists; for they allow us reason and free will, not to control our passions and keep them in subjection to the law, but as their servants or instruments. The passions give the law; reason and free will provide for its fulfilment. Consequently, the harmony of the passions is impossible, on the principles of the Associationists; and without such harmony, their means are obviously inadequate.

3. Whoever reads the works of the Associationists must perceive that they place great reliance for the success of their scheme on the mutual love and good-will of the members of the phalanx. There is to be there no pride of birth, no

haughtiness of rank, no insolence of wealth. Gentlemen and simplemen, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, are all to meet as brothers ; and no bickerings, no jars, no envyings, no jealousies, no aversions, rancors, or heartburnings, are ever to find admittance into the *harmonic* paradise. No serpent will ever find his way into the new garden of Eden. Every one will be courteous, affable, gentle, affectionate, forbearing, and eager to oblige ; and men will say, " See how these phalansterians love one another ! " Undoubtedly, without this, the Association will be torn by internal dissensions, and soon prove only a monument to the folly of its founders.

But by what right do Associationists count on this universal and never-failing mutual love and good-will ? They propose no radical change and no supernatural elevation of human nature. Men enter Association with all the essential passions, and with all the diversity of character, taste, and temperament which they now have, and must exhibit in Association the same phenomena as out of it, so far as the occasion is not removed. There is no removal of the occasion ; and there must be, as we have shown, just as much occasion for the exercise of all the bitter and mischievous passions of our nature in Association as in the present order ? Whence, then, is to come this anticipated result, so widely different from our present experience ? From the moral causes operative there ? What are they ? Nay, you cannot appeal to moral causes, for your system is to reach and modify the moral through the physical.

But pass over this. How is the degree of love necessary to set the machinery of Association in operation to be obtained prior to Association itself ? It requires a greater degree of love to introduce than it does to preserve after introduction. If any thing is certain in philosophy, it is that the effect cannot exceed the cause. Hence, universal experience proves that the founders of human institutions are always superior to those who are formed under those institutions. The progress under human institutions is always downwards ; the purest and noblest characters formed under them are the earliest. Man is always superior to his productions, and these are superior to *their* productions. Reverberations grow fainter and fainter in the distance. Mark the difference between the men who made our Revolution and the men of to-day. Between George Washington and James K. Polk there is a distance ; and there would have been a greater distance still, if it

had not been for the continued operation of causes not introduced or essentially affected by our Revolution. Certainly, then, no more love can be in the Association than there is in the cause introducing Association. Then the Associationists must get, under civilization, without Association, all the love they can have with and under it. But if we can have the love without Association, then there is no need of Association ; if not, Association is impracticable. Here is a conclusive argument, not only against Association, but against every scheme for effecting the real progress of man or society *by virtue of a purely human principle*. Proceeding on a purely human principle, man, it is easy to demonstrate, can no more be a *reformer* than an *institutor*, — that is, he can neither by way of reform, nor by way of institution, introduce or establish any thing superior to what he finds existing, or which, in fact, does not fall below it. His boasted improvements are such only in relation to the order he introduces, and consist solely in getting more and more rid of the contradictions to it retained at first from the preëxisting order. The departure on a human principle from the existing order is always a step towards something inferior or less perfect. Man can fall from the civilized state to the savage ; he never rises spontaneously from the savage state to the civilized ; and for the very good reason, that in the moral, no more than in the physical world, can the stream rise higher than the fountain.

Moreover, the love itself, which our Associationists rely upon, can never be adequate to their purpose. It is, at best, only human love, the natural *sentiment* of philanthropy. This answers very well, when the work to be done is simply to propose grand schemes, make brilliant and eloquent speeches, or when there are no disagreeable duties to be performed, no violent natural repugnances to be overcome ; but it fails in the hour of severe trial. Your philanthropist starts with generous impulses, with a glowing enthusiasm ; and so long as there are no great discouragements, no disgusting offices in his way, and he has even a small number of admiring friends to stimulate his zeal, applaud his eloquence, flatter his pride, and soothe him for the rebuffs he meets from the world, he may keep on his course, and continue his task. But let him find himself entirely alone, let him have no little public of his own, which is all the world to him, let him be thwarted on every point, let him be obliged to work in secret, unseen by all but the All-seeing Eye, encounter from men nothing but contradic-

tion, contempt, and ingratitude, and he will soon begin to say to himself, Why suffer and endure so much for the unworthy ? He who loves man for man's sake loves only a creature, a being of imperfect worth, of no more worth than himself, perhaps not so much ; and why shall he love him more than himself, and sacrifice himself for him ? The highest stretch of human love is, to love our neighbour *as* we love ourselves ; and we do injustice to ourselves, when we love them more than we do ourselves.

Nay, philanthropy itself is a sort of selfishness. It is a sentiment, not a principle. Its real motive is not another's good, but its own satisfaction according to its nature. It seeks the good of others, because the good of others is the means of its own satisfaction, and is as really selfish in its principle as any other of our sentiments ; for there is a broad distinction between the *sentiment* of philanthropy, and the *duty* of doing good to others, — between seeking the good of others from sentiment, and seeking it in obedience to a law which binds the conscience. The measure of the capacity of philanthropy, as a sentiment, is the amount of satisfaction it can bring to the possessor. So long as, upon the whole, he finds it more delightful to play the philanthropist than the miser, for instance, he will do it, but no longer. Hence, philanthropy must always decrease just in proportion to the increase of the repugnances it must encounter, and fail us just at the moment when it is most needed, and always in proportion as it is needed. It follows the law so observable in all human society, and helps most when and where its help is least needed. Here is the condemnation of every scheme, however plausible it may look, that in any degree depends on philanthropy for its success.

The principle the Associationists want for their success is not philanthropy, — the love of man for man's sake, — but divine charity, not to be had and preserved out of the Catholic Church. Charity is, in relation to its subject, a supernaturally infused virtue ; in relation to its object, the supreme and exclusive love of God for his own sake, and man for the sake of God. He who has it is proof against all trials ; for his love does not depend on man, who so often proves himself totally unamiable and unworthy, but on God, who is always and everywhere infinitely amiable and deserving of all love. He visits the sick, the prisoner, the poor, for it is God whom he visits ; he clasps with tenderness the leprous to his bosom,

and kisses his sores, for it is God he embraces and whose dear wounds he kisses. The most painful and disgusting offices are sweet and easy, because he performs them for God, who is love, and whose love inflames his heart. Wherever there is a service to be rendered to one of God's little ones, he runs with eagerness to do it ; for it is a service to be rendered to God himself. "Charity never faileth." It is proof against all natural repugnances ; it overcomes earth and hell ; and brings God down to tabernacle with men. Dear to it is this poor beggar, for it sees in him only our Lord who had "not where to lay his head" ; dear are the sorrowing and the afflicted, for it sees in them Him who was "a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity" ; dear are these poor outcasts, for in them it beholds Him who was "scorned and rejected of men" ; dear are the wronged, the oppressed, the down-trodden, for in them it beholds the Innocent One nailed to the Cross, and dying to atone for human wickedness. And it joys to succour them all ; for in so doing, it makes reparation to God for the poverty, sufferings, wrongs, contempt, and ignominious death which he endured for our sakes ; for it is his poverty it relieves in relieving the poor, his hunger it feeds in feeding the hungry, his nakedness it clothes in throwing its robe over the naked, his afflictions it consoles in consoling the sorrowing, his wounds into which it pours oil and wine and which it binds up. "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren, ye did it unto me." All is done to and for God, whom it loves more than men, more than life, and more than heaven itself, if to love him and heaven were not one and the same thing. This is the principle you need ; with this principle, you have God with you and for you, and failure is impossible. But with this principle, Association is, at best, a matter of indifference ; for this is sufficient of itself at all times, under any and every form of political, social, or industrial organization. He who has God can have nothing more.

But our gravest objection to Associationism is, that it implicates the justice of Almighty God. The Associationists tell us that their plan is indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny on this globe. By man they must mean men, or else they are talking of an abstraction. The species has actual existence only in individuals, and the question relates only to actual existences. It is absurd to suppose that God cares for species, and not for individuals, — for the ideal, and not for the

actual, — for the abstract, and not for the concrete. When, therefore, the organization of Labor and Association are proposed as indispensable to the fulfilment of our destiny, — when its friends tell us, as they do, that all the past has been only a preamble to it, a necessary preparation for it, they tell us in effect that no human being has, as yet, had within his reach the means of fulfilling his destiny. But it will not do to say this. God can create no being, and appoint him to a certain end, that is, make it his duty to gain that end, and not provide him with sufficient means of gaining it, if he chooses to avail himself of them, without contradicting his own justice, and thereby proving himself unjust. If there is a single individual of our race that fails to attain his destiny, either here or hereafter, through defect of means, not through his own fault, the blame is chargeable upon the Creator. But God is infinitely just, and we cannot accuse him of injustice without blasphemy. Then the means of fulfilling his destiny, whether here or hereafter, must *always* be within the reach of every man ; and if any one fails to fulfil it, he has no one to blame but himself. Then Association never has been, is not, and never can be, necessary for the fulfilment of our destiny on this globe, or elsewhere ; for man, every man, can fulfil his destiny, if he chooses, without it.

These are some few of the objections which seem to us conclusive against the views and schemes of the Associationists. They by no means exhaust our list of objections ; but we stop with them, because we regard them as amply sufficient of themselves. But let not the Associationists imagine, for a moment, because we refuse to go with them, that we are better satisfied with the present condition of our fellow-men than they are, or that we any more despair of its amelioration than they do. When we deserted the movement party and took refuge in the Church, it was not because we had become indifferent to human suffering, or because we despaired of solacing it. Never did the young enthusiast, the fierce declaimer, the bold radical, feel more alive to every form of human suffering, or entertain a stronger hope of relieving it, than we did, when our kind Mother was pleased to receive us and own us as one of her children. It is true, we did not embrace the Church for the reason that she is a social reformer, for the reason that we believed her capable of effecting the good we had attempted, or which our friends were attempting without her. In view of what she promises her faithful and obedient children, all

that we or they contemplated is not worth a moment's consideration. Nevertheless, she furnishes in abundance all the means necessary to remove all real evils, and to secure every possible good.

Let not the Associationists misapprehend us. We do not ask them to embrace the Church simply because she is the proper agent for acquiring the good they seek for their fellow-men; for we wish them to embrace her from higher and worthier motives. For ourselves, we have been, and are even now, loath to dwell on what the Church can do for us in this life, lest we should be interpreted as assigning false motives for yielding her the homage which is her due. We are unwilling to pursue a line of argument, which, however proper it may be in itself, ignorance or malice may torture even into the appearance of placing time before eternity, society before heaven, or man before or in competition with God. The Church must be embraced for a heavenly motive, or no advantage inures to us from embracing her. She is here to prepare us for heaven, and heaven is the only end that we can legitimately seek. The good she effects for this world is incidental, and should never be made the motive for becoming or remaining a Catholic. But, bearing this always in mind, we may without impropriety show that she can do enough for us even in this world to satisfy all reasonable men.

Some of the Associationists are already looking towards the Church, apparently despairing of success in their enterprise without her; but they are looking to her, we fear, rather with the wish to obtain her sanction for their plan, and her assistance to carry it out, than with any sincere disposition to submit themselves to her direction and discipline. If she will accept Fourierism, they are ready to accept her. But she will make no such agreement with them. She will be all, or she will be nothing. They must accept her unconditionally, or she will not accept them. She has her own method, and will not learn of them; they must learn of her.

But is her method adequate? Let us see. The men who have manifested, under their highest forms, the virtues which are required to remove all real evils and to procure every true good of which men in this world are capable, are undeniably to be found in the Catholic Church, and nowhere else. If all men were like, for instance, St. Raymond of Pennafort, St. John of God, St. Vincent de Paul, or even Fénélon, a great and good man, yet far below the standard of a

Catholic Saint, there could and would be no lack of the good desirable, and no real evil could exist. There is not a form of evil in society, a single ill that flesh is heir to, which some one or more of our saints have not made provision for removing or solacing, and which they would not have removed or solaced, if they had been duly seconded, as you must know if you have made yourselves but passably acquainted with the charitable institutions of the Church. Yet these saints did not go out of the Church, and did but come up to that standard of perfection which she proposes to all, and exhorts all her children to aspire to, and to which all may attain, if God gives them the vocation; and that, too, without any change of the existing political, social, or industrial order. All may have, in the bosom of the Church, whatever the external order, all the means needed for attaining to the highest perfection of which they are capable; and by attaining to that perfection, all is secured that is or can be desired for society.

But you say, all are not saints. True; but whose is the fault? It is not the fault of the political, social, or industrial order, otherwise these could not have become saints; not the fault of the Church, for she proffers to all the same means and assistance she extended to these; nor precisely the fault of human nature, for these were no better by nature than others; and many of the saints have even been wild and dissolute in their youth. All may not be called by Almighty God to the same degree of heroic sanctity, nor is it necessary; but all are called to Christian perfection, and the means which have proved effectual in the case of those who have attained to it are extended to all, and must needs be, if adopted, equally effectual in the case of all. The fault, whenever any one falls below the standard of perfection, is his own, is in the fact that he refuses to comply with all the Church commands and counsels. The Church cannot take away free will; and as long as men retain it, they will, to a greater or less extent, abuse it. Do the Associationists propose to take it away, and reduce men to mere machines? We do not understand them to propose any such thing; and if they should, it would be an additional objection to their scheme. God himself respects our free will, and governs us only according to our *choice*. He gives us, naturally or supernaturally, the ability to will and to do as he wills, and motives sweet and attractive as heaven and terrible as hell to induce us to will and to do as he wills; but he does not will for us; the will must be our own act. If the

Church proposes perfection to all, exhorts all to aspire to it, furnishes them all the assistance they need to gain it, and urges them by all the motives which can weigh with them to accept and use them, the fault, if they do not, is theirs, not hers, and she is not to be accused either of inefficiency or of insufficiency ; for she does all that, in the nature of the case, it is possible to do.

But even a far lower standard of Christian worth than we have been speaking of, and which is possible in the bosom of the Church to all, will suffice for the purpose of the Associationists. Suppose every one should do, not all the Church counsels, but simply what she commands, enjoins, as of precept, and which every one must do, or fall under her censure, what real evil could remain, or what desirable social good would be wanting ? There would be no wars, no internal disorders, no wrongs, no outrages, no frauds, or deceptions, and no taking the advantage one of another. There would be no unrelieved poverty, no permanent want of the necessities or even comforts of life ; for the Church makes almsgiving a precept, and commands all her children to remember the poor. There would remain no ruinous competition ; for no one would set a high value upon the goods of this world. The real cause of all the social and industrial evils the Associationists deplore, so far as evils they are, is covetousness, which is said to be the root of all evil ; and covetousness the Church condemns as a mortal sin. Eradicate covetousness from the heart, and your reform, so far as desirable, is effected ; and it is eradicated, or held in subjection, by every obedient Catholic. Hence, all that is needed is in the Church ; let every one submit to her and follow her directions ; nothing more will be wanting. All can submit to her ; for God, in one way or another, gives to every one sufficient grace for that, if it be not voluntarily resisted ; and she herself is the medium through which is communicated all the strength any one needs to do all she commands. The way to destroy the tree of evil is, to lay the axe at the root ; and this the Church does. She seeks always to purify the heart, out of which are the issues of life, and she never fails to do it in the case of any one who submits himself to her discipline.

But, you reply, there are evils in Catholic countries, and the result promised is as far from being attained there as elsewhere. This is too strongly expressed. There are evils in Catholic countries, but they are fewer and of a more mitigated

character than in other countries, and, moreover, diminish always in proportion as the country is more truly Catholic and more exclusively under Catholic influence. This is evident by contrasting Italy with England, Protestant England with Catholic England, or Spain and Portugal, as they now are, with what they were, when thoroughly Catholic, before they were prostrated by the prevalence of revolutionary and infidel ideas. M. Briancourt virtually admits as much, when he contrasts the present state of things with that which formerly existed, before infidel governments, philosophers, and reformers had detached modern society from the control of the Church. Besides, all in Catholic countries are not good Catholics; and the evils complained of undeniably spring from the acts of those who do not faithfully comply with the requirements of the Church. If all complied, the evils would be removed. The Church is to be tried, not by the effects of non-compliance, but by the effects of compliance. She is answerable only for those who comply with her demands and follow her directions. She cannot force men against their will to comply; and you would be among the first to cry out against her tyranny, were she even to attempt it. The objection implied in the existence of evils in Catholic countries is, therefore, of no weight. Men who reject the Church, or refuse to obey her, must not complain that she does not make all men good Catholics.

The Church, then, offers an easy and effectual method of removing all real evils, and of securing all that is really good in relation even to our present existence. She offers a feasible and an effectual way of serving our fellow-men, — of acquiring and of giving practical effect to the most unbounded charity. Submit to the Church, follow her directions, and you will need nothing more. You can secure all you desire, so far as wise in your desires, whatever be the form of the government, or the social or industrial order under which you live. The internal can be rectified in every state and condition of life; and when the internal is right, you need have no fears for the external. This is a speedy way, and within the power of each individual, without his being obliged to wait for the coöperation of his brethren; for each can individually submit himself at any moment he chooses. It is an effectual way; for the reliance is not on human weakness and instability, but on the infinite and unchangeable God.

Let not our friends scorn this way, because it is old, simple,

and easy. God's ways are not ours. David, to slay the giant, chose a simple sling and a smooth stone from the brook, not the armor and sword of the king. The prophet bade the Syrian simply, "Go wash, and be clean." God's ways are always foolishness to human pride and human prudence; but whoso enters them finds them leading to life. Let not our friends scorn this way, through pride. Others as learned, as philosophic, as high in station, as proud as they, and who once looked upon it with as much distrust and contempt as they can, have, through grace, entered it; and they have found "hidden riches" which they did not look for, and which make all that is promised from Association, multiplied a thousand times into itself, appear poor, mean, and despicable.

ART. V. — *The Two Brothers; or, Why are you a Protestant?* — Concluded.

X. "You will bear in mind, James," remarked John, on resuming the conversation the next day, "that you have pledged yourself to prove that the Catholic Church authorizes superstition and idolatry."

"And if I do not prove it," replied James, "I will abandon the Reformers and the Reformation."

"Since you prefer the charge, it devolves on you to prove it."

"That is not difficult. The fact is notorious."

"Assertions are easily made by the unscrupulous, my brother; but I ask for *proofs*."

"Proofs, proofs! I have them in abundance. What else are your prayers for the dead, — your invocation of saints, — your worship of Mary, — adoration of crucifixes, pictures, images, relics of dead men and women? What is all this, but the most abominable idolatry and superstition? What else is your adoration of the mass, and all the vain and empty ceremonies of your church? O, it is frightful to think to what horrible lengths idolatry and superstition are carried among you! What more besotted, than for a full-grown man to believe that the priest can make his God at will, to fall down and adore a bit of bread, or to imagine that he is worshipping God by kissing the crucifix and telling his beads? I hope, John, you, at least, avoid the superstitious practice of telling your beads."

"I say my beads daily for your conversion."

"That is enough ; my charge is proved. When a man like you can do that, there is no need of other evidence to prove that your church favors superstition."

"It requires strong faith, no doubt, to be able to regard your conversion as possible ; but all things are possible with God, and he has never been known to deny his Holy Mother any request, for she can request nothing not in accordance with his will. If she intercedes for you, your conversion is certain."

"Worse and worse. You confess all I need to prove my charge."

"Did you ever read the record of the trial of our Lord ?"

"Why do you ask that ?"

"Because you remind me of his accusers, who pretended to convict him of blasphemy out of his own mouth. Yet it is nothing strange or uncommon for children to resemble their parents. You say the Church is superstitious ?"

"The *Romish* Church, yes ; and I prove it."

"What is superstition ?"

"A spurious religion or false worship ; a false system of religion, credulity, vain observance."

"You would hardly be able to convict the Church, or to attempt to convict her, of superstition, under that definition, without assuming that you have authority to determine, or by which you can determine, what is true religion ; which we have seen is not the fact. Allow me to suggest a definition a little more to your purpose. Superstition is a vice opposed to true religion, as the schoolmen say, by way of excess, as irreligion is opposed to it by way of defect, and consists in rendering worship to an object to which it is not due, or an undue worship to the object to which it is due. It is, on the one hand, the worship of false gods, and, on the other, the false worship of the true God, and includes all you mean by both superstition and idolatry."

"Very well ; I say the *Romish* Church is guilty of superstition in the sense in which you have defined the term."

"Superstition, in this sense, divides itself into the worship of false gods, and the false worship of the true God. It will be well to consider each division separately. Let us begin with the first, that is, *idolatry*, or giving the worship due to God alone to that which is not God ; or, in other words, worshipping as God what is not God."

"The *Romish* Church worships as God what is not God."

“ The proof ? ”

“ She pays divine worship to the Virgin Mary.”

“ The proof ? ”

“ She authorizes prayers to her.”

“ Nonsense ! prayer is nothing but a request or a petition, and may without sin or impropriety be addressed by one man to another. You might as well say, the constitution of the United States authorizes idolatry, because it recognizes the right of petition, and forbids Congress to make any law prohibiting the people from peaceably assembling and petitioning for a redress of grievances. As well say, every subject who petitions the king, or citizen who petitions the court or the legislature, is an idolater. Try again, brother.”

“ Your Church honors her, a mere woman, as the mother of God.”

“ Well, if she is the mother of God, where is the harm in that, since it is only honoring her for what she is ? ”

“ But she is not the mother of God.”

“ That is for you to prove. You must remember, however, that you are to convict the Church of idolatry by the light of nature, and you can in your argument deny nothing the Church teaches, unless it is forbidden by the natural law. Assuming the Blessed Virgin to be the mother of God ; — as she must be, if Christ is God, — does the law of nature forbid her from being honored as such ? This is the question.”

“ The law of nature, which, as you have agreed, forbids idolatry, forbids her being honored as God.”

“ Unquestionably ; but does it forbid her being honored for what she is ? ”

“ But Catholics worship her as divine, and pay her the worship which is due to God alone.”

“ The proof ? ”

“ They call her our Advocate, our Mediatrix, and thus rob Christ of the glory which is his due ; for he is the only Mediator between God and men.

“ The only mediator and advocate, in his own right ; but, for aught the law of nature says, his mother may be an advocate and a mediatrix under him, by his will and appointment ; for she would then advocate or mediate only by his authority, and he would still be our only advocate and mediator, — since that which I do mediately by another, as my minister or delegate, I do myself as much as if I did it immediately. These terms, applied to the Blessed Virgin, no doubt imply that she

is exalted above every other creature ; but as her exaltation is that of a creature, and an exaltation not by her own natural right, but by grace, it by no means places her in the same rank with her Son, who is exalted above *every* creature, by his own right, the right of his own proper Divinity which assumed humanity."

" But Catholics pray to her much more than they do to God."

" That may be questioned ; but if so, it is nothing to your purpose. You must prove that they pray to her as God, ask of her what may be rightfully asked only of God, and that they pay her honors which are due to him alone."

" They pray to her to have mercy on them, and mercy is the prerogative of God alone."

" Mercy, in the sense of pardon or forgiveness of sin, is the property of God only ; and in this sense, Catholics never ask the Blessed Virgin to have mercy on them. But mercy, in the sense of pity or compassion, belongs to human beings. Thus we say, ' The merciful man is merciful to his beast.' To ask the Blessed Virgin to have compassion on us, and to intercede with her Divine Son for us, to obtain his pardon for us by her powerful intercession, is nothing more than we may lawfully ask of our pastors,—nothing more than what the Scriptures say the Lord commanded the three friends of Job to do."

" The worship which Catholics pay to the saints in general is idolatry."

" The highest form of worship we pay to any saint is that which we pay to the Holy Mother of God. If that is not idolatrous, then, *a fortiori*, not that which we pay to the other saints."

" But you honor the saints."

" And what do you conclude from that ? Does not the law of nature command us to give honor to whom honor is due ? What authority have you for supposing that we pay *undue* honor to the saints ?"

" To honor them as God, in the place of God, is to give them an honor which is not their due, and is idolatry."

" Granted ; but who so honors them ?"

" Catholics."

" The proof ?"

" Catholics may not honor them as the Supreme God ; but they honor them as a species of inferior gods, as the *Dii Minores* of the heathen."

“ The proof ? ”

“ The fact is evident of itself.”

“ Not by any means. The honors the heathen paid to their inferior gods were different in kind from those which we pay to the saints, and, moreover, were paid as due them in their own natural right, and not as due only to what they became through grace. The heathen offered sacrifices, and therefore paid *divine* honors, to their inferior gods. Catholics offer no sacrifices and pay no divine honors to the saints ; they venerate them for what, through grace, they became, and they ask their prayers and intercession, which is no more than we may ask of the living, and is no more than your parishioners not unfrequently ask of you, — no more than you sanction whenever you pray God for your congregation, or for an individual who has requested to be remembered in your prayers.”

“ But you have no warrant in Scripture for praying to the saints.”

“ That were nothing to the purpose, if true. You bring your action on the law of nature ; and when you find that under the law of nature you have no cause of action, you are not at liberty to plead some other law. If praying to the saints is not idolatry by the law of nature, you cannot allege it under the head of idolatry, against the Church.”

“ But, unless the Church has a warrant in the word of God for praying to the saints, she has no right to pray to them.”

“ And unless it is forbidden by some precept of the law of nature, you cannot deny her right.”

“ The Romish Church worships crosses, dead men’s bones, locks of their hair, their finger-nails, and shreds of their garments.”

“ What then ? ”

“ Then she is idolatrous ; for we must worship God, and him only.”

“ *Worship* is a word of more than one meaning ; it may mean paying divine honors, and also simply paying a civil respect, honoring or acknowledging worth wherever we find it. In the former sense, it is due to God alone, and is by Catholics paid to him alone, and never to the objects you enumerate. In the latter sense, it may be paid, and the law of nature requires that it should be paid, to kings, judges, magistrates, to our parents, and to whomsoever by rank or worth is entitled to honor. In this sense, the law of nature not only does not forbid, but commands us to honor or to treat with respect such

objects as are related to eminent worth. To honor crosses and relics of the saints, for the worth to which they are related, is, then, in accordance with the law of nature, and it is only in this sense that we honor, respect, or, if you please, *worship* them."

"But you do not honor them merely as memorials of a worth which was real; you pay them divine honors."

"False!"

"Not false. Witness the Holy Coat of Treves."

"What of that?"

"Multitudes, in the recent pilgrimage to it, prayed to it, saying, 'O Holy Coat, have mercy on us!'"

"The evidence of what you assert?"

"It is said so."

"By whom, and on what authority?"

"Do you deny it?"

"Deny it? Do you suppose Catholics are so besotted as to pray to what has no life, no sense, no power to help them, and that, too, when their Church, as I showed you yesterday, positively prohibits praying to relics? The thing is impossible; no Catholic ever did, or ever could, utter such a prayer. You must not judge our people by your own. We preserve, and we honor, the relics of departed saints; they remind us of the worth of the saints; and when they do so, we pray to the *saints* to pray God for us, and procure for us the graces and favors we need. What precept of the law of nature does this violate?"

"Why not pray directly to God?"

"That question is out of place. Why do you ask a fellow-mortal to pray for you? Why do you pray and intercede for your congregation?"

"But you are idolaters, for you worship images."

"If by *worship* you mean paying divine honors, your assertion is false."

"Your houses and churches are full of images and pictures, and you kneel and pray to them."

"Kneel and pray *before* them, I grant; kneel and pray *to* them, I deny. There is a difference between praying *before* an image and praying *to* it, which I should suppose even a Protestant might understand."

"But you break the second commandment; and that your deluded followers may not detect the fact, you have expunged it from the Decalogue."

“ We do not expunge what you call the second commandment ; we only reckon it as a part of the first commandment.”

“ Nevertheless you break it, for it says, ‘ Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.’ ”

“ Graven *thing*, not graven *image*, is the correct translation, and more to your purpose ; otherwise the precept would not forbid making statues of Jupiter, Neptune, and other purely fictitious beings. But do you understand that precept to forbid absolutely the making and keeping of images, statues, or pictures ? ”

“ Of course I do ; I am not wise above what is written.”

“ Nobody asks you to be wise above what is written ; the question is, What is written ? Then I am to understand you to maintain that Moses broke that commandment when he made and set up the brazen serpent in the wilderness ; that Solomon broke it when he placed the brazen sea in the temple on twelve brazen oxen ; that it was broken by the images of the Cherubim, who spread out their wings over the mercy-seat where God promised to meet his people ; that our stern Puritans of Massachusetts break it by suspending the image of a codfish in their State House ; that Congress break it in ordering a statue of Washington ; and that it is broken by that dog’s head carved on your cane, and those lion’s-claws on the feet of your table ? ”

“ No, I do not say all that.”

“ Well, what do you say ? ”

“ Why, that the commandment forbids the making and keeping of images, &c., as objects of religious veneration.”

“ That is, ‘ Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them,’ or, as the catechism says, ‘ It forbids making them, so as to adore and serve them ; that is, it forbids making them our gods.’ ”

“ But the Romish Church commands, you cannot deny, supreme religious worship to be paid to what you call the sacred Host.”

“ What then ? ”

“ Then she is idolatrous ; for she commands her children to pay divine honors to a bit of bread.”

“ False ! She commands no such thing. She commands us to worship Jesus Christ, who is God and man, entitled in his

own right to supreme worship, and who veils his divinity and his humanity both under the sacramental species. It is not the bread, for she teaches there is no bread there, but the Son who is consubstantial to the Father, and whom we are to honor as we honor the Father, that she commands us to adore. There is, then, no idolatry in the adoration."

"But her teaching is false, — the Host is nothing but bread."

"That is a matter which you, by the light of nature, cannot decide."

"But she must prove to me that it is not bread, before I can be bound to adore it."

"Undoubtedly; but you must prove that it is bread, before you can pronounce the adoration idolatrous."

"But I have the evidence of my senses that it is bread."

"You have the evidence of your senses that the species of bread are there, and that the Church asserts; but that, under the species of bread, there is the *substance* of bread, you have *not* the evidence of your senses; for the senses never, in any case whatever, take cognizance of substances. You have, therefore, the evidence of your senses against nothing the Church asserts. Consequently, by the light of nature alone, you can neither affirm nor deny what she asserts; and unless you can deny it, you cannot say that the adoration of the Host is idolatrous. If what she teaches be true, the adoration is due, and commanded by the natural law, which commands us to give to every one his due. Have you any thing more to adduce in support of the charge of idolatry?"

"Perhaps it is true that Catholics worship, in the strict sense of the word, only God; but, though they may worship the true object, they render him a false worship."

"That is, they worship him in an undue manner."

"Yes, that is what I mean."

"To be able to say that, you must first determine the *due* manner of worshipping him. But you cannot do this without authority, and you have, as we have seen, no authority, except the light of nature. Are you able by the light of nature alone to determine what is the due worship of God?"

"I am able, in some cases, at least, by the light of nature, to say what is *not* due worship."

"Be it so; what is there, then, in Catholic worship forbidden by the law of nature?"

"All her peculiar worship, — her saint-worship, her venera-

tion of relics, her beads and crucifixes, her fasts and feasts, her empty forms and idle ceremonies."

"Her empty forms and idle ceremonies? By what authority do you pronounce her forms empty, and her ceremonies idle?"

"Do you deny that her whole worship consists of empty forms and idle ceremonies?"

"Of course I do. But be so good as to specify what you call an empty form, or an idle ceremony."

"The light of nature teaches us that God is not worshipped by mere show, by vain pomp and parade, and that no worship can be acceptable to him which is not real, in spirit and in truth."

"Granted; proceed."

"Your bowings and genuflections, your fasts and your feasts, are a vain mockery, if merely external, and the heart be far from God."

"No doubt of it; proceed."

"Confessions to a priest, external acts of penance, the repetition of *paters* and *aves*, and even the giving of alms, are vain illusions, and have no power to purge the conscience, if there be not genuine repentance, deep and pungent sorrow for sin."

"Nothing in the world more true; proceed."

"The heart must be right; there must be internal holiness, or all our outward worship will avail us nothing."

"As true as preaching. Go on."

"This is enough. In conceding this much, you condemn your Church."

"How so?"

"Because all she enjoins is outward, formal, mechanical, addressed to the senses and imagination, requiring no internal purity and holiness in the worshipper."

"And where did you learn that?"

"Is it not so?"

"What proof have you that it is so?"

"It is what the Reformers and we have always alleged against her."

"If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household! I have not asked what you allege, but the proof of what you allege, against the Church."

"Do you mean to call all Protestants false witnesses and calumniators?"

“Is it more unreasonable to believe them to be such, than it is to believe that the overwhelming majority of all who bear the Christian name, or have borne it, have, for eighteen hundred years, or from the very age of the Apostles, been sunk in superstition, and guilty of the abominable sin of idolatry? It seems to me much easier to believe that a Protestant can calumniate than that a Catholic can be an idolater; and in so believing, I believe nothing worse of you than you profess to believe of us.”

“What else can one see in your worship than mere outward form?”

“What else should you expect to see in external worship but external worship? External is by its very nature external; and I am unable to comprehend how the Church should have an external worship, and yet not an external worship. But if you had ever taken the least pains to inform yourself, you would have known that the Church teaches all her children that no external act, which does not proceed from internal justice and sanctity, is, or can be, meritorious.”

“You rely on the sacraments.”

“Well, what then?”

“Are they not outward?”

“Are they not inward?”

“Does not the Church teach that the child is regenerated in baptism?”

“She does.”

“And it is no superstition to believe that a little water poured upon the head of the child, and a few words muttered over him by the priest, can regenerate the soul?”

“If you make the water and the words the efficient cause of the regeneration, it is unquestionably superstition, for none but the Holy Ghost can regenerate the child; but if you understand by the water and the words simply the medium through which the Holy Ghost is pleased to communicate the grace which regenerates, there is no superstition; for the cause assigned is adequate to the effect. The Church teaches the latter; the former is the vain fancy of her calumniators.

“If it is the Holy Ghost that regenerates, why can he not regenerate without the water and words as well as with them?”

“That is a question which does not fall within the jurisdiction of the law of nature. You and I have no right to call Almighty God to an account, and to ask him, Why do you so?”

“ But how does the Church know that the Holy Ghost regenerates in baptism ? ”

“ That is a question which pertains to positive revelation, and not to the natural law. The revelation is her authority for what she asserts, concerning which, if it do not contradict natural reason, the natural law enacts nothing.”

“ There are other sacraments.”

“ Certainly ; but all are founded on the same principle, and are not the efficient cause of grace, but the media through which the Holy Ghost communicates the graces which our Lord, by his own infinite merits, has purchased for us.”

“ But any body can receive the sacrament, whatever his internal disposition ; and the efficacy of the sacrament does not depend on the recipient.”

“ Any body can receive the sacrament externally ; but nobody can receive any spiritual benefit from it, unless he receives it with proper internal dispositions. He who should approach the sacrament of penance, for instance, without all you understand by *repentance*, would, instead of receiving the fruits of the sacrament, only profane it, and add to his guilt. In the sacrament of the Eucharist, he who eats or drinks unworthily eats and drinks condemnation to himself. The efficacy of the sacrament does not, indeed, depend on the recipient ; but that the recipient may experience its effects, or that it may operate its effects in him, he must take care that he interpose by his malice no obstacle to its operation.”

“ But what is the use of your saint-worship ? ”

“ That is not precisely the question.”

“ The worship, if useless, is idle or vain, and therefore superstitious. You must, then, prove that it is not useless, or you do not clear your Church of the charge of superstition.”

“ You must prove from the light of nature that it *is* useless, or you do not sustain your charge against her. You bring the action, and the burden of proof is on you.”

“ I accuse the Church of superstition ; and I adduce as proof of my accusation the worship of the saints, which she authorizes.”

“ But you cannot adduce your accusation in proof of your accusation. The *cultus sanctorum* is conceded to be authorized by the Church, and the very point in dispute is, Whether that is or is not superstitious. It is only on the assumption that it is, that you can conclude from it that the Church is

superstitious. To assume that it is superstitious is to assume what is in question, which you are not permitted to do. You must, therefore, since the point is denied, prove that the *cultus sanctorum* is useless."

"Reason can see no use in it."

"That, if conceded, were not enough. You can conclude nothing against the Church from the inability of reason. Reason must be able to affirm its inutility, or it can affirm nothing to your purpose."

"But I must have affirmative proof that it is useful, before I can reasonably assent to it."

"Nothing more true ; but the authority of the Church suffices for that, unless you can divest her of her authority. You are attempting to convict the Church of superstition, in order to be able to conclude against her authority. You must, then, prove that she authorizes superstition, as the condition of setting aside her authority, and, therefore, that what she authorizes is superstitious, as the condition of proving that she authorizes superstition. It is, therefore, not for me to prove that the *cultus sanctorum* is useful, but for you to prove that it is useless, and therefore superstitious."

"It is an undue worship."

"That is the point you must prove."

"Any worship which God forbids, does not exact, or approve, is an undue worship, and therefore superstition."

"Granted ; what then ?"

"What is your authority for saying that God does exact or approve what you term the *cultus sanctorum* ?"

"Your memory is apparently very short. Let me ask you by what authority you assert that God forbids it, or does not exact or approve it."

"I find no authority for it in the Scriptures."

"That is not certain ; but you cannot appeal to the Scriptures, for you have no legal possession of them and are not authorized to interpret them, and because you bring your action, not on the revealed, but on the natural law. Besides, the fact that you find no authority for the *cultus sanctorum* is not sufficient for your purpose ; you must have authority *against* it, and you can conclude nothing against it, unless you find it prohibited by the law of nature."

"I know, by the light of nature, that God does not exact or approve, but forbids, all idle and vain worship."

"Undoubtedly ; but what is idle and vain worship ?"

"The Romish worship of the saints."

"That is begging the question, or making your accusation the proof of the truth of your accusation, — the ordinary Protestant method of proving what they assert against the Church. But proceeding in this way, we shall never be able to come to any conclusion. Is not any worship superstitious in which the worshipper looks for effects from inadequate causes?"

"Perhaps so."

"Thus it is superstition to fear bad luck because we have seen the new moon over our left shoulder, or because we have begun a piece of work, put to sea, or commenced a journey on Friday; to expect to discharge what we owe to God by paying divine honors to what is not God, to please him by vain observances, or to obtain blessings by means of prayers to inanimate or senseless objects, — objects which can neither bestow the blessings nor intercede with God for them; for in these, and all similar cases, the causes are inadequate to the effects. On the contrary, in all cases in which the effects feared or expected are feared and expected from adequate causes, although there may be error, there is no superstition."

"Be it so."

"Then in order to convict the *cultus sanctorum* of superstition, you must show that the effects we expect from it are expected from inadequate causes."

"That can easily be done. The saints cannot atone for our sins, and be our mediators."

"Granted; nor do we expect any thing of the sort from them. All we ask of them is their prayers."

"Even that is superstitious, because the saints have no power to hear your prayers or to pray for you."

"How know you that?"

"They are no longer living."

"In the flesh, conceded; but the Church assures us that they still live in the presence of God, and if they do, they can hear our prayers in him, and do for us all we ask of them; and how can you, from the light of nature, say they do not so live?"

"Your veneration of relics is superstitious, for you acknowledge that they have no life or sense to help you."

"We do not expect them to help us."

"Then the veneration is idle, and therefore superstitious."

“ In the respect we pay to the relics of a saint, it is the saint we honor ; and whatever we expect, we expect from the intercession of the saint, and through that intercession from God, who is honored in his saints, and who himself delights to honor them.”

“ But the superstition is in supposing that honoring the relics is honoring the saint.”

“ The law of nature teaches the reverse ; for that teaches us that honor to what belonged to another, because it belonged to him, is a pious and affecting mode of honoring him. Hence the universality of funeral ceremonies, the marks of respect which all men show to the relics of their deceased friends, especially to the remains of those held to be deserving of honor for their rank, their virtues, their services, their heroic deeds ; and surely none are more deserving of honor than the saints of God.”

“ Your feasts, fasts, and external observances are all superstitious.”

“ How do you prove that ? ”

“ They are all external and mechanical ; and to expect spiritual effects from them is to look for effects from inadequate causes.”

“ The law of nature commands us to worship God externally as well as internally, and an external worship must needs be external. The fact, that what you object to is external, is, therefore, no ground of objection. Feasts or festivals are merely days set apart for public thanksgiving to God for his mercies and favors to us, in becoming man for us, in suffering and dying for us, in rising again for us, in sending us the Holy Ghost, in raising up and giving to us such or such a saint, &c. If kept according to the intent of the Church, internal as well as external thanks are rendered by each worshipper, and therefore the observance of the festival is not and cannot be mechanical. The law of nature commands the giving of thanks to God ; and perhaps even the mere external observance of appointed seasons for public thanksgiving is better than no observance at all. Fasts are for the mortification of the body ; they are admirably adapted to that end ; and the light of nature teaches us that the mortification of the body is wholesome for the soul. Moreover, to fast, as required, is also to fast with proper interior dispositions. You cannot, then, say, either that in them there is only a mechanical action, or that we look for effects from inadequate causes.”

“But the idle ceremonies and vain observances of your public worship are superstitious.”

“If idle and vain, superstitious of course; but how do you know that they are idle and vain? Our public worship consists of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, prayers, and singing the praises of God. These you have no right to pronounce idle or vain. Our sacrifice we hold to be a real sacrifice, in an unbloody manner, of a real victim; and prayers and the singing of praises have, by the common consent of mankind, — the authority for determining what is the law of nature, — always been held to be appropriate parts of public worship. Much of what you call idle ceremony and vain observance is integral in the worship itself; and what is not absolutely essential is adopted for the sake of decency, solemnity, and the edification of the faithful.”

“I am not edified by it.”

“Because you are not one of the faithful, and do not worship. Satan, no doubt, could himself bring the objection to our worship which you do. Our worship is adapted to the edification of those who worship, not of those who do not.”

“But your worship is calculated to lead the weak and ignorant into idolatry and superstition.”

“It will be time to consider that objection when you have shown that a Catholic, by practising what the Church enjoins or permits, is rendered superstitious.”

“Your worship is exceedingly offensive.”

“To whom? To Protestants? Then let them become Catholics, — especially since they have no warrant from Almighty God to be any thing else.”

“Your Church is exceedingly impolitic. The practices to which we object may have been very well in dark and superstitious ages; but men in this enlightened and scientific age demand a more pure and spiritual worship.”

“The policy you would recommend to the Church, then, is, to be superstitious with the superstitious, and irreligious with the irreligious? If her practices could have a superstitious tendency, it is precisely in a dark and superstitious age in which they would be dangerous, and when it would be least proper to insist on them. If this age be what you suppose, it is precisely now that they are most appropriate, as being in opposition to dominant tendencies. But the Church is not reduced to the necessity of taking the advice of those who

despise her, and very possibly the age is not so enlightened as it appears to those whose eyes are accustomed only to the twilight. Have you any thing more to add ? ”

“ There is no use in continuing the discussion. Let me say what I will, you will dispose of it by declaring it irrelevant, or by a sophistical distinction.”

“ Do you keep your word, and give up the Reformers and the Reformation ? ”

“ You have not made me a Romanist.”

“ I have not attempted to do that ; I have simply demanded of you a reason why you are a Protestant.”

“ I have given you reasons which satisfy me, and that is enough. Each of us must answer for himself, and not for another.”

“ You pledged yourself, if you failed to convict the Church of idolatry and superstition, to give up the Protestant cause. Do you regard yourself as having made out your case ? ”

“ There is no use in multiplying words. My mind is made up.”

“ You have no right to make up your mind without reason.”

“ My choice is made. I was born a Protestant ; I have lived a Protestant ; and I will die a Protestant.”

“ If you choose death, you, no doubt, can have it. Almighty God forces no man to enter into life.”

“ I take the responsibility ; and nothing shall move me.”

Here the conversation ended, and the two brothers separated. John entered a religious house, where he resides, devoting himself wholly to religion ; James remains the minister of his congregation. He has recently married again, and he appears to have forgotten his domestic afflictions. He continues at the head of the “ Protestant League,” is louder than ever in praise of the Reformers and the glorious Reformation, and more violent than ever in his denunciations of Catholics and Catholicity. Humanly speaking, there is no hope of his conversion. It is to be feared that James Milwood is the type of a large class of Protestant ministers. I would judge no individual, but it seems to me that the notion many people have that Protestants are generally in good faith, and ready to embrace the truth, if presented to them, rests on no adequate authority. So far as I have known Protestants, they are ready to say, as said a Protestant minister to me the other day, “ I would rather be damned than be a Catholic.”

ART. VI. — PIUS THE NINTH, and the *Political Regeneration of Italy.*

FREEDOM and improvement walking hand in hand, with religion for their guide, is a spectacle, which, while it reflects immortal honor on the age wherein it is exhibited, cannot fail to excite the admiration and praise of generations to come. History will record the great names of those who endeavour to chain interest to the throne of virtue, and to imitate the divine legislation by deriving the strength of their dominion from happiness and order, reserving force for those only who are so perverse as not to value the blessings of the one or the security of the other. Meanwhile, we, as Catholics, may feel a noble pride—the pride of children in their mother's greatness—at witnessing the High Priest of our holy religion inaugurate this reign of peaceful glory, and at hearing the peal which summons a great nation to rise from its slumbers, loose the bonds from its neck, and resume its garment of joy, issue from the sanctuary of the Christian Church.

The ashes of the Fisherman slumber beneath the shrine of the Vatican, a fitting sepulchre ; but we behold a new and brilliant proof that the vivifying spirit with which his Divine Master endued him on the shores of Galilee was not entombed with them, but was bequeathed, like the prophetic mantle of old, to his successor.

A condensed sketch of the principal circumstances, which, duly considered, will enable them to judge of the true attitude of the present Holy Father, with regard to his temporal dominions, of the difficulties against which he has had to struggle in introducing social reforms, of his prudence, and of the probability of his success, cannot, therefore, fail to command the attention of our readers, to whom we should do no slight injustice, if we supposed for a moment that they could be indifferent to the well-being of the native land of Columbus and Americo, the nursery of religion, science, and the arts, — classic, holy, beautiful Italy, — or to the hero of our age, the honor of religion, the friend of improvement, our great and glorious Pope, PIUS THE NINTH.

Cæsar is represented by Lucan in the act of pausing, in his march to Rome, on the banks of the Rubicon, the boundary line of its immediate territory, as if then and there alone his

gigantic enterprise had burst in its true light upon his mind. The same feelings of anxiety which agitated the breast of the conqueror, whose powerful arm lacerated the charter of Roman freedom, must have filled, from different motives, the heart of the Pontiff, on the eve of the publication of the far-famed decree of the Amnesty. This great decree was the Declaration of Roman independence, the harbinger of a new order of things, the corner-stone of a system which was to change the political condition of Italy, and to elicit a voice of surprise and exultation from all the inhabitants of the earth. The Pontiff might have assented, as had been done before, to the liberation of a few privileged individuals through a solitary act of mercy, — but a total and unreserved grant of forgiveness he could not have signed, without willingly or unwillingly persevering in the career of which such a grant was the first step. In order to understand and admire more fully the magnanimity which dictated this step, let us recall briefly the circumstances of the new Pope's position, and take a cursory view of the events which gave rise to the present liberal feeling in Italy.

The first blow struck at the system of exaggerated conservatism, — the conservatism of abuses, — in modern days, was the independence of this country, asserted at a time when the claim seemed almost ridiculous, and achieved, after a brief struggle, in spite of revered prescription and superior force. The principle, that rational liberty is a vested right of the people, which to withhold is tyrannical in a ruler, to regain heroic in a nation, was first practically proclaimed to the world by our gallant forefathers at Lexington and Bunker's Hill. Had every people claimed their rights with equal moderation, resorting to force only when driven to it by the unjustifiable obstinacy of governments, the past century, and the present, would not have so many fearful crimes to account for at the bar of Eternal Justice. But the just and true principles of popular freedom were appealed to as the apology for criminal excess; and the horrors of the French Revolution were the first baneful fruit of their perversion. The spirit of liberty, however, was abroad, and its power shook the thrones of the earth. In some regions it produced tumult and bloodshed, but was quelled by the overwhelming force of its opponents. In other places it merely required and obtained redress of grievances, or a modification of the existing forms of power. Let us consider the effects produced by the new reign of ideas in Italy.

The report that the colonies of Great Britain, on the distant shores of North America, had thrown off their allegiance to the mother country, produced little or no excitement in Rome, where political innovations were considered worthy of particular attention only when they could be practically represented by *the fig of Cato*. The Romans were too indolent, or too wise, to trouble themselves about the dissensions of a people of whom they knew little more, at the time, than that they lived on the other side of the ocean. But, for the contrary reason, the tidings of the French Revolution struck horror and dismay to every generous heart ; and the liberty which could raise its head and smile, amid such revolting scenes as were of daily occurrence in the public squares of Paris and Lyons, was regarded as a demon let loose upon earth, — an appellation frequently given to it by the Italian poets of the time.

Still, there were men in Italy imbued with the principles of the Gallic philosophy, — men who labored under pecuniary embarrassments, or were impatient of all restraint, — and these envied the adventurers of the French anarchy, and longed for the time when, imitating their violence, they might enjoy their good fortune by fishing for office and opulence in the waters of society, made turbid under the specious pretext of social reform. The storm soon rolled on and darkened the shores of Italy. The queen of nations now became a province of Gaul, whose strong men were once brought to Rome to waste their lives, for the amusement of their conquerors, in the slavish occupation of gladiators ! *

The transition of France from a republican bedlam to an absolute monarchy, which occurred soon after, improved not the hapless condition of Italy. The heathen Directory, whose members considered the Son of God highly honored by the title of "*Citizen Christ*," dragged Pope Pius the Sixth to die, an aged and suffering exile, in Valence ; and the first and last of "*Most Christian*" emperors dared to raise his sacrilegious hand to menace Pius the Seventh, his prisoner at Fontainebleau. Still, at the time appointed by the Most High, the scourge of his anger passed away, the home of the Italian was

* The manner in which the French generals, and the men whom they raised to office in the Roman and Alpine Republics, oppressed, exhausted, and debased them, is generally known, and could not have been more unjust, or more rude, had their administration been intended as a retaliation for ancient wrongs.

disencumbered of foreign usurpers, and the Martyr-Pontiff returned once more to his see. The brief reign of the French had produced, however, a strong impression and lasting effects on the holy side of the Alps. The doctrines of LIBERTY and EQUALITY, arrayed in French fashion, had spread far and wide through the land; secret societies had been organized in different places; the good and the bad of the whole nation had been roused from their lethargy by the stirring events of that memorable period. The factious and the rebellious lamented that the times of turmoil and impunity should have passed away so soon; and many of those who would have remained faithful to their sovereigns permitted their allegiance to be shaken by the noisy declamation of their restless fellow-citizens.

Yet, down to this time, all parties seemed to view the renovation of Italy, not as a peaceable amelioration to be effected through legitimate means, and with the blessing of religion, but as a forbidden fruit to be snatched with the fearful joy of crime. The Church, without whose *fiat* no extensive change in Italy was ever obtained even in part, and without whose co-operation it would be vain to attempt to remodel the social order of the whole country in any rational form, could not sanction the cry of liberty as raised in the beginning of this century in Europe; for the few voices that uttered it with the reverence due to that sacred word were drowned in the delirious uproar of the multitude, who used it as synonymous with the wildest anarchy. If, then, the Church kept her old standard, and remained conservative on the side chosen by all the elder European governments, the cause was not any predilection in her for absolutism, but the fault of the pretended patriots, who sought for a change which would only have given to the people their lawless and grasping dictatorship in lieu of the ancient sovereignties.

The Lombardo-Venetian kingdom was the only part of Italy which claimed a definite reform, the particulars of which were laid down with precision. The demand put forward there was, to be redeemed from the yoke of Austria, and to exist once more as a nation of Italians, not as a populace of German serfs. Many of the noblest and most gifted sons of Northern Italy identified themselves with the national cause, and Italy's rights were advocated by the serried arguments of the philosopher and the lofty aspirations of the poet.

The error which they committed was that of the Irish

Patriots of '98. They determined to obtain by a plot, matured in secret and to end in bloodshed, what they could hope to accomplish, or at least to prepare, only by persevering and constitutional agitation. The strong arm of Austria cut asunder the threads of their machinations, and led those who were saved from the scaffold, either to bedew with tears the hard bread of the prisoner, or to wander unpitied and alone in eternal exile from their native shores.

The attempt made by the Lombard patriots, and the failure of their plot, resounded over all Italy. Austria, alarmed by their schemes, after having destroyed the authors of them, insured her sway by drawing closer and tighter the bands of oppression; and the other Italian governments, in the apprehension of similar attempts, imitated her example. Still, the spirit of discontent ceased not its silent work, and a new proof that it was not dead was exhibited, in the Pontifical States, at the accession of Gregory the Sixteenth to the chair of St. Peter.

The revolution of 1831 was, in its abettors, its motives, and its object, less honorable than the Lombard movement. Its abettors were chiefly the malcontent and disreputable portion of the community, leavened with the old French Revolutionary spirit. Many of them were officers and soldiers in retirement, and nearly all of them were Carbonari. They hated the quiet government of the Pope, under whom the exciting scenes in which they had been actors during the days of the republic and the empire were unknown; and their object was, generally speaking, nothing but plunder and revolt.* Bologna and some other cities joined in the rebellion, with the hope of escaping from the rule of their unpopular governors. But no representation of their grievances preceded their rash and injudicious outbreak, and their aim was so undefined, that in Rome itself, when the military were led out upon the Piazza of the Column of Trajan, to quell the insurgents, they were received with discordant and ridiculous cries by the rabble, some exclaiming, "Viva la Libertà!" "Viva la Repubblica!" others, "Death to the Pope!" and others even, "Long life to Louis Philippe!"

The good sense of the true Roman people — and their de-

* As an illustration to the purpose, it is a remarkable fact that one of those who were placed for a time in personal danger by their lawless proceedings was the Archbishop of Spoleto, now Pope Pius, and one most active and effectual in repressing them his cousin, the chivalric Secretary of State, Cardinal Ferretti.

portment is a redeeming feature of those turbulent times — taught them that such a disgraceful insurrection was neither calculated to do honor to their country, nor to correct what was wrong in its administration. The Trasteverini especially, who are now such enthusiastic defenders of Pius the Ninth and his wise ameliorations, sided not with the profligate and bankrupt Liberals who opposed Pope Gregory; and as in Italy every feeling elevated above the ordinary routine has its expression in music and poetry, a *tarantella* or ballad in the popular dialect was composed for the occasion, and sung through the streets, which is well remembered in Rome to the present day. One stanza of it ran thus: —

“Santo Padre! non tremate
Se sentite archibugiate;
Che per farvi star sicuro
C’è Clemente e Peppe il Duro.” *

Clement and “Joseph the Tough,” were the Ciceroacchios of ’31. The refrain of the ballad was, —

“Chi non dice Viva Gregorio
Si prepari al mortorio.” †

But under the melancholy auspices and amidst the extraordinary difficulties mentioned before, began the reign of Gregory the Sixteenth, — a prince of great benevolence of heart and extensive learning, worthy of better times, or, at least, of more prudent advisers. Those by whom alone the real liberties of the people could have been properly asserted kept aloof from the movement of the self-styled Liberals, which they considered only as a puny and spurious imitation of the French Revolution, and those who came forward professing to be the organs of the people were interested and faithless demagogues. What course could the new Pontiff adopt? His kind and generous disposition was met uncandidly and rudely by a rabble he had never offended. No one came to his aid, who was able and wise enough to help him; no man of powerful intellect and established popularity was found to indicate the proper course to be followed, or to conciliate the affections of

* “Holy Father! tremble not
If thou hearest their guns fire.
For to assure thee
Thou hast Clement and Joseph *surnamed* the Tough.”

† “Let those who say not ‘Life to Gregory’
Get ready for their funeral.”

his people in his favor. The country was not ripe for renovation, nor had the day appointed for it arrived.

Gregory saw not at home a friendly power upon which he could rely for support in his greatest need, and in an evil hour for the country, it was supplied by the proffer of Austrian intervention. By the aid of friendly bayonets, insurrection was quelled, and the new sovereign's influence was forced to work as part of a system composed of two other and unwholesome elements, — the mean chicanery and petty tyranny of subalterns, and the gratuitous and unjust, yet perpetual, interference of foreign envoys residing at Rome. A conservative stand once taken, the correction of every abuse was sought from the vigilance or interposition of the civil authority, until this omnipresent government became a heavy burden both for the people and their virtuous and benevolent sovereign. It became, however, gradually understood all over Italy, that this order of things could not last for ever.

Endowed with at least equal genius and better natural advantages, the people of Southern Italy remained stationary while the world all around was undergoing a change, believed to be for the better. In the course of time, the horror of innovation, so characteristic of the Italians, began gradually to subside, and the more powerful minds of the nation were compelled to charge themselves with the task of ascertaining the applicability of the principles of social reform to the wants and deficiencies of their country. They began to look upon the regeneration of Italy now, not as a dream, but as a necessity ; and fortunately they understood that so desirable a consummation was not to be brought about by a faction, but by the nation at large ; not by the people alone, but by their sovereigns ; not in spite of the religion of Italy, but with its approval and by its concurrence.

The powerful and elegant writer, Vincenzo Gioberti, of Turin, was the first well-known genius who seized upon the idea that the regeneration was to come from the *good*, by *lawful* means, and to place it before the people in its true light. In his *Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians*, he told his countrymen, in glowing terms, of the glory of their ancestors, who had excelled in military renown, and in every branch of science and literature, beyond all competition. He showed them what they were capable of accomplishing ; he roused the moral power of the nation, and directed it towards a definite object, by telling the people and their sovereigns what end

they should strive to keep in view. The plan which, according to his advice, was to be carried out, consisted in a constitutional arrangement of the affairs of Italy, in pursuance of which Austria was to yield up peaceably to the Italian princes the apple of discord, her Lombardo-Venetian provinces, and to receive a compensation, by the consent of the greater powers, in some other region. The princes of Italy, without losing any of their rights, were to unite for their general good understanding and security in a confederation, similar to that of Germany, with the Pope at its head, as the least likely to inspire distrust or jealousy. The work of Gioberti was somewhat enthusiastic, perhaps dreamy, and his summary disposal of the peninsula seemed too arbitrary to be ever effected. In some instances, too, he allowed his private disagreements to lend a tone of unjust and unprofitable severity to a book intended for the impartial instruction of the public. Still, it made the Italian Revolutionaries pause to reflect, and understand that violence is not a prudent beginning, where mutual confidence and union are the ultimate object, and that, as they had tried in vain to arrange their difficulties by getting rid of the Pope, they had better make the most of him by soliciting the aid of his powerful authority. The body of the people at large, and the clergy, who understood that some extensive reorganization must eventually take place, were delighted at the proposal of a methodical adjustment of things, which did not make it necessary for them to sacrifice their religion and plunge into the worst of all public evils, an intestine war. The work of Gioberti became the theme of every tongue, and had an immense merit in schooling the minds of the people and preparing them for the great events that Providence ordained to take place.*

Cesare Balbo, one of the most influential members of the Sardinian cabinet, followed, explained and partially modified the views of Gioberti, in his work, *The Hopes of Italy*. Another of the most popular authors of the day, the Marquis d'Azeglio, author of the celebrated romance, *The Challenge of Barletta*, pursued the favorite subject in his new book, *The Last Events of Romagna*, in the same practical and popular spirit.

Thus had an all-wise Providence gradually disposed the

* We speak here only of the first edition of Gioberti's work. We detect as much as any body can what he says of the Jesuits in the *Prolegomena* to his second edition.

Italian public for a change, upon sound, and not anti-religious principles. The feasibility of a great bloodless revolution was canvassed down to the minutest details of its execution, and although it was not known from what point of the peninsula the unusual movement would receive its earliest impulse, all felt confident that something great to be performed was no longer a matter of choice, but a solution as inevitable as it was expected to prove beneficial.

This condensed historical sketch of the state of Italy previous to the accession of Cardinal Mastai to the Pontifical throne was necessary in order to give our readers a correct idea of the circumstances in which the new sovereign was then placed, and the main features of his position and policy can now be easily and briefly traced. Let us, then, see how he found himself situated at the time in regard to his people, to the Church, and to foreign powers.

His people, as it appears from what we have said, were already ripe for great and durable changes. They were prepared to receive them thankfully from authority, and to coöperate for them, under its guidance, upon sober and reasonable principles. The deportment of Pius, and the rapidity of his reforms, sufficiently prove this to have been his own conviction. We may add, that it was the firm opinion of every body conversant with the state of affairs in Italy, that, had not the rights of a nation been conceded by some power, human or divine, a desperate effort would have been made to seize them, not by an obscure faction, but by almost every individual who did not believe patient endurance or thoughtless repose ever preferable to an open claim of indemnity, or who did not hold all popular revolutions, even when inevitable, to be evil in themselves. What was his position in regard to the Church? — It is singular to notice the awkward accounts given of this particular by different classes of people, when the news of the changes at Rome began to be diffused abroad. Some of the Rationalistic, or, if we may so distinguish them, of the Macaulay school, saw nothing in Pius the Ninth but a man of powerful genius in the act of giving a new form to the beautiful system framed by men similarly gifted who had gone before him. Of Protestants in general, some wisely discovered that a new, thorough, godly reformation was on the carpet; some saw nothing but a cunning artifice of Austria in disguise; while others hesitated, uncertain what opinion to express at what they considered as the novel event of Antichrist transformed suddenly into a George Washington!

The only persons who spoke rationally were the unprejudiced friends of true liberty, who cheerfully applauded the extension of its blessings to the Italian people ; and the Catholics, who were, moreover, rejoiced at viewing the action of the Holy See, freed from all the hateful trammels of secular intrusion, manifest itself with the vivifying spirit with which it was animated, at first, by that heavenly Founder who promised to be with it for ever.

The Church from the very beginning fearlessly proclaimed the doctrine, that there is a moral force, more powerful than the will of monarchs, derived from a sublimer source than merely human legislation. To this doctrine, under God, she owes her existence and increase, during the first three centuries, against the tyranny of pagan Rome, and, after Rome had bowed to her sceptre, against imperial usurpation and feudal intrusion, during the Middle Ages. If our Leos, our Innocents, our Gregories, and our Hildebrands are admired for their indomitable courage, it is because they opposed the unjust claims of the heads of empires and of armies. During the struggles of the commonwealths of Italy against the emperors of Germany, the head of the Guelph or national party was the Pope. Alexander the Third, of glorious memory, went to Lombardy in person to unite the principalities and the free cities of the North in the far-famed league against Frederic, and if he did not himself mount horse and lead them to the field of battle, as Julius would have done, he lifted up his hands to heaven and blessed their banners, as the army of patriots passed before him in military array. The city of Alexandria in Piedmont was built by the allies, as a monument of gratitude to the Pontiff after whom it was named, and exists to this day to bear testimony to the memorable event.

Even the ambition of the Borgias, with the sixth Alexander at their head, had for its object to drive all French, Spanish, and German interlopers over the Alps, and to unite all Italy in one compact monarchy under the sway of their house, — a sway that would have been at least home-born and congenial.

If the Church in later times has lent her influence to maintain conservatism in Europe, it has been only because the fanatical advances and the indiscriminate violence of the reformers of Germany, England, and France, and of their philosophical pupils, the Terrorists of the Convention, have rendered such a course wise and necessary for public order. What superstition is to religion, anarchy is to liberty. Now that the

thinking portion of politicians, all over the world, have purified the true gold of liberty from the base alloy of anarchy, the Church claims it again as her own, and as an ornament which only became foreign to her, when its character, by the folly and madness of its pretended friends, was rendered doubtful, and its value uncertain. The Church thus proves that it is never necessary for her security to be behind the wise ameliorations which the changes inevitable in human affairs demand from age to age, and from people to people, and, truly universal, she not only follows with a firm and certain step the march of events, but even directs them powerfully to their true goal, — the social happiness of nations.

What, finally, was the position of Pius in regard to foreign powers? He certainly owed them no debt of gratitude, where-with he may be reproached, now that he has dared to arrange the affairs of his family without seeking their advice or court-ing their approval. Many encroachments had been made by them, which were protested against in vain; and many agree-ments concluded with them by his predecessors, of which they enjoyed all the advantages, and the Popes endured the un-pleasant restraint. *Concordats* had been most prudently and candidly arranged by the nuncios of Rome to the different capitals, with the existing monarchs, or by the Pontiffs at Rome with the representatives of foreign princes; but the result was almost invariably, that, while the Pope was com-pelled to fulfil on his part every iota of the contracts mutually signed, the monarchs, generally speaking, had scarcely sealed the stipulation with their *ultimatum* when they violated its most important clauses.* As a recompense for their want of faith, they graciously extended their patronage to the Pope, their protection to the Holy See, and Austria especially was ever ready to hand over to the Italian police any unfortunate youth who had used the word “freedom” in a sonnet to the *Shade of Dante*, but was always deaf when the Papal nuncio solicited the restoration of a parish priest, suspended, because he did his duty, by a colonel of carabinieri.

Each succeeding act of officiousness and usurpation rendered

* The Pope might have addressed to some of the monarchs who ad-vanced to give him greeting the interrogation of our blessed Saviour, which the Romans, with one of those withering satirical allusions for which they are so famous, addressed to the Emperor of Russia when he went to give *his* kiss of peace to Gregory the Sixteenth: — “*Amice, ad quid venisti?* — Friend, whereto art thou come?” (Matt. xxv. 50.)

the Pope's protectors physically stronger, but increased and strengthened on his side that moral power, which, impelled by Pope Pius as a weighty engine against Austrian influence in Italy, has shattered it, let us hope, for ever. May the prayers of all good Christians hasten on the happy day when that bird of ill omen, the double-headed eagle, will cease to darken, not only Ferrara, but even Milan, with its lugubrious presence!

Our readers will perceive that our object thus far has not been so much to extol those traits of magnanimity and benevolence of our beloved Holy Father which have been so justly and frequently lauded by the press, as to show that the course of which the promulgation of the decree of amnesty was the first irretrievable step was a course rendered advisable by every circumstance of time and place, — a course inspired by the principles of humanity, virtue, and patriotism, — a course which was not merely the advance of one benevolent individual, but of a whole nation, — a course adopted with mature and prudent deliberation.

Should the views proposed have, perchance, the effect of inclining some to think that Giovanni Maria Mastai, taken as a man and a politician, is not after all so wonderful as he is represented to be, that, since he has only obeyed the mandate of the age and nation over which he is called to preside, his foresight and his ability do not appear after all so very surprising, — should they be thought to warrant such a conclusion, then must we say that Pius the Ninth is not a statesman at all, but a hero!! He is a prophet, an apostle sent upon earth by the God of nations. In him, then, must we see personified and individualized the spirit of moral power in this century, as in the last the soul of physical force was embodied in Napoleon Bonaparte. Then let Austria quail beneath his gaze, for Pius is not simply a hero, but a host, — not merely a patriot, but a nation, — not only a holy man, but religion! As it has been said that Ireland was O'Connell, and O'Connell Ireland, so now far more truly may we say Italy is Mastai, and Mastai is Italy! But while we admire the wisdom of the Supreme Ruler in preparing and arranging the materials of such a mighty task as that of rousing a great nation from the slumber of ages, let us not offend that wisdom by forgetting the extraordinary personage whom God has appointed to perform it. In our admirable army, when a general has fallen upon the field of battle, a hitherto unknown officer is sometimes seen to assume the command, and by his coolness and valor to extricate his

warriors from a position of jeopardy and exposure. In like manner did Pius step forth from the ranks, in the moment of difficulty, and with calm and resolute dignity seat himself upon the first of earthly thrones, and by the waving of his hand compose to peace and tranquillity the stormy elements whose incessant turmoil had rendered so difficult the times of his venerable predecessor. Who taught *him* to wear with ease the garments of sovereignty, who, a few days before, had only shown himself an individual adorned with the private virtues of integrity and prudence? Where did *he* learn to walk without discomfort in the brilliant but heavy panoply of a hero, who was but a fit shepherd for a small and remote portion of the Christian fold?

From his quiet and secluded home, he studied the condition of his native country and the wants of his fellow-citizens. He explained to himself the secret causes of division and mistrust, and divined the charm whose virtue was adequate to remove the motives of complaint. It is said, that he had registered the fruits of his long and accurate investigation, in the view of bequeathing, at his death, to the Pontiff who should then fill the chair of St. Peter, a book to serve as a guide towards the most certain and expeditious method of raising Italy to the level of modern improvement. And when called, himself, by the inscrutable dispensations of Providence, to fulfil the sublime duty which he had so much at heart, O, how the spirit of noble generosity and paternal benevolence pervaded the whole system of his government! The decree of amnesty is a beautiful example to show that these qualities are as great in the reigning Pontiff as are his consummate skill and unparalleled wisdom. We must be allowed to recall to the memory of our readers the beginning of that celebrated decree, the wording of which is the first, and a faithful, specimen of Pius the Ninth's diplomacy:—

“PIUS IX., POPE,

“TO HIS MOST FAITHFUL SUBJECTS.

“During the days when our heart was deeply moved by the public rejoicing at our exaltation to the Pontificate, we were unable to repel an emotion of sorrow, upon thinking that not a few families of our subjects were held back from a full participation in the common joy, because, in the deprivation of domestic comfort, they suffered a great portion of the punishment merited by some relative who had done injury to social order and the sacred rights of his legitimate sovereign. In like manner we turned an eye of compassion upon many inexperienced young men, who, although

drawn by fallacious inducements into political turmoil, seemed to us rather the victims than the authors of seduction. From that very time, therefore, it was our intention to extend our hand and offer peace to the children who had gone astray, should they wish to exhibit signs of repentance. The attachment which our good people has shown to us, and the evidence of constant veneration which the Holy See has received in our person, have assured us that we can pardon without danger to the public. Accordingly, we ordain and direct that the opening of our Pontificate be solemnized by the following acts of sovereign grace.

“I. To all our subjects who find themselves at the present moment in a place of correction, on account of political offences, we forgive the remainder of their penalty, provided they solemnly make a written declaration, upon their personal honor, that they will not at any time, or in any place, abuse this concession, but that they will rather endeavour to fulfil every duty of a faithful subject.

“II. Under the same condition, all those subjects who have gone to foreign parts for political motives will be received again into our States,” &c., &c., &c.

These words were a signal for intoning a hymn of thanksgiving by millions of happy men. When the bereaved mother, the daughter, the spouse, the sister, of the captive and the exile read those words, tears of gratitude and joy gushed from their full hearts; and, fervently kissing the document which bore them, they lifted up their eyes and their hands to heaven, praying that God would bless and protect that Father who in the days of his exaltation had thought of the secret grief of their unhappy families. And when the decree of mercy was read to the emaciated prisoner himself, — “What,” he exclaimed, “am I to give promise of submission and just obedience upon no bond but mine *honor*, — I, who would not have been listened to before now as capable of uttering a truth, though accompanied by the most sacred and awful oaths?” — and seizing the pen with which he was to sign the sentence of his own liberation, he wrote, while his hand trembled with emotion, that he would yield up his blood and his soul in defence of the great and good Pius, who rendered his benefits a bond of double force by the winning grace and magnanimous generosity with which he conferred them.

After the promulgation of the decree of amnesty, some time was spent by the Holy Father in maturing his designs of improvement. This circumstance should not be forgotten by those who are tempted to think that he proceeds too rapidly

in his measures of reform. Although day after day he was closeted with the wisest amongst the cardinals, with the Roman princes, and the true friends of the people, still weeks and months rolled by and no radical or general amelioration was announced. An incident was recounted in Rome at the time, which may be mentioned as characteristic of his appropriate and graceful manner of doing even a little thing well. A sheet of gilt-edged paper was found by a prelate, one afternoon, upon the staircase that leads to the Pope's apartments in the Vatican, bearing two Italian verses, the sense of which was, —

“ Mastai, you promised wonders,
Pray what are they to be ? ”

The Holy Father was not in the palace, but when he passed through the antechamber upon his return, the prelate presented the curiosity to him. Having read the verses, he quietly took a pen from a table near at hand, and in his usual happy and easy mood completed the stanza with no unsatisfactory answer, —

“ Mastai, you promised wonders,
Pray what are they to be ? ”
“ *Have patience yet a little while,
And I will let you see !* ”

He has redeemed his promise. By resigning in favor of his people privileges heretofore absorbed by the sovereignty, he has shown that he felt himself in possession of despotic power to its widest and farthest extent, and that he acknowledged a well-educated and religious people to be its most fitting and worthy co-administrator.

The greatest concessions made, up to the present day, have been the liberty of the press, the National Guard, the grant of constitutional privileges. These three great concessions, while they elevate the people to the enjoyment of the blessings they so ardently desired, return back to him who granted them in the character of a certain and unfailing support. For the temperate and judicious regulations of the press have enlisted that great engine of public opinion, and the moral power of which it is the vehicle, in defence of the sovereign's wise and independent measures ; the National Guard, superseding the friendly bugbear of foreign protection by the aggregate of the country's force, is his assurance against annoyance from without and turmoil within ; and the constitutional reform,

including the adequate representation of the provinces, the reorganization of the civil and criminal code, and the remodeling of the administration throughout his dominions, will redeem him from the incessant anxiety and unpleasant sense of responsibility which ever afflict the sovereign of an unhappy country. The people will be employed by the exercise of these powers under the auspices of their sovereign, who, while he renders them quiet and contented, has placed upon them the responsibility hitherto incumbent upon himself, making it their interest to conduct themselves with propriety, and in a certain measure identifying their safety and their happiness with their loyalty.

In the Church, of course, no reorganization is intended, no improvement is needed or expected of Pius the Ninth. But to the minor and every-day details of her intercourse with the civil power, and her well-being in particular times and places, her Chief Pastor will devote himself with a sincerity of zeal, which, while it purifies and encourages those who are within, will edify and attract those who are without. This the Holy Father has expressed to be his greatest and dearest wish. In the very beginning of his administration he is known to have said, — “I wish now to regulate well the little wheels of my state, that I may afterwards do my duty at those great wheels of the Church which the Almighty has appointed me to direct.”

Were it the object of our present remarks, we might here point out the good effects already obtained by Pius the Ninth, in his character of Sovereign Pontiff, amidst his incessant occupations and various cares as monarch. Madrid, London, Jerusalem, to pass over in silence other places which might be mentioned, have borne brilliant testimony to them. The infidel monarch of the East, once so much dreaded, has proffered the right hand of friendship to the old enemy who broke his armaments and scattered his forces at Lepanto and Vienna. May we not hope that the various Christian populations of the East — who wander apart, but not far from the precincts of the true fold — will, ere long, be led by all-powerful grace to bethink themselves of the Father, whose name, in the days of Chrysostom, and Athanasius, of Gregory the Illuminator, and Anthony the Abbot, was emblazoned in letters of gold upon the sacred Diptychs, and breathed with reverence amidst the mysterious rites of the incruent Sacrifice? May we not hope that Pius is the shepherd chosen by the Almighty to gather

these wandering children back into the fold? And, to continue this strain of joyful anticipation, is it too much to hope that the influence of the Pope's humane polity may teach other rulers — though Italy claim them not for her children by their birthright or their faith — that there is a triumph more glorious than that of the leader of victorious armies, — a triumph which extends its conquest over the heart of a people, by permitting it to breathe legitimately the hymn of freedom? It was from the City of the Seven Hills that the Western world learned its veneration for that false military renown which has caused rivers of tears and of blood to flow in many a hapless region. The ideal of a Christian hero now exhibited by the same city to the world cannot be given by the Almighty as an object of sterile admiration. O, may the day be not far distant when the glory of Pius will be emulated in other lands, when the same notes of content which make the cloudless sky and the sunlit plains of Italy look more beautiful will be reëchoed by a thousand happy voices in other regions and in other tongues, — in every land where oppression yet counts one dishonorable shrine, from the blood-stained battlements of Cracow, Prague, and Warsaw, to the plain of Clontarf and the hill of Tara!

Rome — Italy — affords ample reason to hope for so consoling a spectacle. For the influence of the spirit which animates the breast of Pius seems to breathe, under his auspices, through the whole country, whispering to every heart lessons of duty, of religion, of propriety.

When the numerous prisoners of Sant' Angelo in Rome beheld the gates of the castle open before them, as by miracle, and heard their sometime guardians invite them to walk forth wherever it liked them best, what were the first noisy demonstrations of their joy? No obstreperous display of rejoicing was there, but the same hand which broke the fetters of bondage from their limbs adorned their necks with the golden chain of religion. Of their own free will and accord, they assembled in the venerable Basilica of St. Peter *ad Vincula* on the Esquiline Mount, there to kneel in humble repentance before the altar of the Most High, and to partake of the bread of life; not deeming themselves fully delivered while a stain remained upon their conscience, and escaping at the same time from the fetters of oppression and the bondage of crime.

Scarcely had Pius inaugurated the reign of pardon and friendship from the Vatican, when the spirit of dissension

seemed to take an eternal departure from the dominions of St. Peter. No theft, no quarrel, no crime, was heard of throughout the city. If a crowd assembled, and it was breathed that its proceedings would displease the Pope, it spontaneously dispersed, each one retiring quietly to his own home.

Compare these results of paternal benignity with the consequences of the opposite system in the sister kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In the squares of Reggio and Messina the guillotine is erected, in lieu of the arches of peaceful triumph which adorn the thoroughfares of Rome and Bologna ; and in place of the hymn of gratitude which greets the ears of the benevolent Pontiff, the misguided monarch is assailed with the curses of a people driven to misery and guilt by his obstinate and imprudent severity. The name of King Ferdinand, had he imitated the noble example proposed to him, might have been handed down to posterity with the name of Pope Pius ; yet, in all probability, Sicily is a picture of what Latium would have been, but for the wisdom and benignity of its godlike ruler.

To adduce another instance of what the Roman provinces are now, rival townships, which from the days of the Guelphs and Ghibellines had maintained hereditary hostility and kept alive traditional feuds, have sent their people, telling their beads, with their priests at their head, to salute each other as brothers, and to unite in the kiss of peace, from their magistrates down to the humblest artisans.

All seem to have taken for their maxim the beautiful sentence which appeared in large letters upon the Ruspoli palace in the Corso, on the day of Pius's first triumph, the glorious 8th of September, 1846 : —

“ Not one of us will be guilty of
a thought or a deed that might
disturb for an instant the calm
of his paternal heart.”

O, how much this noble, this generous, this religious people are wronged by those who think that they would be capable of abusing the gifts bestowed upon them by the anointed hand of Pius, to the injury of social order, or that God will permit them to succumb in their efforts to reach the goal of national security and happiness ! The work commenced by the Sovereign Pontiff is the work of God, and must and will be crowned with that success so ardently desired by every heart to which the sacred charity of the Gospel is not a stranger.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. — *Christian Ballads*. Revised Edition, with Additional Ballads. Hartford: Pearson. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. 192.
2. — *The Story of Raymond Hill, and other Poems*. By JOHN DENNISON BALDWIN. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. 123.
3. — *Remarks on the Past and its Legacies to American Society*. By J. D. NOURSE. Louisville, Ky.: Morton & Griswold. 1847. 12mo. pp. 223.
4. — *Locke Amsden, or the Schoolmaster*. By the Author of "May Martin," "The Green Mountain Boys," &c. Boston: B. B. Mussey & Co. 1847. 12mo. pp. 231.
5. — *Human Knowledge: a Discourse before the Massachusetts Alpha of the Phi Beta Kappa Society, at Cambridge, August 20th, 1847*. By GEORGE P. MARSH. Boston: Little & Brown. 1847. 8vo. pp. 42.
6. — *The Progress and Prospects of Germany: a Discourse before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Brown University, at Providence, R. I., September 1st, 1847*. By HENRY WHEATON, late Minister of the United States at the Court of Prussia. Boston: Little & Brown. 1847. 8vo. pp. 54.
7. — *Fame and Glory. An Address before the Literary Societies of Amherst College, at their Anniversary, August 11th, 1847*. By CHARLES SUMNER. Boston: Ticknor & Co. 1847. 8vo. pp. 51.
8. — *The Duty of Obedience to the Civil Magistrate. Three Sermons preached in the Chapel of Brown University*. By FRANCIS WAYLAND, President of the University. Boston: Little & Brown. 1847. 8vo. pp. 40.
9. — *The Massachusetts Quarterly Review*. No. I. Vol. I. December, 1847. Boston: Coolidge & Wiley. 8vo. pp. 143.
10. — 1. *The Saints and Servants of God. The Life of St. Philip Neri, Apostle of Rome, and Founder of the Congregation of the Oratory*. 2. *The Lives of St. Thomas of Villanova, Archbishop of Valencia and Augustinian Friar; and of St. Francis Solano, Apostle of Peru, of the Order of St. Francis*. New York: Edward Dunigan. London: Thomas Richardson & Son. 1847. 2 vols. 8vo.
11. — *Oregon Missions and Travels over the Rocky Mountains in 1845-46*. By Father P. J. DE SMET, S. J. New York: Edward Dunigan. 1847. 12mo. pp. 408.
12. — 1. *Instructions on the Commandments and Sacraments. From the Italian of St. Liguori. By a Catholic Clergyman*. Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1847. 32mo. pp. 254. — 2. *Man's only Affair: or Reflections on the Four Last Things to be remembered*. From the French. Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1847. 32mo. pp. 160. — 3. *The Christian sanctified by the Lord's Prayer*. From the French of Father Grou. Boston: Thomas Sweeney. 1845. 16mo. pp. 120.
13. — *The Metropolitan Catholic Almanac, and Laity's Directory, for 1848*. Baltimore: F. Lucas, jr.

* * WE send out here the first number of the second volume of our new series. Our readers, we trust, will find it not quite so heavy as have been some of the preceding numbers. We think, from the promises of assistance we have received, that we may assure our readers that they will have in the Review hereafter a periodical coming nearer to what a Catholic Review in this country should be, than they have heretofore had. Several vexed questions, which it was thought necessary to discuss, and which could not be discussed without grieving some worthy people, probably will not come up again, and we shall, most likely, henceforth be free to carry on the war solely against the errors of the avowed enemies of Catholicity.

Some have complained that the Review adopts a tone unbecoming a recent convert and a layman, but without justice. The editor of this Review is indeed a recent convert and a layman, but he is nobody, and should not be taken into the account, because the question is not what it is or is not becoming in him to say, but what is or is not becoming in a Catholic Quarterly Review, and because it is well known that in religious and theological matters he does not speak from his own head, but under the revision of those who are neither laymen nor converts. Then, again, it is hardly Catholic to look at the editor, rather than at the doctrine he advances. If the doctrine is sound, it must be held, let who will advance it; if it is unsound, its unsoundness is a sufficient reason for not holding it.

We have never expected to be able to please every body, but we are bound to say that our success has been greater than we ever expected. The patronage extended to the Review has been and is encouraging, and demands our warmest thanks, especially to the venerable prelates of the American Church, and to the reverend clergy, whose approbation we court, and against whose approbation we could not succeed, and should be sorry to succeed, if we could. We publish the Review for them and the faithful generally, and to them we commit it without reserve. It is theirs; we are only their servant, to do the bidding of the pastors of the Church, without any reference to our own will or pleasure.

The continued success of the Review will depend entirely on the interest taken in it by the venerable bishops and clergy, who have thus far shown it all the favor that could be asked; we shall do our best to render our labors not unworthy of their approbation hereafter, and, if not to serve, at least not to injure, the cause of our holy religion.